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ABSTRACT
RELATIVE AND ABSOLUTE PRICE EFFICIENCY IN STOCK MARKETS: COULD BEHAVIORAL FINANCE
AND EFFICIENT MARKETS BOTH BE CORRECT?
by
James Ryan Hickey
University of New Hampshire
Prior research on stock prices has found that most variation in stock prices is attributable to variation
in expected returns rather than cash flows. Prices exhibit “excess volatility” and are too persistent to be
explained in terms of cash flows. This finding has contributed to the divergence between the so-called “be-
havioral finance” school of research and advocates of “efficient markets.” I examine whether the relation
between fundamentals and prices is stronger in relative stock prices than absolute stock prices. I also ex-
plore whether the reasons for the excess volatility and persistence problems may be attributable to structural
change.
Chapter 1 reviews the literature on stock prices. The extant research overwhelmingly relies on absolute
stock price data; few researchers even consider relative stock prices. Research in psychology, often cited by
behavioral researchers as reason to think markets are not efficient, provides reasons to suspect that relative
stock prices may more closely reflect fundamentals than absolute prices. In addition, research on disag-
gregated prices suggests that the relationship between relative prices and fundamentals may be clearer inx
the data than between fundamentals and absolute prices. In Chapters 2 and 3, I use time-series techniques,
adapted from widely accepted approaches in previous literature, to examine this question. Chapter 2 uses
short-run tests to examine whether relative prices also exhibit excess volatility. Chapter 3 uses cointegration
techniques to examine the persistence problem; but I also examine whether there is less evidence of struc-
tural change effects on relative prices than absolute prices. I find evidence consistent with relative prices






This chapter examines the literature on stock market efficiency and argues that there is an important open
question about market efficiency that the literature has not yet adequately addressed. I provide evidence
that, while the behavioral finance literature grounds itself on psychological realism, it has overlooked the
implications of the psychology research on relative versus absolute valuations. I argue that this
previously-ignored branch of research may help explain why the question of stock market efficiency
remains unsettled and controversial, and suggest a way forward for future research.
2
1.1 Introduction
The efficient markets hypothesis (EMH) defines a capital market as ‘efficient’ if asset prices fully reflect
all available information about fundamentals (see Fama (1970) and Fama (1965)). If prices fully reflect
information about fundamentals, the prices of the various assets in the market should send accurate signals
to investors about which assets are likely to be “good” investments and which are not. Whether financial
markets actually are efficient, though, remains unsettled: the 2013 Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences was
awarded to Eugene F. Fama, Lars Peter Hansen, and Robert J. Shiller - despite the fact that Fama is a
proponent of efficient markets and Shiller is a proponent of behavioral finance. Fama and Shiller agree that
these two approaches to financial economics are mutually contradictory. Fama writes that “the behavioral
finance literature is largely an attack on market efficiency” (Fama (2014) p. 1477), while Shiller notes that
there is a “split between efficient markets enthusiasts...and those who believe in behavioral finance” (Shiller
(2014) p. 1487).
This chapter provides a review of the current debate on stock market efficiency. I argue that both camps
have missed important evidence already in the economics and psychology literatures, and part of the reason
they have overlooked this evidence is because the standard view of “market efficiency” is too simplistic.
Most economists, I think, would view the question of whether financial markets are efficient as a simple
binary: either they are efficient or they aren’t.
I will argue that there are two different concepts of market efficiency that we should be testing. The
first claims that the $ value of a stock or portfolio of stocks (the “absolute price” of the asset) closely
reflects the underlying fundamentals. I refer to this hypothesis as “absolute price efficiency.” This notion
of efficiency is what all of the extant literature of which I am aware has examined. The second claims that
the ratio of the prices of two different stocks (the relative price of one asset in terms of the other) reflects
the underlying (relative) fundamentals. I refer to this hypothesis as relative price efficiency. This chapter
proceeds as follows:
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First, I provide a motivation for what relative prices teach us about financial markets. I show that if all
individual stocks are priced efficiently in absolute terms, then it follows that they are also priced efficiently in
relative terms. However, the converse is not true. Two stocks or baskets of stocks may be priced inefficiently
in absolute terms but efficiently in relative terms. The distinction is important. The concepts of relative
and absolute price efficiency are closely aligned with the notions of informational and allocative efficiency.
Informational efficiency is obtained when asset prices fully reflect all available information, as mentioned
above; tests of EMH examine whether available information can be used to earn above-average risk-adjusted
returns. Allocative efficiency is a stronger condition: it is obtained when society’s scarce capital is allocated
across companies and investment projects according to their expected returns and riskiness. Some refer
to this as “separating the wheat from the chaff.” An alternative but closely related way to define allocative
efficiency is in terms of Pareto-optimality. The market’s pricing of various assets implies a specific allocation
of available capital; if there does not exist a reallocation of the market’s capital that would make at least one
person better off without harming anyone, prices may be said to be allocatively efficient. In financial markets,
this translates to the statement that risk is optimally shared among market participants.
In general, informational efficiency is a necessary but not sufficient condition for allocative efficiency
- but we will see that most tests of efficiency make an assumption that implies an if-and-only-if relation
between informational and allocative efficiency. If stock markets are relative-price efficient, that would
be evidence of informational efficiency even if absolute prices are not efficient. Moreover, it would also
possible that they are allocatively efficient in a certain specific sense.1.
Second, I will review the debate between EMH and behavioral finance in order to characterize the nature
of the divide. Researchers in both fields primarily examine data on absolute prices. In addition, researchers
often use techniques that allow them to decompose (absolute) returns into a “cash flow” component and
an “expected returns” component. In this context, the expected returns component may be thought of as
a catch-all term for factors unrelated to cash flows; this includes both psychological biases (systematic
1This would signal that the stock market is internally allocatively efficient. I will argue this more explicitly in Section 2
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forecast errors) and time-variation in discount rates.2 Studies of broad market indices generally find that
only a small share of price variation can be traced to movements in cash flows. This is the essence of
the “excess volatility” problem. On this point, at least, the two schools of thought are in agreement. The
divide between behavioral economists and proponents of EMH derives largely from the question of how
to interpret these results. Behavioral economists believe that excess volatility stems from the influence of
psychological factors and momentum trading. According to this view, these factors lead markets to bid prices
away from levels consistent with the fundamental value. EMH proponents argue that the excess volatility
stems primarily from a time-varying discount rate or risk premium. According to this view, stock prices
reflect their fundamental values, but are more volatile than predicted by the canonical model because the
discount rate is more volatile. To reiterate, these conclusions are based on the patterns observed in absolute
price data; few researchers in either camp have given serious thought to examining relative prices. Essentially
no-one has examined whether relative prices exhibit the same excess volatility as absolute prices.
Third, I discuss studies on disaggregated stock prices. Researchers find that variation in firm-level stock
prices is driven largely by cash flows, not expected returns. In other words, disaggregated stock prices do
not exhibit nearly as much excess volatility as do aggregate stock prices. This finding represents a paradox
for both EMH proponents and behavioral economists. It is a paradox for behavioral economists because
these results contradict the predictions of their psychology-based theories. For EMH, the problem is this: if
discount rate variation is really driving prices so strongly, why doesn’t that effect appear in the disaggregated
data? I will argue that the answer here may have to do with the effects of market-wide shocks on absolute
prices. Such “macro” shocks may well be better described as uncertain - in the Knightian sense - rather
than as risky. Certain findings from the research on disaggregated stock prices suggests that the relationship
between cash flows and prices may appear “clearer” - that is, easier to detect - if we examine relative prices
instead of absolute prices. While this dissertation focuses on relative versus absolute price efficiency, a
natural secondary hypothesis that I also explore is whether the symptoms of inefficiency are reduced in
2This is a significant simplification, of course, which will be more fully fleshed out later in this chapter; but that is the basic
intuition of what this technique accomplishes.
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disaggregated data.
Fourth, I review a branch of psychology research that, I argue, has been overlooked, or at least underap-
preciated, by behavioral and EMH economists. Research from psychology is frequently cited by behavioral
economists as support for the view that markets do not do a particularly good job at setting stock prices.
But psychology research finds that people are actually quite accurate at making relative judgments of value,
even in contexts where their “absolute” judgments may be suspect. Whether these findings apply to financial
markets is an open question. However, if they do, one would expect markets to do a better job setting relative
prices than absolute prices. If so, the connection between relative price movements and fundamentals would
be stronger - or “closer” than the connection between absolute prices and fundamentals. From this it would
follow that markets may do a reasonably good job setting prices that provide accurate signals to investors
about which assets are likely to be good investments and which are not. As an example, people might strug-
gle with the question of whether the price of a share of Microsoft stock is at the right level; but they find it
much easier to determine whether Microsoft is under- or over-valued relative to Caterpillar or HP.
Thus, the studies of disaggregated data and the psychology research suggest the same thing: it might
be possible that we will see a stronger connection between relative prices and fundamentals than between
absolute prices and fundamentals. That might be because the connection It would be reasonable to conclude
from such a finding that markets may be more relative price efficient than they are absolute price efficient.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 explores what “relative price efficiency”
and “absolute price efficiency” teach us about markets and how they relate to informational and allocative
efficiency. Section 3 discusses the origins of the EMH-Behavioral divide - specifically, the excess volatility
problem - and the theories that developed to explain this problem. Section 4 explores recent developments in
the EMH literature. I note that research in this area generally focuses on absolute prices. Section 5 discusses
developments in behavioral finance. I note that this research, like the EMH research, focuses on absolute
prices. Section 6 discusses studies that use disaggregated data, and why they suggest a “clearer” relationship.
Section 7 discusses the psychology literature and why it suggests a “closer” relationship. The final section
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concludes.
1.2 What Relative and Absolute Stock Prices Tell Us About Markets
This section first presents a series of propositions showing that absolute and relative price efficiency are
separable (to a degree). If the prices of all stocks equal their fundamental values (defined as the present
discounted value of future cash flows), then the market is allocatively efficient. If this seems like a strong
statement to the reader, it should be noted that it is not a controversial idea in the literature; it is almost taken
for granted. Cochrane (2011) pointed out that his work, which purported to show that all price variation can
be explained by variation in expected returns (not cash flows), was analogous to that of Fama (1970). While
that work dealt explicitly with informational efficiency, Fama made a strong assumption that implies an
equivalence between informational and allocative efficiency (I discuss this at length in Section 2.3, below).
Moreover, Cochrane (2011) bases a number of his arguments on Campbell and Shiller’s (1988) decompo-
sition, which explicitly claimed to be testing “market efficiency” by measuring excess volatility (Cochrane
(2011) 1047 - 1048; see also citations therein).
However, even under a more general assumption than that made by Fama and subsequent researchers,
allocative efficiency ought to imply informational efficiency (see discussions in subsequent sections); a sit-
uation in which the market is allocatively efficient but informationally inefficient would be pathological, if
it were even possible. These propositions allow us to develop an argument that there is a link between the
concepts of absolute and relative price efficiency are connected to the notions of informational and allocative
efficiency. The most important of these arguments shows that if absolute prices are inefficient but relative
prices are efficient (according to empirical criteria), then prices are likely to be informationally efficient and
allocatively efficient across stocks, but prices are not allocatively efficient across asset classes (e.g. stocks
versus bonds).
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1.2.1 Propositions: Relative and Absolute Price Efficiency
Proposition 1: If absolute stock prices are all equal to their fundamental value (thus are individually effi-
cient), then relative prices are efficient; but not the converse.
Proof: Let Pi and Pj be the prices of assets i and j, with i , j. Denote the efficient prices of each asset P ∗i



















Thus, absolute price efficiency for disaggregated prices implies relative price efficiency. However, consider
the converse. Assume that PiPj = (
Pi
Pj








In the above equation Pi , P ∗i unless ω = 1. This demonstrates that it is possible for relative prices to be
efficient even if absolute prices are not.
Proposition 2: If a value-weighted market index is not absolute-price efficient, at least one of the individual
stocks included in the index is not absolute-price efficient.
Proof: Let P be the price of a (value-weighted) index of the stocks of N firms. This is, by definition, a






where I is an indexing constant and ηi is the number of shares of firm i outstanding. Note that, as defined
above, ηiPi is the number of outstanding shares of firm i times the price of one share in firm i; it is therefore
the market capitalization of firm i. Therefore the index value P is the sum of the market capitalizations of
the N firms included in the index. Notice that the weight of any one firm in the value of this index varies
with the firms overall valuation. For instance, if a firm issued a 2-for-1 stock split, but the price of individual
shares simultaneously fell by 50%, the firm’s market valuation would not change: ηi would have doubled
but Pi would have fallen by half, so the firm’s contribution to the value of the index would be constant.
The value of a broad market index, therefore, tracks the level of total market capitalization one-for-one in
percent terms. 3. Obviously the index value and the level of market capitalization are not identically equally
to each other, but the index is just a constant (I) times the total level of market capitalization
∑N
i=1ηiPi . The
definition of the efficient price of an individual stock, P ∗i , necessarily defines the efficient value of the index:






If it were true that for all i, Pi = P ∗i , then P = P
∗. The market index would be at its efficient level. By the law
of contrapositives, then, P , P ∗ implies that there exists at least one i for which Pi , P ∗i . This is precisely the
statement made in Proposition 2. Note that we can only say that at least one individual stock is inefficient.
It is possible that all the individual stocks are absolute-price inefficient, but it is also possible that some of
the individual stocks are absolute price efficient and some are not.
Proposition 3: It is possible that although a market price index is absolute-price inefficient, one or more
relative prices are efficient.
By Proposition 2, an absolute-price inefficient market index implies that at least one individual stock
is absolute-price inefficient; so that Pi = ωP ∗i with ω , 1. Define iIE ≤ N such that Pi is absolute-price
inefficient if and only if i ≤ iIE (In other words, ordering the stocks in the index by whether they are
3As a simple demonstration of the intuition here, suppose that the prices of all stocks in the index increase by 1% over their
initial values Pi . But then P = I ∗
∑
ηi(Pi ∗ 1.01) = I ∗ 1.01
∑
ηiPi = 1.01 ∗ I ∗
∑
ηiPi . The final term in this equation shows that
the index value has increased by 1%; the preceding term shows that market capitalization has increased by 1%.
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individually absolute-price efficient or not, with iIE being the last inefficiently-priced stock). Consider, then,
assets i, j, and k such that i, j ≤ iIE and k > iIE . If Pi = ωP ∗i and Pj = ωP
∗
j (as before, ω , 1) then
Pi
Pj
= ( PiPj )
∗
(see Proposition 1). But PiPk , (
Pi
Pk
)∗. An analogous statement holds if one replaces the i in the previous
sentence with j. It follows that in this case some relative prices are efficient and some are not.
In the special case iIE = N , there is no such k. In the special case in which all prices deviate from their
efficient levels by exactly the same factor ω, then dividing any one price by any other cancels the ω term
from both the numerator and denominator; all relative prices would be efficient. Therefore it is possible (at
least in theory) that absolute prices are in general not efficient, but relative prices are efficient. There may be
good a priori reasons to suspect that deviations from efficiency are generally not all of the same magnitude
for all prices. In that more general case, we would not observe that all relative prices are efficient.
To summarize the important points of these propositions: if individual (disaggregated) prices are effi-
cient, then relative prices are efficient. But it is possible that a market aggregate is absolute-price inefficient
while some or all relative stock prices are efficient.4 This concludes the propositions about the connections
between absolute and relative price efficiency. I now turn to a discussion of what absolute and relative price
efficiency teach us about markets.
1.2.2 Propositions: Implications
The preceding discussion shows that there are four possible states of market efficiency, not two:
1. Absolute prices are generally efficient and relative prices are generally efficient.
2. A market index’s value is absolute-price efficient, but disaggregated prices are generally not absolute-
price efficient and relative prices are generally not efficient.5
3. Absolute prices are generally inefficient but relative prices are generally efficient.
4It is theoretically possible that a market aggregate is efficient even though individual prices and relative prices are not. This
case, however, is somewhat pathological. It is also not consistent with the literature, which finds better evidence for the efficiency
of disaggregated prices than for aggregate prices; see below. I therefore give no further consideration to this case.
5As mentioned, this case is both pathological and hard to reconcile with the existing literature, so is not considered further
here.
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4. Absolute prices are generally inefficient and relative prices are generally inefficient.
Which of these four states the market falls into is in large part an empirical question. But if the reader
is unwilling to abandon the standard efficient/not efficient binary, his appraisal may involve an underlying
value judgment. This binary labeling works fine if we have reason to think that the “true” state is (1) or (4).
In (1), the market is both allocatively and informationally efficient. In state (4), it is neither. States (2) and
(3), however correspond to states in which the market’s allocative efficiency and informational efficiency are
not the same.
Consider first case (2). That state implies that the market index value is allocatively efficient; it sends
an accurate signal about the future prospects of investment in the stock market as a whole. But the stock
market itself is not doing a good job of pricing individual stocks because individual stock prices do not send
accurate signals about their prospects; individual stock prices are not allocatively efficient and may also be
informationally inefficient. Case (3), though, being much more realistic than case (2), is of greater interest.
In that case, the value of the market index is not allocatively efficient - it does not send an accurate signal
about the future cash flows earned from investment in the stock market as a whole. But the market prices
individual stocks in a way that sends accurate signals about the relative prospects of different stocks. This
would mean that the market is externally not allocatively efficient, but the market is internally allocatively
efficient and must therefore be informationally efficient in relative terms (movements in the relative values
of individual stocks reflect changes in the relative prospects of those stocks; thus new relevant information
about any two firms must be incorporated into their respective prices as that information becomes publicly
available, and that information is incorporated into prices in a way that reflects the new information’s “true”
impact on the relative prospects of the two firms). In other words, under this condition, it might be possible
to improve upon the current social allocation of capital by moving some funds into or out of the stock market
as a whole (that is to say, a Pareto-improvement might be possible); but it is not possible to reliably “beat the
market” with a strategy involving shorting one stock and buying another based on any (public) information
about the two firms.
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The above argument demonstrates the reason to test both absolute and relative prices: it turns out that
relative and absolute price efficiency tests can inform us about informational and allocative efficiency in
a way that absolute-price tests alone cannot. The connection is not a simple one-to-one relation; in other
words, it is not the case that ”relative efficiency means informational efficiency and absolute efficiency
means allocative efficiency,” or some such simplistic structure. Rather, Relative prices inform us about
aspects of both allocative and informational efficiency. We can only make a well-informed assessment
about informational and allocative efficiency by knowing something about both absolute and relative prices.
However, thus far I have not provided a formal definition or discussion of informational and allocative
efficiency. Because a better understanding of these concepts will aid us in understanding what relative and
absolute prices have to teach us about markets, I turn to an examination of this issue below.
1.2.3 Informational versus Allocative Efficiency
So far, I have defined what is meant by relative price efficiency as opposed to absolute price efficiency. I
have also provided simple demonstrations of the fact that these concepts are related to each other, but are
logically distinct. But what do these notions have to do with informational and allocative efficiency? As
mentioned, Fama (1970) defined a capital market as efficient if prices fully reflect all available information
about fundamentals. Many tests therefore examine whether it is possible to earn excess returns by using
available information; if so, prices must not fully reflect available information, and one would conclude
that the market is not efficient. This is what is meant by “informational” efficiency. In contrast, “allocative
efficiency may be described as the proposition that the allocation of capital across various assets is Pareto-
efficient; risk is optimally shared. This implies that prices must accurately reflect the present discounted
value of future cash flows - P = P ∗.6 These notions may be expressed mathematically as:
6This is a necessary and sufficient condition because if P , P ∗, a stock’s price does not reflect the future prospects of investment
in it, and the amount of capital allocated to holdings in that stock must be non-optimal; a Pareto-improvement could be obtained
by moving a non-zero amount of capital into or out of that asset depending on whether P < P ∗ or P > P ∗. If P = P ∗, a stock’s price
accurately reflects the future prospects of investment in it and the amount of capital allocated to that investment is optimal.
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φmt = φt (1.6)
and
f m(pt+τ |φmt ) = f (pt+τ |φt) (1.7)
where φt is the set of relevant and available information at time t, φmt is the set of information used by the
market to form its forecasts, f (·) is the “true” joint probability distribution of prices p at time t+τ conditional
on available information, and f m(·) is the market’s assessment of the joint probability distribution at time t+τ
conditional on the market’s information set.7 Since (??) states that the market uses all relevant information
in constructing its forecasts, it corresponds to informational efficiency. Allocative efficiency corresponds
to (??) because that condition states that the probability distribution of future returns used in the market’s
forecast is the same as the “true” probability distribution. This implies perfect knowledge about the process
determining future outcomes - a strong assumption, but one that delivers sharp textable predictions (see
Fama (1976) 134 - 137).
However, notice that in this description of efficiency, Fama (1976) and indeed almost all research on
these topics up to the present day assumes that there exists one objective model or process governing the
evolution of asset prices over time, and that this model is known by participants. This strong assumption
leads us to a sharp conclusion: under these assumptions, if the market is informationally efficient, it must be
allocatively efficient, and vice versa. In other words, Fama’s assumption implies that (??) is true if and only
if (??) is true.
Suppose instead that we abandon the assumption that there is such a knowable, objective model. Then
we have imperfect knowledge about the future. As a result, it would then be possible that the market is
informationally efficient but not allocatively efficient. In other words, the market knows what information
7At this point I am following Fama (1976) and assuming the objective distribution f (·) exists. This is a strong assumption, and
the reader will note that I argue below that we may want to consider relaxing it.
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matters and adjusts its forecasts as new information becomes available, but it does not have perfect knowl-
edge about how to interpret that information. If (hypothetically) a market always incorporated all relevant
information in its forecast, but its forecasts failed to accurately assess P ∗, the market would not do a perfect
job allocating capital to good investment prospects due to imperfect knowledge. It would seem natural to
say that the market is informationally efficient but not allocatively efficient. This might appear in the data as
something akin to market state (3): absolute price inefficiency but relative price efficiency.
It is therefore necessary to design a testing strategy that may allow us to distinguish between informa-
tional and allocative efficiency. In the preceding section, I showed that absolute- and relative-price efficiency
are logically distinct. In addition, however, the use of both absolute- and relative-price data may help us dis-
tinguish between informational and allocative efficiency. For example, in Chapter 2, I employ VAR-based
tests of absolute- and relative-price efficiency. Using a VAR in this way imposes Fama’s (1976) assump-
tion that the price process can be described with a single “true” or “objective” model. The null hypotheses
of these tests are consistent with both informational and allocative efficiency (because Fama’s assumption
means that informational efficiency implies allocative efficiency). If the null hypothesis is not rejected, the
inference is clear: the model appears to be a reasonably good representation, and the market appears to be
both informationally and allocatively efficient. Suppose, though, that the hypothesis is rejected for absolute
prices (as it is in most empirical tests). One interpretation of this result is the obvious one: the model is
fine, but the market is neither allocatively nor informationally efficient. However, it is also possible that
the rejection of the null hypothesis occurred because the VAR is not a good model of the price process. In
other words, the VAR is not a good description of the forecasting strategies used by a diverse set of market
participants with imperfect knowledge about the process. Given their imperfect knowledge, it is likely that
market participants will not rely on a single forecasting strategy, and they will likely find it quite difficult
to make a confident assessment of the “true” fundamental value of an asset. But they might find it easier to
assess the relative value of different assets; this is an idea with support in the psychology literature, and one
to which I will return below.
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However, suppose that one runs a test of market efficiency for both absolute and relative prices, and we
find that the null hypothesis is rejected for absolute prices but not rejected for relative prices.8 This would
suggest that the market is incorporating new information in a way that causes its forecast of P ∗ to deviate
from the actual value of P ∗; but these deviations “wash out,” so to speak, in relative prices. This means
the market’s forecasts (as represented by the VAR) deviate from the “true” fundamental value by the same
factor for all prices. This would support the idea that market participants find it difficult to identify a good
estimate of the efficient price level in absolute terms, but that they find it easier to assess the relative values of
different assets. In other words, the market chooses a forecasting strategy for prices, applies it consistently
across different stocks, and updates those forecasts as new information becomes available. Knowledge is
imperfect, but the imperfection of knowledge is less extreme for relative values than for absolute values.
In this scenario, therefore, the reason for the rejection of absolute price efficiency can be attributed to the
fact that the VAR is not a good description of the markets forecasting strategy. The results would be con-
sistent with the proposition that participants have more difficulty when attempting to estimate the absolute
value of assets i and j individually than when attempting to assess the value of i relative to j; the market’s
difficulty at assessing absolute values appears in the data as deviations in the market’s forecast (away from
f m(P ∗) = P ∗). But market participants do not have as much difficulty assessing relative values, so the mar-








. This would be consistent with informational
efficiency (conditional on the market’s imperfect knowledge about the price process) because it would sug-
gest that the market does update its forecasts as new relevant information becomes available. The market is
not, however, allocatively efficient - absolute prices are not consistent with an optimal allocation of capital
across asset classes. However, because in this scenario relative prices appear to be efficient, the markets
allocation of capital within the stock market is efficient. Thus, if we reject absolute-price efficiency, but
do not reject relative-price efficiency, the data suggests a market that is informationally efficient, internally
allocatively efficient, but externally not allocatively efficient. In other words, the market incorporates all
8This corresponds to the third of the four scenarios mentioned in the previous section.
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relevant information in its forecasts, but does not necessarily do a good job determining how much capital
should be invested in the market as a whole. However, once the amount of capital available for investment in
stocks is decided, the market does a good job allocating that capital across the stocks of various companies.
This is why relative stock prices are important and relevant: they allow us to examine the market’s ability
to distribute a given amount of capital among different assets. Asset prices are supposed to be signals that
help investors separate the wheat from the chaff. Relative price efficiency would mean that market prices
send accurate signals about which assets are likely to generate high cash flows and which are not. But this
is a different question than the one examined by most of the literature. Even papers that analyze firm-level
data do not directly address the market’s internal allocation of funds.9
Therefore, one must distinguish between, respectively, the efficiency of price(s) that measure the level of
market capitalization and the efficiency of price(s) measuring the distribution of that capital among various
assets. The price of a broad market index measures the level of market capitalization but does not, on
its own, imply anything about the distribution of that capital. Relative price efficiency is consistent with
efficient (internal) allocation, but does not, on its own, speak directly to the efficiency of capital allocation
across different types of assets.
I now turn to the sources of the divide between behavioral and EMH and what we can learn from this
literature. We will observe that the origins of this divide stem from analyses of what I have termed absolute
price efficiency.
1.3 The Source of the EMH-Behavioral Divide
1.3.1 Early Evidence of Excess Volatility
This section documents a major reason for the divide between EMH and the behavioral approach. Our
awareness that stock prices do not appear to behave in a manner consistent with EMH appears to have
9Vuolteenaho (2002), for instance, is really examining whether firms’ total market capitalizations are related to their underlying
fundamentals; see below.
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emerged in large part due to a set of studies that used the present value model to uncover evidence of “excess
volatility.” While excess volatility is just one of many “anomalies” that can be identified, it is among the
most troubling anomalies for efficient markets theory (see generally Siegel (2002) for a full discussion of
purported anomalies and the evidence for them). The present value model states that the fundamental value





where ρ is the discount rate and Dt is the dividend paid at time t. The canonical version assumes a constant
discount rate, but that assumption has been relaxed in many studies. Under rational expectations, Pt, the
actual price at time t, should equal the mathematical expectation of P ∗t . I will explore the implications of
this argument below as well as in Chapter 2. 10 Chapter 3 will include a discussion of cointegrated vector
autoregression results that address the validity of the Gordon growth model, and therefore, the present value
model.
Leroy and Porter (1981), Shiller (1981), Campbell and Shiller (1988), and Campbell (1991) all provided
important early evidence that stock prices are too volatile to be explained by future dividend flows. Ac-
cording to LeRoy and Porter, “[T]he bounds on price dispersion implied by the efficient markets model are
dramatically violated empirically...” (p. 571). Shiller (1981) argued that, if Pt = Et(P ∗t ) as mentioned above,
the fundamental value must equal the price plus a forecast error. If so, and again by imposing rational ex-
pectations, the variance of P ∗ must equal the sum of the variances of P and the forecast error.11 Therefore, a
necessary (but not sufficient) condition for market efficiency is:
σ (P ) ≤ σ (P ∗) (1.9)
10There are some models that are special cases of the present value model but are known by other names. A well-known
example is the so-called “Gordon growth model” (see Gordon (1962) and Gordon and Shapiro (1956)).
11There is no covariance term because if the covariance was non-zero, the forecast could be improved; rational expectations
rules this out.
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He then plotted P and P ∗ (detrended) for the S&P Composite Index (left) and for the Dow Jones Indus-
trial Average (right) and got a similarly dramatic result:
Figure 1.1: Shiller (1981) Volatility Test
Plainly, the condition (??) was violated by this data. The actual price appears to be far too volatile for its
movements to be plausibly explained by movements in cash flows, assuming a constant discount rate. This is
the essence of “excess volatility.” Furthermore, Shiller argued that the amount of movement in expected real
interest rates that would be necessary to explain the observed price volatility was implausibly large (pp. 433
- 434). However, among the responses to this was the argument that there are plausible econometric reasons
why this result might be spurious. The problem is that stock prices and dividends are nonstationary. In
order to address the nonstationarity issue, Campbell and Shiller (1988) examined excess volatility in another
way. Using data on the S&P Composite Index, they ran a vector autoregression to generate an estimate of
the market’s forecast of the fundamental value of the dividend-price ratio. They then compared it with the
actual dividend-price ratio observed in the data. If REH is correct, these ought to be quite closely correlated.
However, they found a correlation of only 0.175 - within 1.2 standard deviations of 0. Their findings implied
that one-period returns are about four times as variable as they ought to be given the model (p. 673). That’s
slightly less than the factor of five to thirteen times found by Shiller (1981) (p. 432), but nevertheless this
is a corroboration, not a rejection, of Shiller’s earlier finding. Another important study is Campbell (1991),
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which found that the variance of news about future cash flows can account for only one third to one half
of the variance of unexpected stock returns (p. 176). The data source was CRSP’s value-weighted NYSE
index. Despite differences in the precise variance ratios these studies found, they corroborate each other
qualitatively: stock prices are much too volatile to be explained by cash flow variation. Note also that these
findings emerged from studies that examined absolute price data on several different broad market indices.
None of the studies considered relative prices.
These findings have, if anything, been even further corroborated in more recent years. Shiller (2003)
wrote that “[T]here is still every reason to think that, while markets are not totally crazy, they contain quite
substantial noise, so substantial that it dominates the movements in the aggregate market” (p. 90). Indeed,
evidence has been uncovered that this problem is not unique to equities markets: Giglio and Kelly (2018)
find evidence of excess volatility in a wide variety of financial markets, and they argue that time variation in
discount rates cannot account for this volatility.12
1.3.2 Further Developments: Decomposition Techniques
However, these results were not the end of the excess volatility literature. Subsequent research attempted
to determine what was driving prices, if not cash flows. This led to the development of decomposition
techniques that allow the researcher to quantify the degree of excess volatility. They allow the researcher
to make a well-supported claim about the percentage of price- or return-variation that can be explained by
fundamentals. These approaches vary in their precise formulations, but most appear to rely on essentially
the same underlying idea. For instance, Campbell, Lo, and Mackinlay (1997) show that, if one assumes a
constant discount rate, the price of a stock at time t can be written:
Pt = PDt +Bt (1.10)
12Specifically, they find evidence of excess volatility in markets for sovereign and corporate default risk, commodities, interest
rates, and currencies.
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where PDt is the present discounted value of expected future dividends (the so-called “fundamental value”)
and Bt is a “rational bubble” term: it is the expected discounted value at time t of future price increases.
The presence of Bt is (at least theoretically) consistent with both constant expected returns and rational
expectations. However, the authors argue that empirical and theoretical reasons exist to rule out the bubble
term in practice. (Campbell, Lo, and Mackinlay (1997) 258 - 259). In addition, they explore the insight this
decomposition provides for studying returns and the variance of returns, and consider the consequences of
allowing for a time-varying discount rate (Campbell, Lo, and Mackinlay 260 - 267).
Cochrane (2011) provides two other approaches to this decomposition. Suppose one performs three re-
gressions in which the dependent variables are discounted long-run returns, discounted dividend growth, and
the log dividend-price ratio. The independent variable for each is past values of the log dividend price ratio.
Then the following relation holds:






where k represents the number of periods that the independent variable is lagged behind the dependent
variable. Each of the three bs in the above is the coefficient on the lagged dividend-price ratio drawn from
one of the three regressions. The first is drawn from the regression of discounted returns; the second from
the regression of discounted dividend growth; and the last from the regression of the log dividend-price ratio.
These coefficients can be interpreted as the fraction of dividend yield variation attributable to, respectively,
expected returns, dividend growth, and a rational bubble. However, that decomposition is equivalent to a
variance decomposition. Define the following terms:
dpt: the log dividend-price ratio at time t
ρ: the (assumed constant) discount rate
rt+k: the expected return k periods ahead











Like several of his predecessors, Cochrane drew data from a CRSP value-weighted market index. He
found that “all price-dividend ratio volatility corresponds to variation in expected returns. None corresponds
to variation in expected dividend growth, and none to ‘rational bubbles’ ” (Cochrane (2011) 1050; em-
phasis added). This basic qualitative finding - that all the “action” is in returns, and little or none of it in
fundamentals - also appears across studies of a number of other asset classes: Treasuries, bonds, foreign
exchange, sovereign debt, and housing. Moreover, at least according to Cochrane, his finding is typical and
representative of the larger literature on this topic (Cochrane (2011) 1051 - 52).
While the techniques employed in the research discussed above may appear different on the surface, all
are derived from the present value model. Moreover, these papers use absolute-price data, often the price of
a broad market index. When economists attempted to quantify the extent to which price variation is due to
fundamentals, they decomposed stock prices (or returns, or variances) into two or three parts. Cash flows
(that is, dividends) is always one component; one or both of “expected returns” and a “bubble” term may also
be included depending on the researcher’s precise goal and approach.13 Despite the diversity in techniques,
the core results are not in dispute: stock prices do not appear to be driven primarily by cash flows.
The current divide between behavioral economists and EMH proponents is not, then, over whether div-
idends matter: it is over why they appear to explain such a small proportion of movements in prices (see
the above discussion of Cochrane’s result). Behavioral economists focus on the role of human psychology,
structural factors such as limitations on short-selling, and known behavioral regularities such as momentum
trading. This claim, of course, means that behavioral researchers tend to believe that fundamentals don’t
seem to be important because they aren’t important: markets are not efficient. EMH researchers, however,
believe that the fact that all the “action” is in the expected returns component arises because the primary
13For instance, Campbell and Shiller (1988) used a VAR to compare the actual dividend-price ratio with an estimate of its
fundamental value; they found a correlation between these of less than 0.2, suggesting that cash flows can explain less than a fifth
of price variations.
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force driving asset price movements is time-variation in discount rates or risk premia.
Two points about this argument are worth further discussion. Firstly, in the context of the present value
model, the discount factor ρ is really an amalgamation of both intertemporal preference structures and at-
titudes toward risk. That may sound odd, but it can be demonstrated easily enough. Suppose that market
participants become, on average, less (more) willing to bear risk. Then for any given price, investors would
require a greater (lesser) stream of future dividends to justify buying the stock at that price. But this logic is
easily inverted: if the stream of expected future dividends is held constant, a reduction (increase) in willing-
ness to bear risk would cause the present value of the stock’s future cash flows to the investor - that is, the
stock’s fundamental value as defined by (??) - to fall (rise). If so, the only way the fundamental value could
fall (rise) while holding constant the future dividend stream is for ρ to fall (rise).
Second, why would discount rate variation appear in the data as “expected returns” variation? Recall










An important point is that this decomposition - like others previously mentioned - assumes a constant
discount rate. So if discount rates are actually varying, where would that variation be ‘picked up’ in the
decomposition? The key is that the econometric models used in this context provide estimates of expected
future dividend-price ratios (dpt+k) and expected future dividends (dt+j). Thus terms 2 and 3 - the “cash
flows” term and the “rational bubble” term respectively - could not change. The estimation procedure es-
sentially fixes the value of these terms for given ρ. Therefore, discount rate variation, being ruled out by
assumption, would be attributed by these decompositions to the only “free” variable: rt+j , which represents
expected returns. This is what is meant when we say that EMH proponents believe that excess volatility is
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explained by a time-varying discount rate/risk premium.14
While these techniques corroborated Shiller’s (1981) finding of excess volatility and provided measure-
ments of the extent to which prices are too volatile, they also illuminated a related problem. Excess volatility
is a property of period-to-period price movements; in other words, it is a short-run property of the data. But
the fact that movements in stock prices are mostly attributed to expected returns also suggested a problem
with the long-run properties of the data: the degree of persistence in price movements. The fact that we
observe swings in stock prices in the same direction over long periods of time, and away from estimates of
the fundamental value, is the long-run analogue to the excess volatility problem. It also presents a problem
for the EMH explanation of excess volatility. Since EMH advocates claim that excess volatility reflects a
time-varying risk premium, their model of the risk premium must produce the same degree of persistence
to be an adequate explanation. Models of a time-varying risk premium struggle to match the persistence in
the data to the degree of persistence predicted by their models. I will present a more comprehensive review
of the literature on persistence in Chapter 3, which uses cointegration techniques to examine the long-run
properties of relative prices. The remainder of this Chapter focuses on excess volatility.
In summary, it is widely agreed that absolute stock prices exhibit excess volatility, and that this excess
volatility is largely traceable to variation in “expected returns”. Decomposition techniques have revealed that
movements in stock prices appear to be almost entirely driven by changes in expected returns, not by cash
flows. Naturally, because so much of the action appears to be in expected returns - which may be attributable
to discount rate variation - economists interested in preserving EMH have developed a large body of theories
that attempt to explain discount rate variation. The following section explores what we can still learn from
an examination of the EMH literature.
14Given the above arguments, the terms “discount rate” and “risk premium” end up being used essentially interchangeably for
most of this paper. That choice is at least partially dictated by the literature I am reviewing here.
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1.4 Time-Varying Discount Rates and EMH
This section attempts to provide a brief snapshot of the EMH literature on time-varying discount rates. My
primary purpose here is to provide the reader with evidence for my claim that the EMH literature focuses
on absolute prices. This literature, however, is far too large for a complete exploration here to be feasible.
Therefore, I attempt to select a representative set of papers from this literature. The next subsection will
explain the reasoning by which I have selected the set of papers I discuss; after that, I will document the fact
that those papers generally focus on absolute prices, with a strong tendency to refer to examine broad market
indices rather than disaggregated stock prices.
1.4.1 Selecting a Representative Set of EMH Papers
EMH advocates knew very well that it is not enough to simply assert that expected returns vary because
risk and appetites for risk vary, then go hunting at random for predictive variables; the researcher must
develop a theory of discount rate variation.15 Fortunately, Cochrane (2011) can serve as a guide for this
review: he provided an overview of several classes of theories that have been developed to explain discount
rate variation. He discusses two broad classes of theories and their subfields: (1) investor-based models,
which include macroeconomic models, behavioral theories, and finance theories; and (2) theories of mar-
ket frictions, including segmented markets, intermediated markets, and liquidity-based theories (pp 1065 -
1072).
Cochrane points out that the finance theories actually require the “deeper” macroeconomic theories in
order for them to represent a meaningful explanation of the data (p. 1068). So for our purposes, the finance
theories are subsumed in the macroeconomic theories. The behavioral research rejects EMH, as mentioned
previously. Finally, the theories of market frictions effectively reject EMH. They postulate market structures
that may well prevent the market from operating as efficiently even if investors are ‘fully rational’. A
15In other words, a testable theory of time-varying discount rates must impose restrictions on how discount rates can vary.
Without such restrictions, the central claim would be unfalsifiable: any thinkable state of expected return variation would be
consistent with variation in the underlying preferences of market participants.
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simple example is a model with (binding) limitations on short-selling. In such a market, if an asset became
overpriced, investors aware of the overpricing might not be able to take a desired short position, and the asset
could remain overpriced. This research is, therefore, not what I mean by “behavioral”; so I do not explore
these theories further.16
The point is this: we can avoid explorations of a number of these lines of research without committing
a serious oversight. The relevant research for purposes of this section belong to the subfields identified by
Cochrane as macroeconomic models. Cochrane provided a list of important papers that use macroeconomic
models to explain discount rate variation (p. 1066). In the upcoming subsection, therefore, I discuss the pa-
pers named by Cochrane in his list. Their theoretical contributions are well-known, but insufficient attention
has been given to their almost singular focus on absolute rather than relative prices.
1.4.2 Macroeconomic Theories of the Discount Rate
In this subsection, I will discuss a number of important papers that examine EMH-consistent theories of the
discount rate. The point is primarily to document the kinds of questions the researchers are asking (in other
words, what phenomena specifically are they trying to explain?), and what kinds of data they use to test
their ideas. Some of the research I discuss will mention the “equity premium.” These papers may address
the equity premium puzzle as well as variation in discount rates, but the equity premium puzzle is not the
focus here. I will document a strong tendency for researchers to consider the implications of their theories
for absolute prices, not relative; and their use of absolute stock price data, generally on market-level indices.
Several studies build on canonical intertemporal consumption models, which have the desirable feature
of tying discount-rate variation to macroeconomic data. Cochrane’s examples cover the following theoreti-
cal developments: nonseparability across types of good or over time; habit formation in the utility function;
and recursive preferences over inertemporal consumption lotteries. Studies that serve as examples of these
developments are, respectively, Eichenbaum, Hansen, and Singleton (1988) and Yogo (2006); Campbell and
16I do not mean to disparage this research in any way. My focus here is the EMH-behavioral divide, but these theories do not
squarely belong to either the EMH or behavioral branches; thus, they are not relevant for this paper.
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Cochrane (1999); and Epstein and Zin (1989, 1991), Bansal and Yaron (2004), and Hansen, Heaton, and
Li (2008). For Eichenbaum, Hansen, and Singleton (1988), stock prices are neither part of the data nor a
serious element of their discussion. Asset returns appear only as an independent variable in their estimation
procedure.17. Yogo (2006) uses data on industry-level portfolio returns (constructed in accordance with the
Fama-French (1993) three-factor model) in order to address two major questions about his model’s impli-
cations for expected returns (see Yogo (2006) pp. 547, 555). First, can the model explain the intertemporal
variation in the equity premium?18 Second, can the model explain cross-sectional variation in returns? (This
exploration of cross-sectional variation marks Yogo (2006) as a singular exception within this list of papers).
Campbell and Cochrane (1999) used calibration techniques to simulate data and compared that simulated
data to actual data from the S&P 500 index (p. 235). Their focus was on explaining aggregate stock market
behavior, including return predictability, high volatility, and countercyclical movements in risk premia (pp.
248 - 249).
Epstein and Zin (1989) was a theoretical work. Epstein and Zin (1991) is its empirical counterpart.
Epstein and Zin (1989) showed that their model could generate predictions about the temporal behavior of
consumption and asset returns (Epstein and Zin (1989) 960). In the counterpart, the authors tested their
theory using monthly weighted returns on a value-weighted NYSE index. (Epstein and Zin (1991) 273,
284). Bansal and Yaron (2004) build on the model of Epstein and Zin (1989). They explore whether their
model can explain the equity premium and the volatility of market returns. Their stock market data is value-
weighted market returns from CRSP (Bansal and Yaron (2004) 1490, 1502). Hansen, Heaton, and Li (2008)
also build on the work of Epstein and Zin (1989). Their data comes from a value-weighted market portfolio,
a portfolio of low book-to-market ratio stocks, and a portfolio of high book-to-market ratio stocks (Hansen,
Heaton, and Li (2008) 265 - 266).
Finally, there is a class of models known as “rare disaster” models. Instead of modifying the utility
function, these models modify the hypothesized distribution of returns - essentially by adding a fatter “left
17Indeed, the only mention of stock returns made in this paper is in a brief footnote, see p. 58.
18Note that, given the emphasis on explaining “expected returns,” this really refers to the discount rate.
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tail” to the returns distribution. Cochrane cites Rietz (1988) and Barro (2006). Rietz (1988) used stock
market data based on that of an earlier work, which used an annual average of the S&P Composite Index
(Rietz (1988) 121, 131). Barro (2006) concluded that a rare disaster model can explain numerous asset
pricing puzzles, including the volatility of stock returns. His stock returns data come from total-return
indexes for a number of countries, except that in a few cases he uses a market-price index (Barro (2006) 823,
831 - 834).In more recent years, the rare-disaster framework appears to be growing in popularity. Manela
and Moreira (2017) Wachter (2013), and Gabaix (2012) all argue that rare disaster models help explain the
patterns seen in stock market price fluctuations - and all examine stock market data at the level of some kind
of market aggregate (see Manela and Moreira (2017) 143, 156; Wachter (2013) 1016, 1019; Gabaix (2012)
645 - 646).
The apparent success of these models at accounting for features of stock market data - especially excess
volatility - has been well-documented before now. But the sources and type of data they explain has not been
a major consideration in previous reviews of the literature. Table I, below, summarizes the data types and
sources used in these studies.
Table 1.1: Papers and Data Sources for Macroeconomic Theories of Discount Rates
Paper Data Source/Type
Eichenbaum, Hansen, & Singleton (1988) Aggregates; Asset prices only as Indep. Var.
Yogo (2006) Industry portfolios; cross-sectional returns
Campbell & Cochrane (1999) S&P 500 index
Epstein & Zin (1989) Theoretical
Epstein & Zin (1991) NYSE Index
Bansal & Yaron (2004) CRSP Market-level Returns
Hansen, Heaton, & Li (2008) 3 Broad-based Portfolios
Rietz (1988) S&P Composite Index
Barro (2006) Cross-country market indices
Gabaix (2012) Unspecified market aggregate
Wachter (2013) S&P 500 Index
Manela & Moreira (2017) CRSP market portfolio, Dow Jones Index
There is a strong tendency for researchers to focus on the behavior of stock prices measured by the level
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of a market index - in other words, the absolute price of a broad market aggregate.19 As I argued in Section
1.1, above, this means that these studies say nothing about relative prices. EMH proponents are engaged
in searching for an explanation of apparently anomalous behavior - attempting to ‘rescue’ the proposition
that the absolute prices of stock market indices are efficient. They do this by seeking explanations for the
observed variation in the discount rate. But in seeking to explain the behavior of a relatively narrow class
of asset prices, researchers have spawned a remarkably diverse array of theoretical approaches. Few have
considered alternative ways to explain the anomalous behavior, such as the market attempting to cope with
unanticipated structural change (Knightian uncertainty). Furthermore, few researchers considered alternative
ways of looking at stock market data. They continue to examine the time-series properties of absolute prices,
and almost always those of broad aggregates. While some of this research considers the implications for the
cross-sectional variation in returns (Yogo (2006)), such explorations appear to make up only a small minority
of the extant literature. While cross-sectional variation in returns represents an indirect way to study how
relative stock prices behave, I know of no literature within the milieu of EMH that considers relative stock
prices explicitly.
What about the behavioral finance literature? How did behavioral theories develop? Does this literature
exhibit the same almost singular focus on absolute prices? The next section explores these questions.
1.5 Patterns in the Behavioral Finance Literature
I begin by exploring the central premise of this research and the specific questions behavioral finance re-
searchers have been investigating. Numerous reviews of this literature already exist: a full paper-by-paper
summation here would, therefore, be of minimal use.20 I mean to draw attention in this section to the phe-
nomena that behavioral finance seeks to explain, the evidence that researchers in this field consider, and the
role that research from psychology plays in their research.
19The returns on such an index are, of course, simply the percent change in the absolute price of the index, possibly plus a
dividend yield; thus returns data is in practice measuring the same thing as price data.
20See Shiller (2014), p. 1504, citing 5 different survey studies, the most recent in 2011.
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Shiller’s Irrational Exuberance provides a useful snapshot of the state of behavioral finance through
2005. The most important point is that behavioral finance researchers believe that ”[T]he market is not
well-anchored by fundamentals” (p.147). While arguments in favor of market efficiency are considered,
the data used by Shiller in his arguments against these claims is entirely based on absolute prices, and it is
predominantly market-level data. Moreover, disaggregated data, and related studies, are usually considered
only to the extent that they serve as examples of inefficient pricing (see pp. 181 - 191 generally). Where
mention is made of evidence based on the prices of individual stocks, that evidence appears to be treated
as an afterthought.21 Behavioral finance posits that the explanation for the observed variation in expected
returns is to be found in human psychology. If psychological factors drive expected returns, such factors
are the underlying cause of excess volatility. Thus, behavioral finance necessarily rests on the premise that
markets are inefficient. Researchers in the field rely on absolute-price data, and usually market-level indices
or other aggregates. The literature is primarily engaged in offering an explanation for excess volatility (and
high persistence).
One chapter of Irrational Exuberance is titled ”Psychological Anchors for the Market,” and the contents
of this and later chapters demonstrate that ”the Market” in this context means a measure of the level of the
market as a whole. Behavioral finance researchers claim that the salient features of the market can be ex-
plained with reference to human psychology. Irrational Exuberance cites specific and distinct publications
from psychology on pages 148, 150, 151, 152, 154, 155, 157, and three studies on page 158. The central
thesis of the work is that the absolute price of the market as a whole is not efficient, and that human psychol-
ogy is the explanation. Where studies in psychology are considered, therefore, the focus is naturally placed
on what these studies teach us about the behavior of the market as a whole. They are deployed as suggestive
evidence of market inefficiency (in other words, as explanations for excess volatility). The implications of
these studies on, say, the cross-sectional variation in returns, or even on the disaggregated data (absolute
prices of individual stocks), are barely considered.
21Evidence that the prices of individual stocks appear less excessively volatile than the market is mentioned in just one sentence
out of a 17-page chapter, and its relationship with psychology research is not considered at all (p. 194).
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Lest one wonder whether this is really a representative picture of behavioral finance, consider Shefrin’s A
Behavioral Approach to Asset Pricing. While Irrational Exuberance was written to be comprehensible by the
general public, Shefrin’s book is aimed at an academic audience. It covers a wide range of topics, including
heuristics and representativeness, prospect theory, heterogeneity in risk tolerance and time preferences, and
the role of “sentiment.” Shefrin, like Shiller, emphasizes behavioral explanations of aggregate phenomena.
Shefrin’s central concern in the book is describing and advocating behavioral explanations of the ”stochastic
discount factor” or SDF. “[T]he behavioral SDF decomposes into a fundamental component and a sentiment
component, where the sentiment component captures the aggregate error in the market (p. 3, emphasis
added).
Though Shefrin does not totally restrict his analysis to market-level aggregates, it is clear that for pur-
poses of equity markets, his primary focus is on absolute prices. In a section where he discusses the implica-
tions of allowing for heterogeneous traders that may make systematic errors, he asks: “[M]ight the errors be
self-canceling in the aggregate?” (p. 116, emphasis added). The subsequent sections discuss the necessary
and sufficient conditions for market efficiency, but it is plain from context that he means the efficiency of an
absolute price (see pp. 117 - 122 generally). He might just as easily have asked whether the errors cancel
in relative prices - but that alternative formulation makes no appearance in the section. Later, he shows that
“The expected return of any security Z is the sum of three components” (p. 232). But the section leading
up to this conclusion, and his discussion of its interpretation, focus on the returns on that singular asset Z.
Little mention is made of the implications of the methods he discusses for either cross-sectional variation
in returns or for relative prices. Finally, consider his discussion of prospect theory: he investigates “how
the presence of prospect theory investors affects prices, relative to a market composed entirely of expected
utility maximizing investors, when the market portfolio is risky” (p. 408). Note that this is not a reference to
the relative prices of two assets, but to how inserting prospect-theory investors alters the model’s prediction
of the absolute price of the market portfolio. Despite a long discussion of the implications of prospect theory
for investors buying and selling behaviors, implications for absolute prices are discussed but implications
30
for cross-sectional returns or relative prices are barely considered (see pp. 419 - 428 generally).
Research in behavioral finance through 2005 was, it appears, sharply focused on explaining the perceived
inefficiency of absolute prices. A diverse array of theories from psychology were cited by these researchers
as suggestive reasons why financial markets might be inefficient. Has this pattern changed at all in more
recent years? All the evidence of which I am aware seems to indicate that there has been no major shift.
Shiller (2014) provides a very broad review of research on financial markets, including a review of the
history of behavioral economics (Shiller (2014) pp. 1504 - 1507). No mention of behavioral theories that
explore the cross-sectional variation in returns, or relative stock prices, is made. Consider also just a few
recent publications. Leal (2016) finds that a model with bounded rationality and heterogeneous traders
‘chartists and ‘fundamentalists can help explain excess volatility (p. 1847 1848). The data used in the
paper is predominantly returns on the S&P 500 Index. Chen, Lung & Wang (2013) find that “heterogeneous
beliefs strongly Granger cause excess volatility using quarterly S&P 500 Index data (p. 633). He & Li
(2012) emphasize that a continuous-time, heterogeneous-traders model can replicate some of the stylized
facts observed in stock markets - but again, when they refer to prices they mean the absolute prices of a
market index (see pp. 975, 986).
Researchers in behavioral finance focus predominantly on explaining the perceived inefficiency of abso-
lute prices, and usually they have in mind a singular “market price” measured by an index. In that sense,
behavioral finance is a sort of photo-negative of EMH research: each is engaged in “searching for theories”
- in the EMH case, ideas that reconcile the data with efficient markets; in the behavioral case, theories that
explain why markets are inefficient. Both camps focus largely on absolute price data, and generally look
at a broad market aggregate instead of lots of disaggregated prices. The findings from psychology cited by
behavioral economists naturally belong to families of psychology research that speak to the data they are
concerned with, and which provide justification for their premise that markets are, indeed, inefficient. It
should not be surprising that they have not generally considered whether there might be strands of psychol-
ogy research that might suggest a different view.
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Nothing in either this section or the previous should be construed as suggesting that there is no liter-
ature that studies the cross-sectional variation in returns. Indeed, there is a rich literature that studies the
empirical properties of this cross-section - but these analyses are largely based on the CAPM and related
multi-factor analysis, often involving the so-called “Fama-French portfolios” and estimates of market alphas
and betas (see Cochrane (2011) pp. 1057 - 1064). That research belongs to the category of “finance” the-
ories mentioned previously, which require a deeper economic theory to be well-grounded. This research,
broadly speaking, provides evidence that prices are related to fundamentals and risk, and that the direction-
of-change of prices with respect to fundamentals and risk is generally as we would expect under the present
value model. But these papers do not provide direct evidence that these relations are quantitatively consis-
tent with the present value model. As such they cannot be regarded as offering a sound explanation for the
observed problems of excess volatility and persistence.
Thus, within the mainstream of both EMH and behavioral literature, there remain two important but
under-explored questions. Is there any research using disaggregated data that directly speaks to the validity
of the present value model?22. Might there be reasons from psychology that financial markets might perform
certain tasks rather well? The answer to the first question is that few such studies exist - but their findings
represent a puzzle for both EMH and behavioral researchers, because they provide evidence that the rela-
tionship between fundamentals and prices is clearer in the disaggregated data than in studies of market-level
indexes. To the second question, the answer is a resounding yes - and that furthermore, other research areas
within economics are already aware of it. The next sections explore these issues.
1.6 Studies of Disaggregated Data
Some of the leading researchers cited previously have noticed the dearth of research that both speaks to the
validity of the present value model and uses disaggregated data or the cross-section of returns. Cochrane
(2011) cited just two papers, Vuolteenaho (2002) and Cohen, Polk, and Vuolteenaho (2003), calling them “a
22This, of course, excludes the aforementioned Fama-French multi-factor models, for reasons previously mentioned
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start, with too few followers” (p. 1064). Shiller (2014) also noticed this remarkable void in the literature.
He also cited exactly two papers that directly address the question: Vuolteenaho (2002) and Jung and Shiller
(2006).
The review of this literature, therefore, must necessarily be brief. Jung and Shiller (2006) found that
with continuous CRSP data from 1926, firm-level dividend price ratios were significantly related to future
dividend growth rates. Cohen, Polk, and Vuolteenaho (2003) found that 75 to 80 percent of the dispersion
in book-to-market ratios is due to dispersion in expected profitability, and only 20 to 25 percent due to
dispersion in expected returns. Vuolteenaho (2002) found that firm-level returns are mostly driven by cash-
flow news. These papers also found evidence that expected returns news is highly correlated across stocks,
but cash flow news is not. To this short list we might append the closely-related work of Yogo (2006),
previously mentioned; and Cohen, Polk, and Vuolteenaho (2009). The latter is the only additional paper of
which I am aware that uses cross-sectional returns data to examine the present value model. The evidence
they present is consistent with the present value model (p. 2778). Moreover, this is the only paper of which I
am aware that says anything explicitly about relative stock prices. The authors find that the relative prices of
stocks are consistent with their betas (p. 2739).23. What these papers suggest is that the relationship between
prices and fundamentals may be seen more clearly in the disaggregated data. The data sets I use in Chapters
2 and 3 are more aggregated than individual stock prices, but are not market-level indices. The subsequent
chapters primarily test relative price efficiency, but I will also be able to see whether this disaggregation
effect can be seen in sector-level aggregates.
If there is more recent work in this area, I have not found it. Nevertheless, this small area of the literature
should not be discounted - in fact, it is key, because it presents a paradox for both EMH and behavioral fi-
nance. For EMH researchers, it poses the question: if expected returns (equivalently, discount rates) strongly
drive aggregate prices, why do they appear to play a much smaller role at the level of individual stock prices?
Conversely, why do fundamentals (cash flows) appear to be the major driver of firm-level prices, but not
23Of course, the previously mentioned caveat about studies of market betas applies here as well
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market-level aggregates? For behavioral researchers, the paradox is this: why, if psychological biases drive
aggregate prices, do they appear to be of so little importance for firm-level prices?
These findings provide a clue about why we might want to examine relative prices: the relationship be-
tween prices and fundamentals may be easier to see in the data. The high cross-asset correlation of expected
returns news suggests that aggregate prices may be driven largely by market-wide “macro” shocks. Such
market-wide shocks are likely to be related to events such as domestic policy shifts, major economic events,
and the development of new technologies. Such overarching societal changes are likely to be uncertain in the
Knightian sense: they cannot be fully described in advance by either market participants or by economists.
In other words, unanticipated structural change has strong effects at the market level.24 Taking relative prices
may have the effect of canceling out those shocks. In other words, the relationship between cash flows and
prices may be clearer when we examine relative prices.
1.6.1 A Clearer Relationship
Even if we assume that the underlying relationship between prices and fundamentals is the same for absolute
and for relative prices, we might still expect to see this relationship more clearly in the relative-price data
than the absolute price data. The reason for this is the effect of uncertain “macro” shocks on absolute prices.
For any two assets i and j, something that moves both Pi and Pj by the same percentage has no effect on the
relative price. Therefore, we might expect that an underlying macro trend or shock will have little or no effect
on relative prices. That is not to say that ‘macro’ shocks such as monetary policy changes, credit constraints,
or news about expected returns could not affect different assets in different ways. The difference between the
effect of such a shock on one asset versus another would obviously affect relative prices; nevertheless, the
underlying common trend would affect a broad market index, but not relative prices. Would that “common
trend” be connected to expected returns or cash flows?
Vuolteenaho (2002) and Cohen, Polk, and Vuolteenaho (2003) both found evidence suggesting that dis-
24Note that “unanticipated” here does not reflect irrationality because changes that are uncertain in the Knightian sense cannot
be anticipated even by fully rational market participants.
34
aggregated (firm-level) prices are driven largely by cash-flow news, but that such cash-flow news is weakly
correlated across different stocks. However, expected-returns news is strongly correlated across stocks; thus,
a broad market index could appear to be driven largely by expected returns, while disaggregated stock prices
would not. This story would be consistent with the idea that macro shocks largely drive changes in expected
returns, but because expected returns are strongly correlated across stocks, there would be little effect on
relative prices.
A brief example will serve to clarify my meaning. Let P be the price of a market index. Suppose a
macroeconomic shock occurs that changes the price of all stocks by a percentage of µ, on average. The
shock, however, changes the price of asset i by µ+µi and that of asset j by µ+µj . µ is the ‘common’ shock,
while µi and µj are the “idiosyncratic” effects of the shock on i and j respectively. Note that these may be
thought of as one-time shocks or as underlying trends that last for some time. One may use the well-known
approximation (for reasonably small µ) that:
ln(X(1 +µ)) ≈ ln(X) +µ (1.13)
By (??), the change in the log-price of the market index will correspond to the common shock, while the
change in the log-price of specific assets will reflect both the common shock and the idiosyncratic effect of
the shock:
∆ln(P ) = µ (1.14)
∆ln(Pi) = µ+µi (1.15)
The log relative price, however, behaves quite differently:
ln(Pi(1 +µ+µi)/Pj(1 +µ+µj)) = ln(Pi(1 +µ+µi))− ln(Pj(1 +µ+µj)) (1.16)35
But by (??), this is approximately equal to:
ln(Pi) +µ+µi − (ln(Pj) +µ+µj) = ln(Pi/Pj) + (µi −µj) (1.17)
The change in the log relative price will be µi −µj - the idiosyncratic effects matter, but the common
trend does not. If µ reflects a change in growth trends due to a policy shift or a major economic event, this
demonstrates that such shocks - which the mainstream literature chalks up to variation in expected returns -
will have greatly reduced effects on relative prices. In addition, it is clear from (??) that disaggregated price
movements will reflect both the idiosyncratic effects and the common shock.
The mainstream literature showed that a large proportion of variation in P is due to variation in expected
returns, but the literature on disaggregated prices finds a larger role for cash flows. Thus one may roughly
interpret µ as an expected returns effect and mui as a cash-flow effect. If, as I have argued, these shocks
reflect unanticipated structural change - that is, the market coping with Knightian uncertainty - we would
expect to see a somewhat reduced role for “expected returns” in the disaggregated data and a more sharply
reduced role for expected returns in relative prices. Moreover, if µ is not a one-time shock but a persistent
trend, this would also suggest higher persistence for aggregates and disaggregated absolute prices than for
relative prices (a question that will be addressed further in Chapter 3).
In addition, this implies that relative prices may have a practical advantage (from the perspective of
the econometrician) over absolute prices: the more it is the case that movements in absolute prices are
tied to uncertain macroeconomic events, the more the role of fundamentals in absolute price data may be
’obscured’ to some extent by those shocks. That is not true of relative prices: the econometrician may be
able to identify a clearer role for fundamentals in relative prices because they ‘cancel out’ the effects of
unanticipated structural change - effectively, canceling out the effect of changes in expected returns.
Nevertheless, this is not really an explanation of why prices move as they do. We need a theory of how
people determine the values of various assets. Behavioral finance taught us that we might learn much about
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the performance of financial markets by considering the evidence from psychology. But researchers in that
field read the psychology literature as providing suggestive evidence that markets ought to be inefficient.
Could the psychology literature provide an answer to the paradox presented by the disaggregated data? In
the following section, I will argue that it does.
1.7 The Psychology of Relative Valuations
There is a significant area of research in psychology that suggests that individuals are better at making
relative judgments or valuations than they are at making absolute valuations. Is this finding true for asset
prices as well? Does it apply to stock valuation? These are open questions, which have not yet been explored
directly. I now turn to a review of this research.
Weber (2004) provides a helpful overview. A common finding seems to be that “people find it easier
to make relative comparisons rather than provide absolute judgments” (p. 164). In particular, risky choices
are better described and predicted by models that use relative risk measures such as coefficient of variation
than by models that use an absolute measure of risk like variance or standard deviation. Dyer and Jia (1997)
showed that a relative risk-value model “can explain many decision paradoxes” while retaining some of the
desirable properties of classical expected-utility theory (p. 182). Indeed, their measure of relative risk is
closely related to the coefficient of variation (p. 172 - 173). Brenner, Griffin, and Koehler (2012) studied
decision processes in an experimental asset market. One of their findings was that the study participants
could “encode differences in base rate of success” but struggled to reliably understand the validity of other
‘cues’ in the context of “overall judgments or in trial by trial pricing or probability” (p. 177). Participants
in the experiment were able to make reasonably good judgments relative to a reliable benchmark, but were
less able to arrive at an absolute forecast when lacking a benchmark. In other words, the subjects’ forecasts
appeared to be “closer” to an accurate value when they were made in relative terms than when made in
absolute terms (in isolation).
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Chapman and Johnson (1999) studied the psychological phenomenon known as “anchoring”. They pre-
sented evidence that humans make evaluations relative to a benchmark - even when no obvious benchmark
is presented.25 This behavior is closely related to the work of Kahneman and Tversky on prospect theory
(Of course, behavioral economists have worked extensively with prospect theory. Just as with the other
psychological research they cite, though, they have apparently not considered its implications for relative
prices).26 Matthew and Stewart (2009) noted that anchoring and ‘sequential effects,’ a class of phenomena
closely related to anchoring, are considered fairly robust findings in the psychophysics literature as applied
to human reaction to simple stimuli, such as sound. They provided evidence that these decision-related be-
haviors seem to be similarly present in human reactions to prices. Hsee (1996), Hsee and Leclerc (1998) and
Hsee et al (1999) contribute to and review a body of research suggesting that people evaluate options differ-
ently, and exhibit preference reversals, when making comparisons between options (which they call “joint
evaluation”) as opposed to separate evaluations. Hsee et al (1999) suggest an explanation, which is that this
occurs because the values of some attributes may be difficult to evaluate in isolation, and these attributes will
gain greater weight in joint evaluations than in separate evaluations. Joint evaluations, therefore, will often
be better, because an evaluation of trade-offs between options becomes more strongly emphasized. In other
words, people find it easier to make joint evaluations because they are better able to make a judgments of the
relative values of the two options under consideration.
Other subfields within economics seem to be aware of this aspect of human decision making. Consider,
first, a strand of the environmental valuation literature. Researchers in this area frequently attempt to estimate
people’s willingness to pay for environmental goods and services. Several data-gathering methodologies
exist, but what is of interest here is the ongoing discussion in that literature about the usefulness of the
contingent valuation method (CVM) versus a well-known alternative, choice experiments (CE). CVM asks
people directly what they are willing to pay for a product, while CE asks participants to choose from among
25While much of their research was devoted to understanding the sources of anchoring and how to addresses biases that follow
from anchoring, they also found that decision-makers make adjustments along a scale from the anchor to the final answer. The
anchoring phenomenon arises as an inherent part of human decision making, and judgments are made relative to that anchor.
26See e.g. Kahneman and Tversky (1979).
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a set of alternatives. CVM, then, asks for an ‘absolute’ valuation while CE asks for a ‘relative’ valuation.
CVM appears to have fallen out of favor with at least some researchers in this literature. Researchers
have documented serious problems with CVM-based estimates of the value of non-market goods, while
also documenting reasons to be more optimistic about choice experiments. Hausman (2012) documents a
number of empirical problems with CVM, problems which have persisted despite decades of research, and
which he characterizes as more or less insoluble. The problems he discusses upward response bias, large
differences between willingness to pay and willingness to accept, and the embedding and scope problems are
all problems inherent to asking survey respondents to state a dollar-based valuation (an “absolute price”). Jin,
Wang, and Ran (2006) note widespread skepticism regarding CVM, “especially in situations where multiple
options and several attributes are being considered.” However, they also note that choice experiments have
obtained more reliable results (p. 431). Hanley et al (1998) note several advantages of CE over CVM.
CE is more amenable to ‘benefit transfers,’ a vitally important policy tool in the environmental context,
and CE is better able to determine the marginal value of specific characteristics of the options presented
to study participants. Diamond and Hausman (1994) state that CVM is “deeply flawed;” the questions
asked in a CVM survey are “hard to answer” and the responses are “suspect” (p. 62). Moreover, they did
not believe changes in survey methodologies stood much chance of adequately addressing this problem.
Finally, consider the result obtained by Luisetti, Bateman, and Turner (2011): “We reject a null hypothesis
of no range bias, suggesting that respondents may perceive attribute levels in a relative rather than absolute
sense” (p. 284, emphasis added). Several of these papers note that an important part of the problems that
occur in CVM is the information pool available to the survey respondent. This evidence is consistent with
the aforementioned findings from psychology: people have an easier time, and are more accurate at, making
relative valuations than absolute valuations. However, the environmental valuation field is not alone in this
finding. There is also a body of marketing research consistent with these findings.
For instance, Posavac et al (2004) examined the ‘brand positivity effect,’ an empirical regularity in which
consumers judge a singular brand under consideration more favorably than is warranted. They found, how-
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ever, that this effect emerges to a significant degree from ‘selective processing,’ and it is therefore diminished
when consumers are engaged in comparative evaluations as opposed to singular. Posavac et al (2005) found
that the brand positivity effect is reduced when consumers are encouraged to consider alternative brands or
when they already have knowledge about the category of goods to which the brands belong. Kamen and
Toman (1970) studied consumer reactions to changes in the price of gasoline and found that “satisfaction
or dissatisfaction is a function of the algebraic difference between what is experienced and what had been
expected” (p. 35). In other words, even in a context where consumers were apparently making choices based
on an ‘absolute’ price, they made this choice in relative terms, based on a mental benchmark.
All of this evidence suggests that a basic fact about human psychology has been underappreciated by
most behavioral economists: humans are much better at making relative valuations than absolute valuations.
This suggests that, in the context of financial markets, it would not be surprising if we found that relative
prices behave “more” efficiently than absolute prices. If this intuition is correct, the relationship between
cash flows and relative prices would be “closer” than the relationship between cash flows and absolute prices.
Notice that the studies of disaggregated stock market data and the research from psychology (as well as
related research from certain areas of business and economics) would seem to have similar implications for
patterns we should expect to see in stock price data, but for different reasons. The disaggregated data studies
suggest that the relationship between cash flows and prices will be “clearer” in relative prices than absolute;
and the psychology literature suggests that there might be a “closer” relationship between relative prices and
cash flows than between absolute prices and cash flows. Both, therefore, suggest that we might expect to see
greater evidence of relative price efficiency than absolute price efficiency. Perhaps these lines of research
are trying to tell us that the market may do a better job discriminating between stocks with good prospects
and stocks with dubious prospects - “separating the wheat from the chaff” - than it does at setting the level
of market capitalization in absolute dollar terms.
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1.8 Concluding Remarks
What did we learn from this review? A look at several different bodies of literature provides evidence of a
major gap in the literature on stock market efficiency. EMH proponents and behavioral economists alike have
largely ignored the implications of their ideas for relative stock prices. Much of the statistical evidence cited
by both sides uses time-series data on broad market aggregates. While some literature exists that examines
cross-sectional price or returns data, describing this branch of the literature as “underdeveloped” would be,
if anything, an understatement. Even this small literature looks at the properties of the cross-section. That
provides suggestive, but indirect, evidence of relative price efficiency. A more rigorous and direct test of
relative price efficiency would look at the time-series properties of relative prices themselves.
Moreover, literature from psychology, corroborated by evidence from some subfields of economics, tells
us that it should not be too surprising if we found better evidence for relative price efficiency than for abso-
lute price efficiency. EMH proponents and behavioral economists alike focused their research on explaining
the puzzling properties of broad market indices - hence the proliferation, on both sides, of theoretical expla-
nations for the small role for cash flows observed in the data. Their explanations were, so both sides thought,
mutually inconsistent. EMH researchers looked for ways to demonstrate that there were no systematic errors
- that there was no reason to think markets wouldn’t work well. Behavioral economists paid a great deal of
attention to research from psychology, but they used it to justify claims that the market was inefficient. In
their focus on justifying their interpretation of the data, they appear to have missed several hints in that liter-
ature that financial markets may actually do a good job in at least one sense - separating the wheat from the
chaff. The disaggregated data suggests (indirectly) that the strong role of expected returns may be a result of
the market coping with Knightian uncertainty. Where do we go from here?
The gap in the finance literature, plus the hints we see in psychology and in other fields within economics,
suggests fertile ground for future research. It also suggests that behavioral economics and EMH may not
be quite as incompatible as the leaders of these camps seem to think: psychology research, so often cited
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by behavioral economists, actually might give us reason to think markets may be relative-price efficient
even if they might not be absolute-price efficient. We have rich knowledge about the time-series properties
of absolute prices; we have good data about the cross-section. What is missing from the literature is an
examination of the time-series properties of relative stock prices. We should ask: do relative prices move as
we’d expect them to, given a simple model such as the present value model? Do cash flows drive movements
in relative prices? Does structural change play a reduced role in movements in relative prices, as we might
expect from the prior literature?
Chapter 2, which focuses on the short-run properties of relative prices, will primarily address the first
and second of these questions, but it will also provide some suggestive evidence about the role of structural
change. Chapter 3 will examine the long-run properties of relative prices, specifically the matter of persis-
tence, as well as more formally examining the role of structural change. Such examinations, and hopefully
future research along these lines, will help economists build a richer understanding of how financial markets
work: what they appear to do well, what they appear not to do well, and how human psychology contributes
to the market’s ability to adequately perform its basic social tasks.
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Chapter 2
Short-Run Tests of Relative Price Efficiency in
Stock Markets
ABSTRACT
This paper contributes to the literature examining stock market ‘efficiency’. I provide evidence that the
connection between stock prices and fundamentals, as implied by the present value model, can be more
clearly seen in relative prices rather than absolute prices. I also discuss several reasons why relative prices




The key question in this thesis is whether the evidence for stock market efficiency is stronger on the basis
of relative prices - for example, the price of IBM shares relative to the price of P&G shares - than absolute
prices - the price of IBM or P&G shares separately (or alternatively, the value of a market index such as the
S&P 500). The empirical evidence that underpins the debate between proponents of the efficient markets
hypothesis (EMH) and behavioral finance is based entirely on absolute prices. This study is, to the best of
my knowledge, the first to investigate market efficiency on the basis of relative prices. In Chapter 1, I argued
that the behavior of relative prices may provide greater insight into whether stock markets perform well their
role of determining which companies are the most deserving of societys scarce financial capital.
I use the canonical present value model to examine the efficiency of stock markets. According to the
present value model, stock prices should equal the market’s forecast of the present discounted value of all
future cash flows (i.e., dividends). The seminal work of Shiller (1981) and Campbell and Shiller (1988a,b),
and much subsequent research, finds that market indexes of absolute prices (such as the S&P 500 price index
or the Dow Jones Industrial Index) are much too volatile and too persistent to be rationalized on the basis of
future cash flows alone. Proponents of behavioral finance interpret these findings as evidence that markets
are not efficient. They argue that market participants are less than fully rational and prone to momentum
trading and price bubbles. According to this view, stock markets often do a poor job in setting prices. By
contrast, proponents of the efficient markets hypothesis (EMH) argue that these findings are the result of
a time-varying and persistent risk premium. If so, stock markets would be efficient and would set prices
correctly on average. The problem for the EMH view, however, is that standard risk premium models are
unable to account for the excess volatility and persistence.
In this chapter, I examine market efficiency using Shiller and Campbells short-run volatility tests. In the
next chapter, I focus on the longer-run properties of the data using the cointegrated VAR framework.
The analysis in both chapters follows a similar structure. I first look for a connection between stock prices
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and dividends using absolute prices and dividends. I then examine this connection using relative prices and
relative dividends. I refer to these connections as absolute- and relative-price efficiency, respectively.
In chapter 1, I reviewed two strands of research that are suggestive that the evidence for relative-price
efficiency may be stronger. One strand comes from Psychology. Researchers have uncovered considerable
evidence that individuals are better at assessing the value of say an orange relative to an apple, than the
absolute values of an orange and an apple separately.1 This central finding suggests that stock markets may
do a better job at setting relative than absolute prices. I refer to this as proposition as the idea that the con-
nection is “closer” for relative prices. The other strand of research examines the behavior of disaggregated
stock prices. This research finds stronger evidence of a connection between fundamentals and prices using
disaggregated data rather than market-level price indexes. 2 I showed that this finding can be viewed as
indirect evidence that the connection to cash flows may be “clearer” (easier to see) with relative rather than
absolute prices.
In order to establish a baseline for my empirical analysis, I assume a constant discount rate and thus, a
constant risk premium. Financial economists have shown that the constant-discount-rate model is unable to
account for market fluctuations on the basis of absolute prices. The question I pose in this thesis is whether
the constant-discount-rate model can do a better job explaining fluctuations in relative prices.
In this chapter, I adapt Shillers (1981) ex post dividend volatility test and Campbell and Shillers (1988a)
VAR-based volatility test to the case of relative prices. It would be interesting to examine relative prices
for all individual pairs of stocks. But for J stocks, there are J(J − 1)/2 distinct (no reciprocals) individual
price pairs. This number grows rapidly with the number of individual stocks. For instance, using all the
stocks that compose the S&P 500 would result in approximately 125,000 relative prices. In order to obtain
a manageable number of relative prices, I categorize the U.S. stock market into 10 sectors. This gives 45
distinct relative prices.
To preview my results, Shillers (1981) volatility test produces results that are much more consistent
1See Weber (2004), Matthews and Stewart (2009), Chapman and Johnson (2009) and other references in chapter 1.
2See Vuolteenaho (2002), Cohen et al (2003), and Jung and Shiller (2006).
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with the present value model when relative prices are used rather than absolute prices. The VAR-based test
also shows evidence more favorable to the present value model with relative prices than absolute prices.
However, in a number of cases we can reject the hypothesis that the data matches the VAR’s prediction of
the fundamental value even for relative prices. One plausible interpretation of this result is that it is evidence
against market efficiency. However, it is also possible that this result is a reflection of structural change. In
the presence of structural change, the VAR will have difficulty estimating the fundamental value. A fuller,
more formal examination of the role of structural change follows in Chapter 3, but the VAR provides enough
evidence to at least explore the possibility herein.
To do this, I examine whether the VAR rejections are in any way related to the sectors. I find that the
number of rejections appears unusually large for the Hi-Tech sector, but is apparently random for all other
sectors. I argue that this finding may be evidence of problems with VAR estimates of the fundamental value
of the High-Tech sector.
Overall, my findings are consistent with the proposition that the connection between prices and funda-
mentals is clearer in relative prices than in absolute prices. The results provide us with reasons to suspect that
the market, like individuals, does better at determining relative rather than absolute values. This is consistent
with the suggestive evidence from the psychology and disaggregated data literatures.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 adapts Shillers (1981) and Campbell and
Shillers (1988a) volatility tests to the case of relative prices. Section 3 discusses the data. Sections 4 and 5
present results for absolute and relative prices, respectively. In section 6, I analyze what we learn from the
empirical results. Section 7 concludes the chapter.
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2.2 Tests of Absolute- and Relative-Price Efficiency
2.2.1 The Variance Test
My analysis relies on several tests. The first comes from Shiller (1981), which relies on the canonical PV
model to characterize market efficiency. According to the present value model, the price of a stock or basket
of stocks Pt is the mathematical expectation, conditional on all currently available information, of the present





where ρ is the discount rate and Dt is the dividend paid at time t. Shiller (1981) calls P ∗t the ex post rational
price. His key insight was to recognize that under the rational expectations hypothesis (REH), Pt is the
optimal forecast of P ∗t . It follows that P
∗
t can be written as Pt plus a forecast error:
P ∗t = Pt + εt (2.2)
where the forecast error εt has zero mean and is uncorrelated with available information. Therefore, the
forecast error must be uncorrelated with the forecast itself. If this correlation were non-zero, the forecast
itself could be improved. It follows that the variance of the actual price should be less than the variance of
the ex post rational price (see Shiller (1981) 422):
σ (P ) ≤ σ (P ∗). (2.3)
It is straightforward to show that an analogous argument holds for relative prices as well. Let P i and P j
be the prices of two different assets (dropping time subscripts). According to REH plus the present value
model, each of these must equal the mathematical expectation of the present discounted value of all future
dividends:
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where E is the expectation conditional on available information; Dividing (??) by (??), we obtain the relative







One might note that the expectation operator has come “outside” the fraction. While the assumption that
different prices are independent and identically distributed would make this mathematically true, we need
not make such an assumption to justify this. In this case, (??) must be correct because if it were not, at least





, that would imply that investors would expect that they could, on average, increase the
present value of their future cash flows by selling (buying) asset j and buying (selling) asset i. This would
drive the price of asset i up (down) relative to asset j, and PiPj would approach Et[
P ∗i
P ∗j
]. This By REH, PiPj must











where ε′t has zero mean and is uncorrelated with available information. This implies the first of several








However, there are several implementation issues that need to be addressed in order to make this into a
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workable test. I describe the procedures I follow to implement these tests below.
2.2.2 Implementation of the Variance Test
First, one needs a discount rate. Following Campbell and Shiller (1988), I set the annual discount rate as
ρ = 0.936; since I have quarterly data while their data is annual (and Shiller (1981) also used annual data), I
use a quarterly discount rate equal to the 4th root of 0.936, and will use this value for ρ throughout.3 Second,
p∗t is defined based on perfect foresight of the future time-path of dividends. But then it is necessary to replace
the infinity term in the summation (see (??)) with a finite number, and one small enough so that P ∗t can be
calculated within the bounds of the data that is available. Following Shiller (1981), I therefore calculate P ∗
using the present value of 30 years (120 quarters) worth of dividends, which provides a reasonably close
estimate of the “true” P ∗.4 Finally, two adjustments to the nominal price and dividend data must be made.
The data is converted to real prices and dividends using the quarterly CPI. The real prices and dividends thus
obtained are also used for the VAR tests, discussed below. For the volatility tests given by (??) and (??), it
is also necessary to detrend the data, which I do using a standard Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter.5
The other set of tests I use in this chapter are due to Campbell and Shiller (1988). This analysis was
prompted by criticism of Shiller (1981): it was argued that those results might be spurious because dividends
and prices are nonstationary.6 Campbell and Shiller (1988) developed an approach to address this concern.
Instead of comparing prices with the present value of cash flows, they compare the actual dividend-price
ratio with an estimate of the “fundamental value” of the dividend price ratio, defined below. This method
uses a vector autoregression (VAR) to forecast future dividend growth rates and dividend-price ratios. These
3Campbell and Shiller (1989) calculate the value of the discount rate using either returns on four - to six-month prime commer-
cial paper or using the growth rate of an aggregate consumption measure. In either case, using the same discount rate across all
equity assets would be a reasonable next step: such measures are, of course, constant with respect to the stock or stock portfolio
being analyzed.
4For any reasonable choice of the discount rate, the value of dividends beyond 30 years in the future is minimal. Suppose that
the dividend is $10 per quarter forever with the discount rate given above. The present value of 30 years of dividends is 86% of
the present value of the dividends forever.
5Shiller (1981) also de-trends his data; he states that his detrending method uses “a factor proportional to the long-run expo-
nential growth path.” That may have been computationally easier at the time, but it is now standard to use the HP filter, especially
with data at higher frequencies than annual.
6See Shiller (1988) pp. 1060 - 1061, citing Flavin, Kleidon, and Marsh and Merton.
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forecasts can then be used to calculate an estimate of the fundamental value. It is assumed that this estimate
is a good approximation of the market’s forecast. The key equation is the “dividend-ratio model”, from




ρjEt[rt+j −∆dt+j |Ht] + ρiEt[δt+i |Ht] +
(c − k)(1− ρi)
(1− ρ)
(2.9)
where δt is the log dividend price ratio at time t, rt is the return on an alternative asset at time t, ∆dt is the
growth rate of dividends at time t, and Ht is the set of all available information at time t. Note that the log
dividend-price ratio is treated as a stationary process (see Campbell & Shiller (1988), pp. 667 - 669). The
above equations are derived from a first-order Taylor expansion around the mean of this stationary process,
which is why (??) contains the constant term (c−k)(1−ρ
i )









Because δ is assumed stationary and it is linearly related to dividend growth rates, (??) can be tested using













This can be written more compactly as
zt = Azt−1 + εt (2.12)
This has the useful property that the expected value of zt+k is
Et[zt+k |Ht] = Akzt (2.13)
50
Now, let e1 = [1 0]
′
, e2 = [0 1]
′






(c − k)(1− ρi)
(1− ρ)
(2.14)
Since this must hold for arbitrary zt, we must have the following condition for all i = 1,2,3, ...,∞, where i












I run this test for two values of i: i = 1 and i =∞. For i = 1, the test is:
1− ρa11 = a21 ;−ρa12 = a22 (2.16)
This test can be thought of as a test of one-period “return predictability.” If the null hypothesis is correct,
the current price accurately reflects what the VAR predicts will happen to the price and dividend over the next
period. Thus, any excess returns over the next period are random, i.e. not predictable. There is an equivalent
way to say this: if we reject the null hypothesis, an investor who knows the “true” model - the VAR -
could earn excess profits by using the VAR forecast and buying (or selling) accordingly.7 Rejections of this
test suggests that one-period returns are predictable. For purposes of this chapter, an in-depth discussion
of return predictability would be off-topic; the reader need only be aware that excess volatility and return
predictability are closely related phenomena. 8 A rejection of this hypothesis is therefore evidence of excess
volatility (and can therefore be interpreted as evidence against market efficiency).




′A(I − ρA)−1zt (2.17)
7Technically, this refers to earning a rate of return over and above the rate of return that exactly compensates the investor for
discounting at the rate ρ.
8This is well-known in the literature on stock market efficiency; see e.g. Timmermann (1993).
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The left-hand side is the observed dividend-price ratio at time t. The right-hand side is the VAR’s estimate
of the present discounted value of dividend growth rates (see equation (??)), based on the VAR’s forecast of
future dividend growth rates. But the present discounted value of dividend growth rates is the fundamental
value of δ. Therefore, this null hypothesis says that the actual log dividend-price ratio is equal to the VAR’s
estimate of the fundamental value. Calling the VAR’s estimate of the fundamental value δ∗t , then, the null





It is straightforward to use these methods to identify a relative-price analogue if one assumes the same


















(c − k)(1− ρi)
(1− ρ)
(2.20)
Subtracting (??) from (??) will give:






















9Campbell and Shiller (1988a) use a “prime” symbol - ‘ - instead of an asterisk for this notation; but using an asterisk should
make it more clear to the reader that this approach is an econometric alternative to calculating P ∗ directly from observed dividends.
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As in the absolute price case, taking the limit of (??) as i goes to infinity causes the ρiEt[δ1t+i − δ
2
t+i |Ht]
term to become arbitrarily small; (??) then becomes (??), which states that the relative dividend-price ratio
should equal the present value of relative dividend growth rates. The right-hand side of (??) is the “fun-


















The first equation is asset one relative to asset two; the second is the dividend-growth rate of asset two
relative to asset 1. By analogy with the absolute-price version of this procedure, call the vector on the left-
hand side of (??) zt and the 2x2 matrix of coefficients on the right-hand side A. Using the VAR forecast
given by (??) (it is the same for absolute and relative prices) and (??) one can generate testable restrictions













where again i represents how many periods ahead the VAR is being used to forecast relative dividend growth,
e1 = [1 0]
′
and e2 = [0 1]
′
. As with the absolute prices, I examine two cases. For the case i = 1, the test
given by (??) is a set of two linear restrictions:
1− ρa11 = a21 ;−ρa12 = a22 (2.25)
Note that this is identical to restriction (??), except that the aii are drawn from the relative-price VARs
(see (??)). We interpret this as a test of one-period relative return predictability (where a relative return is
the rate of return on asset one minus the rate of return on asset 2); and as with the absolute-price version
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of the test, a rejection of the hypothesis means returns are “predictable.” This would be evidence of excess
volatility in relative prices, for the same reasons that a rejection of (??) suggests excess volatility for absolute
prices (see the discussion above).




′A(I − ρA)−1zt (2.26)
The left-hand side is the observed relative dividend-price ratio at time t. The right-hand side is the VAR’s
estimate of the present discounted value of relative dividend growth rates (see equations (??) and (??)), based
on the VAR’s forecast of future dividend growth rates. But the present discounted value of dividend growth
rates is the fundamental value of δ. Therefore, this null hypothesis says that the actual log dividend-price
ratio is equal to the VAR’s estimate of the fundamental value. Since I refer to the VAR’s estimate of the
fundamental value for absolute prices as δ∗t , the relative-price fundamental value is (δ
1 − δ2)∗t. The null
hypothesis may be succinctly stated as:
δ1t − δ2t = (δ1 − δ2)
∗
t (2.27)
Finally, for each relative price pair, I determine the correlation between δ1t −δ2t and (δ1 − δ2)
′
t. This mea-
sures the share of movements in relative prices attributable to movements in the underlying fundamentals.
One may notice that (??) is a sufficient condition - but not a necessary one - for corr(δ1t −δ2t ,δ1− δ2)
′
t) = 1.
10 Therefore, a rejection of (??) does not absolutely rule out corr(δ1t − δ2t ,δ1 − δ2)
′
t) ≈ 1. Campbell and
Shiller (1988), applying this test to absolute prices of a market index, find a correlation of roughly 0.17 (p.
673). Some of the extant literature finds that fundamentals explain less than 10% of the movements in prices.
0.1 - 0.2 is a reasonable range to regard as the “standard” range of possible values for this correlation in the
extant literature. Thus, even a rejection of (??) could still be consistent with our expectation: a much closer
10Consider any two random variables X and Y . Their correlation coefficient is ρXY =
σXY
σXσY
. Plainly then it is possible that
σX , σY , and therefore X , Y , but ρ = 1.
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relationship between fundamentals and relative prices than that found for absolute prices. To know whether
that “closer” relationship exists, we need to examine the correlations, not just the results of the test of (??).
I now turn to the data and the results.
2.3 The Data
My data source is Ken French’s website, http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data library.html,
from which I have downloaded returns data for 10 industry portfolios. This data is monthly, beginning in
July 1926 and ending in December 2016, for a total of over 1000 observations per portfolio. Notice that
since this data is in returns, there is no actual “price” for them. I therefore set the price of each portfolio
at the beginning of my sample equal to 100. The data is returns data in percent terms, but includes returns
both with and without dividends. The return without dividends is of course the percent change in the price
of the portfolio, so I can calculate the price of the portfolio through time; and since the data includes returns
both with and without dividends, I am also able to calculate the dividend paid in each period. This approach
- using aggregates of stocks at the level of sectors or industries - has been used before in the literature on
stock markets. Moreover, the use of 10 sectors has precedent, as does the use of French’s returns data.
Laopodis (2016) used seventeen industry portfolios in the US stock market, and acquired his returns data
from Ken French’s website (see above). Bartram and Wang (2015) use 10 sectors in a study of European
markets. Choudhry and Osoble (2015) use 10 sectors in a study of the US stock market. Tse (2015) divided
the market int 48 industries in an analysis of US stock markets, and repeated the analysis with 34 industries.
Dutt and Mihov (2013) use 28 sectors across a number of countries. Lee, Chen, and Chang (2013) use data
on 10 sectors in a study of 10 stock markets in 10 countries in eastern and south Asia.11
Table 2.1 lists the 10 sectors of the US economy covered by the data.
The nondurables sector covers consumer products such as food, textiles, and toys. Durables covers con-
sumer products such as cars, furniture, and household appliances. Manufacturing includes companies in
11See also Wu and Shamsuddin (2014); Moore (2011) ; and Yang, Tapon, and Sun (2006).
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Data drawn from http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data library.html ; Allocation of stocks into
each portfolio determined by 4-digit SIC codes.
machinery, trucks, and chemicals. Energy covers oil, coal, and gas companies. Hi-Tech includes business
equipment, computers, and electronic equipment. Telecomm covers telephone and television transmission.
Shops includes wholesale and retail as well as some service providers such as repair shops. Health includes
pharmaceuticals, medical devices, and care providers. Utilities includes electricity, gas, and water services.
Other includes categories not otherwise covered, including entertainment, finance, hotels, and mining.
One problem with this data is there are several sector-month observations for which the dividend paid
is 0, and the Campbell and Shiiller (1988) approach requires taking logarithms. In that case the existence
of a 0 observation would render several of the sectors unusable (this is not an issue with the Shiller (1981)
test). Converting the data to quarterly eliminates the zero-dividend problem. While one possible correction
is to construct monthly average dividends and prices over each quarter, doing so introduces several econo-
metric problems. 12. It is far simpler to use end-of-period quarterly data, which does not present the same
econometric issues. This general approach is not new, though different papers have used data of different
frequencies. Shiller (1981), Campbell and Shiller (1988), and Campbell (1991) use annual end-of-period
data, as do Cohen et al (2003) and Vuolteenaho (2002). The papers cited above that divide the market into
12Specifically, estimates of variances, covariances, and autocorrelations are biased in time-averaged data. These biases are
time-varying in nature, which means there is no easy correction. But the problem is actually even more intractable than that: the
three biases represent a sort of “impossible trilemma” for the econometrician. One can use filtering techniques to address any two
of the problems, but the third problem will persist (see Wilson, Jones, and Ludstrum (2001) 175, 177 - 178, 189, and citations
therein)
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sectors all use either monthly or weekly data, but these papers are generally applying a different methodol-
ogy (usually, regressions in which returns are the dependent variable). As a result, their approaches do not
require taking the log of dividends, so 0-observations are not a problem. The use of quarterly data in a VAR
analysis of prices and dividends appears to be an innovation, but one that should improve the quality of my
results by increasing the sample size significantly.
2.4 Absolute Price Tests
In this section, I replicate the absolute-price tests of Shiller (1981), and Campbell and Shiller (1988) outlined
above, for the absolute prices of each sector in my data. These replicated tests form a baseline for comparison
in two senses. First, I can compare my results to those of Shiller (1981) and Campbell and Shiller (1988). A
priori, one should expect that my results would be fairly similar to theirs - and we will see below that this
is what I find. Second, I can compare these results to those of the relative-price analogues performed on the
same data.
I now turn to the results of the Shiller (1981) volatility test.
2.4.1 The Volatility Test
First, consider the results of the volatility test, (??). Table 2.2 provides the standard deviations of the actual
price Pt and the ex post rational price P ∗t .
13
In every case, the standard deviation of the actual price is larger; and in every case, F-Tests that the
variances of P and P ∗ are equal (within each sector) can be rejected at any reasonable significance level
(even as low as α = 0.01%). While the null hypothesis is that the variances are equal, the test is one-tailed;
the alternative hypothesis states that the larger of the two variances is actually larger. 14 The results are, to
13As mentioned above, this test is based on real data, detrended using a standard HP filter. P ∗ is the present value of the next
30 years of dividends. I use the same value for the annual discount rate as Campbell and Shiller (1988), ρ = 0.936; since I have
quarterly data while their data is annual, I use a quarterly discount rate equal to 0.984, the fourth root of 0.936. I use the same
discount rate for the relative price tests.
14The statistic is distributed F with 242 and 242 degrees of freedom.
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Table 2.2: Absolute Price Volatility: Standard Deviations











Table sorted by ratio of σPσP ∗ , in decreasing order.
put it mildly, not close. In fact, the standard deviation of the actual price is, in all cases, at least eighteen
times the standard deviation of the corresponding ex post rational price; in one case, σ (p) was larger than
seventy-five times σ (p∗). The figure below illustrates a typical result.
Figure 2.1: Volatility Test, Durables Sector
Versions of this graph for the other 9 sectors may be found in Appendix I.
These results are qualitatively consistent with the findings of Shiller (1981) and with previous VAR-
based tests: the criterion is “violated dramatically by the data” (Shiller (1981) 423). These results suggest
that period-to-period variability in stock prices cannot plausibly be explained as the result of variation in
dividends (assuming a constant discount rate). Moreover, it suggests that the “excess volatility” problem
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is not noticeably reduced by disaggregating the data from a single market index to 10 sectors. This also
implies that the evidence of market efficiency is no better for prices of 10 sector-level portfolios If there is a
disaggregation effect, it can not be clearly identified in this test. It is not hard to believe that a price measure
composed of the prices of hundreds of firms (as the sectors in this study are) is insufficiently disaggregated
compared to the data used by Cohen et al (2003), Vuolteenaho (2002) and Jung and Shiller (2006). That
research uses prices at the level of individual firms. The reader will see that this result is also consistent with
the results of the VAR tests herein.
2.4.2 Absolute-Price VAR Tests
Before we turn to the VAR results, a brief review of the summary statistics for δt (the log dividend-price
ratio) and ∆dt (the dividend growth rate) may help clarify what it is we are seeing in the data. Table 2.3
summarizes the means and standard deviations of δt and ∆dt observed for all 10 sectors.
Table 2.3: Summary Statistics: Delta and 1-Period Dividend Growth Rates
Range of Means Range of Standard Deviations
δt [-5.41, -4.36] [0.35, 0.87]
Dividend Growth [0.0006, 0.0092] [0.084, 0.291]
The most striking feature of this is the fact that the range of standard deviations of δt is much larger than
that of ∆dt. While this is far from a formal test of excess volatility, it is a hint that we should not be surprised
to see evidence of excess volatility when we run the formal tests.
I now turn to the results of the VAR-based tests. These tests are necessary for the same reason that
Campbell and Shiller (1988) used a VAR test to bolster the findings of Shiller (1981). The simple volatility
test may return spurious results if the price process contains a unit root. I run 10 VARs, one for each
sector. 15 If the results of these tests agree with the results of the volatility tests, it corroborates the above
interpretation of those results: disaggregating from a market index to 10 sectors does not noticeably reduce
15Previous research using similar methods - e.g. Campbell and Shiller (1988) and Campbell (1991) - use one-lag VARs, but
their data is annual. Mine is quarterly. One might argue that the “proper” comparison of my results to that work would be to use
a one-lag VAR; but one might also argue that it is better to use the proper lag length. To address these concerns I ran both lag
lengths. Results do not differ meaningfully across the two approaches.
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the excess volatility problem (and therefore, also corroborates the conclusion that the evidence for absolute-
price efficiency is no better at this level of disaggregation). Prices and dividends are in real terms. Two
preliminary tests are conducted: I check stability conditions, and perform several versions of Dickey-Fuller
and augmented Dickey-Fuller tests for unit roots on the residuals. Both these tests are needed to help ensure
that the VAR is not a spurious regression. The results of these diagnostic tests suggest stability and no
unit-root residual problem, so there does not appear to be a spurious regression problem.
The test results summarized in Table 2.4 are a test of one-period return predictability (restriction (??))
and a test of whether the actual dividend price ratio equals the VAR’s estimate of its fundamental value
((??)). The test statistics are distributed χ2 with 2 degrees of freedom. In the first case, the null hypothesis is
no return predictability, and in the second, the null hypothesis states that δ is equal to its fundamental value
δ∗. Both null hypotheses are consistent with market efficiency. Note that both of these tests are based on
using the VAR to forecast future outcomes and comparing those forecasts to the actual data (in present-value
terms). The difference is the time horizon of the forecast. In the first test the VAR’s forecast is of outcomes
one quarter ahead. The second test uses the VAR’s forecast into the infinite future.
Table 2.4: VAR Tests of Absolute-Price Efficiency: Restrictions (??) and (??)











Sorted by one-period statistic in decreasing order. All statistics are significant at the 1% level.
Given the results of the Shiller (1981) volatility test, these results are not surprising: the movements in
the absolute prices of these sector portfolios do not match the predictions of the VAR. Assuming that the
VAR’s forecast is a good approximation of the market’s forecast, this means that price fluctuations cannot be
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explained by changes in expectations of future cash flows. In other words, price movements cannot plausibly
be explained by changes in dividends, under the assumption of a constant discount rate. Disaggregating
from a single market index to 10 sectors does not improve the case for absolute price efficiency. It should
also be noted that these results form a baseline of comparison with the results for the relative-price tests.
However, we can’t draw any conclusions about the “closer” or “clearer” hypothesis from these results alone.
If the results had been more positive for the present value model, that might have suggested that perhaps
disaggregating reduces the important of market wide or “macro” trends, making it easier for us to spot a
relationship between fundamentals and prices. We can not rule out that disaggregating may have such an
effect, because it may still be the case that 10 sectors is not sufficiently disaggregated to detect this effect.
In addition, the correlations between the fundamental value of the log dividend-price ratio (δ∗t) and the
actual log dividend price ratio (δt) are quite low: they range between -0.03 and 0.32; for 7 of the 10 sectors,
the figure is between 0.12 and 0.21. Under the null hypothesis (??), these correlations ought to be close to
1. Furthermore, these results are similar to what Campbell and Shiller (1988) found when they performed
this exercise: they found a correlation of 0.175 (p. 672). It also falls approximately in the same range as the
accepted range in the extant literature (10% to 20%). This is consistent with the interpretation of the other
results discussed in this section: disaggregating into 10 sectors does not improve the outcome of tests of the
present value model over test on a single market index. The apparent disconnect between the fundamental
value and the actual data can be clearly seen by plotting δt (the actual log dividend-price ratio) and δ∗t (the
VAR’s estimate of the fundamental value) over time. Figure 2.2, below, is a typical example; versions of this
graph for the other 9 sectors may be found in the appendices.
The left axis is for δt, the right axis for δ∗t . The reader’s attention should be drawn to two striking
features of these series. First, the scales of the left and right axes make clear that δ is far more variable than
the fundamental value. Second, significant movements in δ occur even during periods where δ∗t shows little
movement at all, such as the period 1961 - 1984. The first feature corroborates what we saw in the summary
statistics and the Shiller (1981) volatility test: the variability of δ is too high to be plausibly explained by
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Figure 2.2: Fundamental Versus Actual Dividend-Price Ratio, Nondurables Sector
variation in dividends (assuming a constant discount rate). The second feature shows the same thing, but in a
different way: it illustrates that movements in δ are not closely connected to movements in the fundamental
value.
These observations show that this data exhibits similar patterns to those found by previous studies. Hav-
ing quarterly data instead of annual, a longer data set, and slightly more granular data does not noticeably
reduce the excess volatility problem. The VAR results, like the simple volatility test result, do not support
the idea that dis-aggregating the data into 10 sectors makes it any easier to see a connection between prices
and dividends, With this baseline set, we can now turn to a consideration of the results for relative prices.
2.5 Relative Price Tests
2.5.1 The Volatility Test
When we observe the absolute prices of 10 sectors, there are 45 distinct relative prices. Performing the
volatility test in equation (??) requires calculating the actual and ex post rational relative prices. The actual
relative price is the quotient PiPj for any two (nonidentical) sectors. The ex post rational relative price is cal-
culated by dividing P ∗i by P
∗
j , where the individual P
∗ are calculated as described previously. The condition
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consistent with market efficiency is σ ( PiPj ) ≤ σ (
P ∗i
P ∗j
). As with the absolute price tests, I perform an F-test on
the standard deviations of the actual price and the standard deviation of the ex post rational price. The null
hypothesis of the F-test is that the standard deviations are equal, but the test is one-tailed; the alternative
hypothesis of the test is that the larger of the two standard deviations is actually larger. Table 2.5 provides
the standard deviations of the actual and ex post rational relative prices as well as the ratio of the two; Table
2.6 provides a more concise summary of these results. The table is sorted in decreasing order by σ (P
∗)
σ (P ) , which
is given in the fourth column. The F-statistic for each relative price is the square of the entry in the fourth
column, except for the last four rows. For those entries the F-statistic is the square of the reciprocal.16 For
this value, numbers greater than one are consistent with the volatility criterion for market efficiency, (??);
numbers less than one are inconsistent with the criterion.
The efficiency condition σ ( PiPj ) < σ (
P ∗i
P ∗j
) is met for 41 of the 45 sectors, with 39 of the differences being
statistically significant. This means that I find evidence consistent with relative price efficiency in over 90%
of the relative prices examined. In four cases, the results suggest relative price inefficiency, with three of
these being significant at the 5% level.
What do we learn from this? It seems safe to say that the criterion for relative prices is not “violated
dramatically by the data”, to again use Shiller’s description. Depending on the significance level chosen,
only 3 or 4 of the 45 iterations of the test suggest a clear rejection of the market-efficiency hypothesis. At
least 38 of the 45 results are clearly not inconsistent with market efficiency. If one wants to interpret the
‘statistically indistinguishable’ results as ‘non-rejection’ of the null hypothesis, one could say that 41 or 42
of the tests fail to reject the hypothesis consistent with market efficiency.
Figure 2.3, below, provides time plots of P and P* for the relative price between the Durables sector and
the Shops sector. The figure shows markedly different behavior than the behavior in Figure 2.1 with absolute
prices. Figure 2.3 shows that the variation of P ∗ is greater than that of P .
Versions of this diagram for the 44 other relative prices may be found in the appendices. The reader may
16The F statistic has degrees of freedom 242 and 242.
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Table 2.5: Relative Price Volatility Test: Restriction (??)
Relative Price σ (P ) σ (P ∗) σ (P
∗)
σ (P )
Durables/Hi-Tech 6.47 1537.07 237.49***
Nondurables/Hi-Tech 2.14 61.70 28.85***
Energy/Hi-Tech 8.48 172.74 20.37***
Telecomm/Utilities 4.69 76.50 16.31***
Durables/Utilities 31.06 345.90 11.14***
Manufacturing/Telecomm 17.23 173.60 10.07***
Manufacturing/Utilities 25.63 225.65 8.77***
Durables/Telecomm 32.82 251.80 7.67***
Durables/Health 14.08 92.67 6.58***
Durables/Other 33.27 199.85 6.01***
Manufacturing/Hi-Tech 4.98 28.63 5.75***
Manufacturing/Health 8.67 49.22 5.68***
Durables/Manufacturing 7.26 39.05 5.38***
Shops/Other 18.65 75.28 4.04***
Shops/Health 6.76 26.17 3.87***
Nondurables/Durables 1.31 4.98 3.81***
Shops/Utilities 34.05 120.54 3.54***
Nondurables/Other 8.00 27.62 3.45***
Nondurables/Manufacturing 2.40 7.59 3.16***
Non-Durables/Telecomm 9.95 30.95 3.11***
Durables/Shops 18.20 55.31 3.04***
Nondurables/Health 6.21 18.67 3.01***
Telecomm/Other 5.18 14.44 2.79***
Energy/Health 7.05 16.68 2.37***
Hi-Tech/Utilities 89.72 206.10 2.30***
Nondurables/Shops 3.60 7.90 2.19***
Energy/Utilities 51.74 113.30 2.19***
Utilities/Other 5.91 12.92 2.19***
Nondurables/Utiliities 14.45 31.02 2.15***
Energy/Telecomm 23.73 47.84 2.02***
Health/Utilities 72.30 142.07 1.97***
Energy/Other 50.44 88.88 1.76***
Hi-Tech/Telecomm 97.08 160.42 1.65***
Hi-Tech/Other 78.81 110.88 1.41***
Hi-Tech/Health 22.14 28.55 1.29***
Manufacturing/Shops 10.51 13.50 1.28***
Manufacturing/Other 35.72 44.95 1.26***
Manufacturing/Energy 14.10 17.41 1.23***
Health/Utilities 73.26 86.15 1.18**
Durables/Energy 61.92 69.12 1.12*
Hi-Tech/Shops 113.68 114.24 1.00
Nondurables/Energy 15.65 14.07 0.90*
Telecomm/Health 6.75 2.76 0.41***
Energy/Shops 54.87 11.47 0.21***
Telecomm/Shops 62.94 3.69 0.06***
* = Significant at 10% ; ** = Significant at 5% ; *** = Significant at 1%.64
Table 2.6: Summary of Relative-Price Volatility Test: Significance Level 5%
























Figure 2.3: Actual vs Ex Post Rational Relative Price: Durables and Shops Sectors
notice that in the diagram above, the actual relative price is usually higher than the ex post rational price.
There are two reasons not to read too much into this feature. First, it may reflect the fact that P ∗ only reflects
30 years of (relative) dividends; the “true” value of P ∗ could be slightly higher than this estimate. Second,
this pattern is not seen in all or even most other relative prices (see Appendix I). This diagram also presages
the findings of the VAR analysis: note the appearance of what looks like very close comovement between
the actual and the ex post rational relative prices.
A final feature of these results should be noted. With relative prices, it was generally not necessary to
de-trend the data (that is, results are not meaningfully different with the de-trended data). The reason for
this is straightforward. De-trending is necessary with absolute price data to remove the global upward trend
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associated with long-run growth in the value of the stock market.17 The fact that no de-trending is necessary
for relative prices is not in itself evidence of relative price efficiency. P could be efficient, or not, regardless
of whether P ∗ follows a clear trend. We can only say that for P to be efficient, either P and P ∗ follow
approximately the same trend, or neither follow any trend. However, it is clear that relative prices remove
“macro” or market-wide trends. This may be evidence in favor of the idea that if relative prices are efficient,
the reason could be that the relationship between prices and fundamentals is “clearer” in relative price data.
This test, while suggestive, may be thought of as a necessary condition for market efficiency, but not
a sufficient one. It could be the case that σ (P ) < σ (P ∗), yet P deviates from P ∗ in systematic ways; this
would violate market efficiency. In addition, the test employed in this section do not address the problem of
potential unit roots (as was the case with the absolute-price volatility test). One might reasonably draw the
conclusion that the ‘excess volatility’ problem is not nearly as apparent in relative prices as in price levels,
but it cannot be said from this test alone that relative price movements are clearly connected to movements
in fundamentals. As with the absolute price version of this test, one might wonder how the presence of a
unit root might cause these results to be misleading. To address this concern, we turn to the VAR.
2.5.2 Relative-Price VAR Tests
In section 4.2, above, I showed that VAR-based tests of absolute price efficiency provide minimal evidence
that movements in prices can be explained by movements in dividends, assuming a constant discount rate.
The correlations between movements in the dividend-price ratio and its fundamental value are similar to
those found by other studies that use similar methodologies (between 10% and 20%); dis-aggregating the
market into 10 sectors does not produce a noticeable increase in the degree of co-movement between the
fundamental value and actual prices. In this section, I explore whether VAR tests produce more favorable
results for relative price efficiency.
I run 45 VARs (one for each relative price) as described in Equation (??). I run VARs on the relative
17This is true of the tests discussed in section 4.1, above, and was also true of the tests used in Shiller (1981), though his
de-trending method differs from my own.
66
dividend-price ratio and the relative dividend growth rate for each distinct pairing, check stability conditions
(as before, this helps confirm that the regression is not spurious), and perform tests of the restrictions in (??)
and (??).18 For the same reasons as cited above for absolute prices, I also ran the same test with one-lag
VARs as a robustness check (the one-lag VAR matches the one-lag structure used in Campbell and Shiller
(1988) and Campbell (1991)). The one-lag tests were slightly less favorable to relative price efficiency, so I
report those results. As the reader will see, the case for a clearer and/or closer relationship between relative
prices and fundamentals is quite strong even with the “weaker” evidence.
Table 2.7 provides the results of the one-period predictability test ((??)) and the infinite-period test ((??)),
sorted by the one-period test result in decreasing order. The tests statistics are distributed χ2 with 2 degrees
of freedom. Table 2.8 provides a more concise summary of these tests. Recall that (??) is a test of one-
period relative return predictability and (??) is a test of whether the relative dividend-price ratio is equal to
the VAR’s estimate of its fundamental value; in both cases the null hypothesis is consistent with efficient
markets.
From the results, we can observe that the test of restriction (??) can be rejected at the 5% level for 17
of the 45 relative prices and cannot be rejected for 28. (At a significance level of 1%, we can reject the
null hypothesis for only 7 of the 45 relative prices). These results are not consistent with relative price
efficiency as a general proposition: we do reject that hypothesis more than one-third of the time. The results
of these tests, however, suggest that the presence of one-period relative return predictability is not nearly as
clear as the presence of return predictability in absolute prices. This suggests that excess volatility is sharply
reduced (but not eliminated) for relative prices. Another feature of these results is worth noting. We see more
rejections of restriction (??) than rejections of the volatility test, (??) (see section 5.1, above). This might
be a symptom of a unit root, for reasons discussed previously, but we should keep in mind that these are
not tests of stationarity or cointegration. Even these results, though, are favorable to the hypothesis that the
connection between fundamentals and prices is much more obvious for relative prices than absolute prices.
18As with absolute prices, the correct number of lags for the VAR is 4, according to the information criteria, but in this case that
is true for 44 of 45 cases. For the sake of consistency, I use 4 lags for all VARs.
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Table 2.7: VAR Tests of Relative Price Efficiency: Restrictions (??) and (??)














































Sorted by one-period test statistic in decreasing order. * = significant at 10%, ** = significant at 5%, *** = significant
at 1%.68
Table 2.8: Test of Restriction (??) (One-Period Predictability)
p-value > 10% 22
5% < p-value < 10% 6
1% < p-value < 5% 10
p-value < 1% 7
Table 2.9: Test of Restriction (??) (Actual Value Equals Fundamental Value)
p-value > 10% 23
5% < p-value < 10% 4
1% < p-value < 5% 8
p-value < 1% 10
The results of the infinite-period test are in many ways qualitatively similar to the test of one-period return
predictability. In this case, sixty percent (27) of the tests fail to reject the hypothesis consistent with market
efficiency.19 As with the one-period tests, these results are not consistent with relative price efficiency as a
general proposition; we reject that hypothesis in 40% of cases. Nevertheless, this also suggests that excess
volatility is reduced in relative prices. Some relative prices appear to fluctuate in ways that are consistent
with movements in the fundamental value, but several do not. In other words, these results suggest that
divergences between the fundamental value and the actual price are sharply reduced for relative prices, in
comparison to absolute prices.It is also worth noting that the results of this test generally agree with the
results of the one-period predictability test. This corroborates our interpretation of the results of both tests;
if we observed many rejections of one test but not the other, we would have reason to doubt the validity of
the tests and therefore our interpretation of the results.
An interesting question is whether the degree of co-movement between the fundamental value and the
actual dividend price ratio is higher for relative prices than absolute. While this question can be more fully
explored using cointegration techniques (see Chapter 3), the VAR anlaysis provides one additional measure
that may address this question. To examine this, I check the correlations between δ1t − δ2t and (δ1 − δ2)
∗
t. I
also check the correlation between their respective first differences. For 44 of the 45 iterations, the correlation
in levels was above 0.99, and in changes above 0.98. For the other relative price, the level correlation was
19If we use a 1% significance level, this becomes 35 “fail to reject” results - just below 80%.
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0.77 and the first-difference correlation was 0.65. Even in the worst case for relative prices, this is a much
higher correlation than I found for absolute prices. For absolute prices, I found correlations in roughly the
same range as previous studies (0.1 - 0.2); see section 4.2, above. This is the strongest piece of evidence
in favor of relative price efficiency. These correlations mean that cash flows alone can explain a very large
percentage of movements in relative prices. Nor are these large correlations inconsistent with the results
given above: if the series are highly correlated but clearly not equal, we would expect to reject (??) because
of the difference in their levels. This suggests that the estimate of δ generated by the VAR is biased by some
amount, but captures movements in the fundamental value very well.20
Figures 2.4 and 2.5, below, illustrate typical results of the VAR forecast. Figure 2.4 shows a case where
the null hypothesis was rejected for both the one-period and infinite-period tests; figure 2.5 shows a case
where neither of the hypotheses were rejected.
Figure 2.4: δt Versus δ∗t : Relative, Energy and Hi-Tech Sectors
Note that in figure 2.5, one of the cases where we did not reject the null hypothesis given by restriction
(??), the fundamental value and the actual δ sit right on top of each other. This is exactly what the null
hypothesis says: that the two are equal. Even in Figure 4, δ and δ∗ co-move quite closely, even though this
is one of the cases in which we rejected the null hypothesis. One feature of this diagram that we do not see
20Consider a simple example. Suppose that for all t, δ1t − δ2t ≈ (δ1 − δ2)
∗
t +C, where C >> 0, we would observe a correlation
very close to 1, but it would be obvious that the two are not equal.
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Figure 2.5: δt Versus δ∗t : Relative, Nondurables and Manufacturing Sectors
in Figure 5 is the way that the two series diverge in the middle of the 1950s, but then their co-movements
appear to rapidly re-align. This might be because of a shift in the discount rate at around that time, or perhaps
a result of some other kind of structural change that the VAR fails to capture. For instance, a change in tax
policy that impacts one sector but not the other might produce a result like this.21 The VAR would of course
not “know” about the change, so would not be able to account for why the relative price grew around that
date. A shift in the discount rate, though, does not appear to be consistent with the overall results. If a
discount rate shift caused the change in Figure 4, why do we not see that effect in other relative prices? The
discount rate enters the calculation of the fundamental value in the same way for all relative prices (see (??)
and (??)). The examples given above are not atypical. In many other cases, even if we would reject the null
hypothesis, the relationship between the actual δ and the fundamental value appears much closer for relative
prices than absolute.22 The different results across sectors are, in many cases, probably a function of shifts
such as the one seen in Figure 4, but not Figure 5. This is consistent with the idea that, for relative prices, the
VAR’s estimate of the fundamental value captures movements in cash flows well, but its level might be offset
from the “true” fundamental value for at least part of the sample. This would explain why we see rejections
21Either way, the explanation is a form of structural change; the role of structural change in price movements is a theme to
which I will return in Chapter 3.
22Versions of this diagram for the other 43 relative prices may be found in appendix 2.
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of (??) but high correlations between δ and δ∗ for relative prices; see the discussion above regarding the
correlations.
These results are not as strong as the results of the Shiller (1981) volatility test, but they do show im-
proved evidence for relative price efficiency over absolute price efficiency. However, we still see evidence
that some relative prices may be inefficient. The results are markedly less problematic for relative price
efficiency than the serious empirical problems found when analogous tests were applied to absolute prices
of a broad market index, or the absolute prices of the sectors themselves. What these results, taken together,
seem to suggest is that relative stock prices reflect the underlying fundamentals much more than do absolute
prices. These results provide some evidence that stock markets may do a good job allocating capital across
various assets. The overall results provide a hint that the relationship between prices and fundamentals is
both “clearer” and “closer” for relative prices than absolute prices. The fact that relative prices appear to
remove “macro” trends is a hint in favor of the idea that the relationship is clearer in the data; the fact that we
observed very close co-movement between the relative log dividend-price ratio (δ1−δ2) and its fundamental
value (δ∗1 − δ
∗
2) is evidence in favor of the idea that the relationship is closer. However, we can also address
this question by examining whether any patterns appear in the set of prices that “fail” the efficiency tests.
The following section explores the possibility that the rejections/non-rejections of market efficiency are in
some way systematically related to the division of the stock market into sectors.
2.6 Which Sectors Appear to be Inefficient?
In this section, I examine whether there are patterns in the results of the above tests, and what we might
learn from those patterns. For the one-period test, we had 17 relative prices that failed the efficiency test
at α = 5%. Since each relative price is a ratio of one sector’s price to another sector’s price, there are 34
instances in which some individual sector was one of the two in a test for which the result was rejection of
relative price efficiency. For the infinite-periods test (restriction (7)), we had 18 rejections. Tables 2.10 and
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2.11 display the frequency of rejections by sector.
Table 2.10: Test Rejections by Sector: One-Period











Sorted in decreasing order. Note that the sum of column 3 is 34 - corresponding to 17 rejections, because each
rejection involves 2 sectors. Significance level 5%.
Table 2.11: Test Rejections by Sector: Infinite-Period Test











Sorted in decreasing order. Note that the sum of column 3 is 36 - corresponding to 18 rejections, because each
rejection involves 2 sectors. Significance level 5%.
A natural approach to detecting whether there are patterns to these rejections is to test whether the
rejections are independent of sector. Using this data, I perform a standard independence test.23 With ten
sectors and two categories (rejection or non-rejection), the test statistic will be distributed χ2 with 9 degrees
of freedom. For the one-period tests, the test statistic for independence is 19.0966 (p-value 2.44%). For
restriction (7), the infinite-periods test, the independence test statistic is 22.4074 (p-value less than 1%).
These results suggest that rejections of both tests are not wholly random with respect to which sectors are
23I have omitted a possible fourth column in these tables, which would list the count of non-rejections. With 45 relative
dividend-price ratios, each of which is in effect a pairwise comparison, each of the 10 sectors will be included as part of a relative
price 9 times. Thus the entry in each cell in the fourth column would be 9 minus the number in column 3.
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involved in price pairs for which we reject the null hypothesis.
One may also notice that when portfolio 5 (the Hi-Tech sector) is one of the two sectors used in the
relative price, the null hypothesis is rejected 8 out of 9 possible times, for both versions of the efficiency test.
This suggests an obvious secondary hypothesis: is this sector driving the result of the prior independence
tests? Suppose that we drop all the tests in which sector 5 is involved, then re-run the independence tests.
Tables 2.12 and 2.13 list the count of rejections for relative prices in which the Hi-Tech sector is not involved.
Table 2.12: Test Rejections by Sector: One-Period, No Hi-Tech










Note that the sum of Column 3 is 18, corresponding to 9 rejections. Significance level 5%.
Table 2.13: Test Rejections by Sector: Infinite-Periods, No Hi-Tech










Note that the sum of Column 3 is 20, corresponding to 10 rejections. Significance level 5%.
What do the independence tests suggest this time?. Since we have dropped a sector, this time the test
statistics will be distributed χ2 with 8 degrees of freedom.24 For the one-period tests, the independence
statistic is 13.3333 (p-value 10.09%). For the infinite-periods tests, the independence statistic is 13.4308
24Since we consider only the tests for which sector 5 is not involved, J = 9 and thus there are 36 relative price pairs; and the
entry in the omitted fourth column would equal 8 minus column 3 instead of 9.
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(p-value 9.79%). We can conclude from these results that there is some evidence that rejection of relative
price efficiency is more likely when the hi-tech sector is included, and that it is at least plausible that other
rejections occurred more or less at random. We can conclude that 1) we are more likely to observe relative
price inefficiency for the Hi-Tech sector than for any other sector; and 2) of the other sectors, none appears to
be more likely to exhibit relative price inefficiency than the other (again, non-Hi-Tech) sectors. The Hi-Tech
sector is apparently the major culprit for relative price inefficiency.
Ultimately, the point of this research is to assess whether there is better evidence for relative price effi-
ciency than absolute price efficiency. The results in this paper suggest that the market does a better job for
relative prices than absolute prices. In this chapter, I have tested the present value model, but assumed a
constant discount rate. In this as well as previous work, absolute prices fail such tests. Attempts to reconcile
these results with market efficiency have generally argued in favor of a time-varying discount rate (or risk
premium). But these results are hard to reconcile with that hypothesis. One would have to argue that the
discount rate is systematically varying “a lot” for the Hi-Tech sector, but not nearly as much for the other
sectors. But the discount rate in the present value model reflects investors’ preferences (their level of risk
aversion, or their patience). Even theories that tie the discount rate to an interest rate typically use a risk-free
rate - but that would be common across all sectors, so could not be an adequate explanation for the results
herein.
The results for all the other sectors suggest that the market does a reasonably good job at forecasting
future relative values. One might expect, however, that it is harder for the market to arrive at a good forecast
for sectors in which there is a higher degree of uncertainty about the future. By “uncertainty” here, I do not
mean risk. I mean the extent to which future outcomes can be described ex ante by a probability distribution;
that is to say, Knightian uncertainty. I have provided evidence that the market may have difficulty performing
its core task - even for relative values - when one of the sectors involved is the Hi-Tech sector. That is
consistent with what we’d expect if Knightian uncertainty is the factor driving the results. There is research
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providing evidence that this is the case.25 The Hi-Tech sector is, almost by definition, the sector of any
economy (especially a developed economy like the United States) in which the most rapid change - the
highest pace of innovation and the most rapid development of new knowledge - are occurring. It is therefore
a sector in which we would expect a greater amount of unanticipated structural change - that is, a high degree
of uncertainty about the future.
The relative price results help cast light on the behavioral and EMH views of markets. The alternative
explanations those theories offer for the failure of the constant-discount-rate present value model are unsat-
isfying. Consider first behavioral theories. If asset prices are really driven by psychological factors, why
do those factors appear to matter more for prices in one specific sector than all others? Would we have
to conclude that investors who trade in hi-tech stocks are less “rational” than other investors? But then,
what about traders who invest in multiple sectors? Why would such people fall prey to psychological biases
when making investment decisions about this one sector, but not others? Why would they not apply the
same, apparently “rational” decision-making process to hi-tech stocks as to all other stocks? These results
also present a mirror-image of that problem for EMH: why does the risk premium vary through time more
strongly for one particular sector than for others? Perhaps this could be explained by a higher correlation
between consumption and the hi-tech sector. However, because Hi-Tech includes the stocks of compa-
nies that manufacture computer hardware and software, electronic equipment, and business machinery, this
seems unlikely: the prices of those stocks would probably be much more highly correlated with investment
spending than with consumption. It is well-known that investment spending has historically been strongly
pro-cyclical, but consumption is non-cyclical, or at best only mildly pro-cyclical.
These observations do not imply that we should reject any role for human psychology in modeling or
understanding asset prices. Indeed, I have argued that relative prices might behave more efficiently than
absolute prices based in part on what we know about human psychology. That is one of the motivations
for the hypothesis that relative prices will exhibit a “closer” relationship with fundamentals than absolute
25See e.g. Frydman, Goldberg, and Mangee (2015).
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prices. These results would appear to suggest that there is some merit to this intuition. Furthermore, the
strong concentration of rejections in precisely the sector of the economy that is arguably the most prone to
rapid change suggests that we should consider pursuing a third way forward: we ought to be trying to develop
models of asset prices that take the possibility of unanticipated structural change seriously, and which allow
human psychology to play a role, without simultaneously implying that investors forecast in ways that are
both mechanistic and irrational. These results suggest that fundamentals - specifically dividends - matter
more for relative prices than for absolute prices.
2.7 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, I have examined a major question in the literature on financial markets: do movements in
asset prices reflect changes in fundamentals? I have addressed this question by asking whether movements
in relative prices reflect changes in fundamentals more strongly than do movements in absolute prices. The
literature on the stock market suggests that it is hard to spot such a connection in data on broad market in-
dices. I have provided reasons why this connection might be easier to spot if we look at relative stock prices,
taking insights from literature on finance, non-market valuation, psychology, and marketing. Furthermore,
relative prices can teach us about the ability of financial markets to allocate capital among different assets.
If relative prices closely reflect fundamentals, markets are doing a good job shifting capital from assets that
represent “poor” opportunities for future earnings and towards assets that represent “good” opportunities.
This important function of financial markets is one about which data on broad market indexes has little to
say. Straightforward market-efficiency tests based on relative prices provide some suggestive evidence in
favor of the claim that asset price movements are related to fundamentals in a manner consistent with the
present value model. Moreover, I have presented evidence that suggests that researchers should consider
taking the possibility of unanticipated structural change seriously.
Future research on relative-price data could provide further insight on these important questions. The
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very high correlations observed in this research between the VAR-based estimate of the fundamental value
and the actual data is certainly deserving of further scrutiny. In addition, while I have argued that these results
suggest that structural change plays an important role in determining the movements of asset prices, I have
not formally examined this hypothesis. Nor does this chapter speak directly to the issue of price persistence.
An additional issue with this approach is its assumption that the dividend-price ratio is stationary while
prices and dividends are not. This would imply some form of cointegration; a hypothesis I also have not
tested in this chapter. In Chapter 3, I will use a cointegrated VAR approach to address the issues of structural
change, persistence, and cointegration. I am hopeful, however, that this chapter gives us some reasons to
suspect that markets may be efficient - at least in the relative-price sense - and that there are psychological
and behavioral reasons to suspect that markets should be relative-price efficient.
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Chapter 3
Stock Market Efficiency: Long-Run Evidence
from Relative Prices and Dividends
ABSTRACT
This chapter contributes to the literature examining stock market ‘efficiency’. Using tests based on the
present value model, I provide evidence that relative stock prices are more closely connected to dividends
than absolute prices. This suggests that the market may do a better job setting relative prices. This chapter
focuses on the long-run properties of absolute versus relative stock prices, with special focus on the
cointegration properties of the data; persistence; and evidence of structural change.
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3.1 Introduction
In this chapter, I provide an empirical investigation of whether stock prices depend on fundamentals as
suggested by the present value model. In Chapter 1, I showed that much of the extant research on this issue is
based on absolute prices. Shiller (1981), Campbell and Shiller (1988), and many subsequent researchers have
found that absolute prices are much too volatile to rationalize on the basis of dividends or earnings alone.
This finding has given rise to a longstanding debate between proponents of the efficient markets hypothesis
(EMH) and proponents of the behavioral finance school. EMH proponents argue that the excess volatility
is due to a time varying discount rate. 1 They believe that stock prices reflect their fundamental values, but
because of a time varying discount rate, the fundamental value itself is more volatile than predicted by the
canonical present value model. Behavioral finance researchers, on the other hand, argue that investors fall
prey to psychological biases and momentum trading. 2 In the behavioral paradigm, excess volatility arises
because behavioral factors lead participants to bid stock prices away from fundamental values.
Nearly all of the research underpinning the debate between the EMH and behavioral camps is based
on absolute prices. By “absolute price” I mean the monetary cost of a stock, or the value of an index at a
particular moment in time. I argued in Chapter 1 that the connection between stock prices and fundamental
values may be stronger and easier to detect with relative prices. By “relative price,” I mean the ratio of the
price of one asset to the price of a different asset. There are two main reasons why detecting a connection may
be easier with relative prices. First, there exists a body of psychology research that shows that individuals are
better at making assessments of relative values than absolute values.3 This suggests that market participants
may find it easier to judge the fundamental value of IBM relative to Procter & Gamble than to determine
the fundamental value of stock in each company individually. If this were the case, we might expect that the
market as a whole would be better at setting relative prices than absolute prices. The relationship between
prices and cash flows would be “closer” for relative prices than absolute prices. However, there have been
1See e.g. Cochrane (2011)and Fama (2014) and references therein.
2See Barberis and Thaler (2003) and Shiller (2014) and references therein.
3See e.g. Weber (2004), Matthews and Stewart (2009), Chapman and Johnson (2009).
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no direct tests of this proposition. Second, I argued that the literature studying disaggregated stock prices
suggests that the relationship between relative prices and cash flows may be clearer in the data than the
relationship between absolute prices and cash flows.4
In Chapter 2, I examined the excess volatility puzzle using short-run tests. These tests suggested that
there is a much stronger connection between movements in fundamentals and relative prices than between
fundamentals and absolute prices. In this chapter I examine the connection between prices and the long-run
equilibrium relation implied by the present value model. Researchers have found that with absolute prices,
this relationship is difficult to see in the data. I examine whether the connection between prices and the
equilibrium relationship is stronger with relative prices. I examine this through two main lenses. First, I
examine whether the evidence of the expected cointegrating relation is stronger with relative prices; second,
I examine whether deviations from the equilibrium are less persistent with relative prices. As in chapter 2, I
assume a constant discount rate.
This chapter proceeds as follows. First, I provide a brief review of past literature on the long-run behavior
of stock prices. Since these studies, like those discussed in previous chapters, look at absolute prices, they
provide a useful baseline for comparison with the results of the relative-price tests I will conduct. Second,
I discuss the theoretical basis of my analysis, including an exploration of what the models considered in
chapters 1 and 2 imply for the long-run properties of the data. I also discuss the empirical methodology
I use: a cointegrated vector autoregression (CVAR) approach. My empirical investigation examines the
absolute and relative price PV models along three dimensions: 1) the cointegration properties of the data;
2) the extent to which the models leave unexplained unit root(s); and 3) the degree of persistence present in
deviations from absolute and relative fundamental values. I perform the tests for the absolute prices in my
data and compare these results to the analogous tests for relative prices.
It would undoubtedly be desirable to examine relative prices for all individual pairs of stocks. But for J
stocks, there are J(J−1)2 distinct (no reciprocals) individual price pairs. This number grows rapidly with the
4See e.g. Vuolteenaho (2002), Cohen et al (2003), and Jung and Shiller (2006.
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number of individual stocks. For instance, using all the stocks that compose the S&P 500 would result in
approximately 125,000 relative prices. However, the CVAR methodology is an iterative one, with several
steps that cannot be automated. It would therefore be infeasible to perform a CVAR analysis for all of these
relative prices. In order to obtain a manageable number of prices, I categorize the US stock market into 5
sectors. This gives 10 distinct relative prices.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides a review of the extant literature
studying the long-run properties of stock price data. Section 3 discusses the theoretical basis of my approach
and the empirical methodology employed. Section 4 discusses the data. Sections 5 and 6 present results for
absolute and relative prices, respectively. Section 7 concludes the chapter.
3.2 Literature Review: Cointegration Studies
This section discusses findings from the extant literature on the cointegration and general long-run properties
of stock price data. These studies help us understand whether there is any long-run connection between stock
prices and dividends. As with the literature discussed in previous chapters, most long-run studies of stock





where P ∗t is the fundamental value at time t, ρ is the discount rate (assumed constant here, an assumption
frequently relaxed in the literature), and Dt+j is the dividend paid at time t + j. The present value model




where Et is the mathematical expectation. If the present value model is correct, the market’s expectation
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should equal the mathematical expectation.
The present value model can be studied empirically using both short-run tests and long-run tests. The
biggest problem, of course, is how the economist can observe or estimate the market’s expectation. Campbell
and Shiller (1988) used a VAR and REH; they found excess volatility. Campbell and Shiller (1987) exam-
ined whether there is a long-run tendency for stock prices to converge to this VAR-based estimate of the
fundamental value. Short-run tests (such as those I used in Chapter 2) examine whether price changes from
one month or quarter to the next are consistent with period-to-period changes in fundamentals (dividends). A
long-run test would examine whether stock prices tend to mean-revert to the equilibrium relationship implied
by REH and the present value model. In the context of variables with unit roots, the “equilibrium relation”
in (??) takes the form of a cointegrating relation. A vector of time-series variables Xt = [X1,t,X2,t, ...,Xn,t]
is said to exhibit cointegration if Xt is integrated of order D (we would say “Xt is I(D)”) and there exists a
linear combination of the Xi,t that is integrated of order D − 1 or less.5
3.2.1 Non-CVAR Studies
The literature that examines the behavior of aggregate stock prices (often in the context of a broad US stock
index) consistently provides evidence that the present value model is a reasonable description of the price
process in the long-run, but with several serious problems over shorter time horizons. An early example of
a cointegration study is Campbell and Shiller (1987). They assumed a constant discount rate and examined
stock price and dividend data. Their data came from annual observations of the S&P composite index, 1871
- 1986. They use a cointegration test based on the seminal work of Engle and Granger (1987). Suppose
that Xt = [yt,Yt]′, and Yt is a linear function of the present discounted value of expected future values of
yt. Engle and Granger (1987) showed that if these variables are I(1) and the two variables are cointegrated,
there exists a vector α = (−θ,1)′ such that α′Xt is stationary relation. α can be found by estimating an
error-correction model (ECM):
5A simple example: let xt = xt−1 + εt and yt = xt−1 + ηt , εt and ηt being white-noise errors. Both series are random walks,
and therefore I(1), but xt − yt = εt − ηt is stationary (I(0)); so xt and yt are cointegrated.
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∆Yt = β0 + β1Yt−1 + β2yt−1 + β3∆Yt−1 + β4∆yt−1 + εt (3.3)
where εt is a white noise error term. The variable θ can be estimated as the ratio of the coefficients on lagged
Y and lagged y, so that θ = β1β2 . The test for cointegration is a test in which the null hypothesis is that α
′Xt is
nonstationary, where α and Xt are defined as above. Note that this approach will encounter problems if the
I(1) assumption is incorrect: the presence of an unexplained unit root will invalidate the results. Using this
approach, Campbell and Shiller (1987) found weak evidence of cointegration at the 10% significance level.
They also found that deviations from the fundamental value exhibit a high degree of persistence. Behavioral
researchers interpret this as evidence of momentum trading and “bubble” behavior. The CVAR methodology
(see Juselius (2006)) generalizes this approach from a one-equation ECM to a multiple-equation VAR con-
text. The CVAR uses full information and thus provides more efficient estimation; in particular, it provides
a more efficient test of long-run relationships.6 This enables us to see if the weakness of Campbell and
Shiller’s (1987) result is due to the use of the single-equation framework. The CVAR is also more powerful
in looking at short-run dynamics; the Engle-Granger approach says little about this matter.
The Campbell and Shiller (1987) approach ignores several empirical and theoretical factors that may
explain the weakness of their results. Many recent developments in the literature since then have been exten-
sions of the Campbell and Shiller approach that attempt to address one or more of these factors. One such
innovation is to allow for a time-varying discount rate. However, the evidence that the empirical problems
with the present value model can be addressed through this adjustment is weak. Timmermann (1995) allowed
for for a time-varying discount rate and noted a series of failures in the literature to statistically detect the
cointegrating relationship between dividends and prices predicted by the present value model. However, he
noted that prior tests of whether log prices and log dividends are cointegrated were robust to a time-varying
discount rate (so long as the discount rate is stationary). He argued that the failures to detect cointegration
had more to do with a combination of high persistence in the dividend yield and insufficiently large samples
6However, the VAR does also require an assumption about whether the data is I(1) or I(2); see below for details.
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(in other words, the tests had low power). In his simulations, he found that more than 100 observations was
generally enough to overcome this issue. My data set has over 350 observations (see below), so that aspect of
the problem should not be an issue here. However, note that Timmermann (1995) was unable to say anything
about whether the high persistence in the dividend yield was due to the presence of a second, unexplained
unit root. If there is a second unit root, the I(1) assumption underlying the Engle-Granger test is wrong, and
the test will not in general be valid. The CVAR is a more powerful tool for understanding the source(s) of
this persistence than the Engle-Granger approach, and will allow us to get a better understanding of whether
this persistence comes from an unaccounted-for unit root.
Bohl and Siklos (2004) find that a present value model with a time-varying discount rate fits the data
well in the long-run - that is, prices and dividends cointegrate as one would expect under the present value
model. However, it cannot sufficiently explain short-run deviations from the equilibrium relation. These
deviations were large and highly persistent. They claim that non-fundamental factors, such as speculative
bubbles, do better at explaining the short-run dynamics. Their methods are similar to those of Campbell and
Shiller (1987), but they allow for asymmetric adjustment rates.
The first major takeaway here is that studies find high persistence whether or not they allow for a time-
varying discount rate. These findings also illustrate an additional point about the analysis I will conduct:
since I will examine the relation between log prices and log dividends, my specification is robust to a sta-
tionary but time-varying discount rate, even though I do not explicitly build in that assumption. These studies
suggested that the persistence of deviations might be due to an unexplained unit root, but did not rule out the
possibility that the deviations might be “highly persistent but stationary”. A highly persistent but stationary
process is one in which the parameter(s) on the autoregressive terms are high but not quite high enough
to technically qualify the series as I(1); the simplest example is an AR(1) process in which the coefficient
on the lagged dependent variable is just below 1. Such series are likely to be especially problematic with
small samples and/or low-power tests. The CVAR allows us to get a better handle on this question in two
ways: first, it can help us figure out whether the weakness of these results is due to the use of less powerful
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statistical methods; second, we can examine whether the persistence problem is reduced when looking at
relative instead of absolute prices, which would suggest a closer and/or clearer connection between prices
and dividends than previously thought.
Lee (1996) provided evidence that those deviations from equilibrium were caused by an unexplained
unit root. The reader should note that the presence of an unexplained root does not necessarily mean there is
no cointegration. It means only that the simplest possible hypothesis - that prices and dividends cointegrate
from I(1) to I(0) - is inadequate. Lee (1996) provided evidence that by adding log earnings to the data, the
cointegrating relation could be more clearly identified. In the sample, log dividends, earnings, and stock
prices were cointegrated over the period 1871 1992, but the dividend and earnings components explained
less than half of the variation in prices. The additional source of price variation was both large and persistent;
furthermore, the evidence suggested “the presence of another stochastic trend in prices, driven by a third type
of innovation that is not part of either dividends or earnings” (Lee (1996) p. 344, emphasis added). This
finding is further evidence that deviations from equilibrium are driven by an unexplained unit root; but
because Lee (1996) did not examine relative prices, it is an open question whether relative prices would also
show evidence of an unexplained root.
Engsted (2006) found that US stock prices are cointegrated with dividends, but only if one allows for the
presence of an explosive root in the process in addition to the common unit root (Bohl and Siklos (2004)’s
use of a “bubble component” can be interpreted as allowing for an explosive root). My analysis will provide
further evidence for such an unexplained root, if it exists. However, because I use a CVAR, which is a more
powerful and general tool than single-equation regressions, I may also be able to learn more about where this
unexplained root comes from. One of the key questions in this thesis is whether the persistence of deviations
is reduced with relative prices. The CVAR is better able to answer this question. In particular, examining
both relative and absolute prices using CVAR techniques may help us isolate the source of the root, because
the process of converting from absolute to relative prices may “subtract out” the unit root (see Section 3.2,
below, for a fuller exploration of this hypothesis).
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Other research also demonstrates how difficult it has been for researchers to identify a close connection
with absolute prices. For example, Kanas (2005) provided evidence of a nonlinear cointegrating relationship
consistent with the NPV model in the long-run. The term “nonlinear cointegration” here refers to the fact
that if one transforms prices and dividends using the nonparametric “alternating conditional expectations”
method, there should be standard linear cointegration between the transformed variables. Even the need to
attempt such a transformation shows that the cointegrating relation predicted by the present value model is
quite difficult to spot in the data; but as with other work, Kanas (2005) did not consider whether the relation
is easier to see in relative prices. This analysis will address that question.
Shirvani, Delcoure, and Wilbratte (2011) allow for seasonal (or more broadly, cyclical) variation and test
for seasonal cointegration consistent with the present value model. They argue that this is a way to control
for an unidentified unit root that would invalidate the results of e.g. Campbell and Shiller (1987). They find
no evidence for seasonal cointegration, and argue that their findings represent evidence against the present
value model. Of course, if the uncontrolled unit root is present, but is not “seasonal”, their test would not
detect it; as I have argued above, the CVAR approach with relative prices might help us detect, control for,
and learn about the unexplained root.
Other methodologies also demonstrate the ways in which researchers have bent over backwards, so
to speak, to find cointegration between prices and dividends. Multiple studies have found evidence for
cointegration, but only if one allows for heteroskedasticity and/or structural break(s) in the price process
or regressors. (See e.g. Strauss and Yigit (2001), McCabe, Leybourne, and Harris (2003)). Gabriel and
Martins (2011) provided evidence in favor of cointegration consistent with the present value model, but with
structural breaks in the cointegrating vector. Esteve, Navarro-Ibanez, and Prats (2017) find similar evidence
of cointegration between log stock prices and log dividends, but only when one allows for structural breaks
in the cointegrating relation (their data is annual, and they found evidence of two breaks: one in 1944 and
one in 1971).
These findings should not really be surprising. Over such long time periods, we would expect that
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changes in institutions and policy, new technologies, and political developments would cause structural
change in how market participants interpret historical data in forecasting the future. This highlights another
possible advantage of examining relative prices: we might expect that the structural breaks are of similar
nature across absolute prices. If so those breaks may be “canceled out” by taking relative prices, similar to
the way relative prices may help us isolate an unexplained unit root. If so, we would expect to observe that
structural break tests in the CVAR will “flag” more breaks in absolute prices than relative prices. Moreover,
the CVAR is able to cope with structural breaks and heteroskedasticity if necessary - but in the relative price
CVARs, it may be less of a problem.
In summary, much of the prior non-CVAR literature has demonstrated a host of issues that may lead to
weak or negative results for the present value model: heteroskedasticity, structural breaks, unidentified roots,
and persistence. The key question for my thesis is whether these problems are reduced or eliminated with
relative prices. The psychology literature suggests that this may be the case. The CVAR methodology is
also more efficient and powerful than single-equation models and is quite capable of coping with all of these
issues. It allows the researcher to adjust for heteroskedasticity and persistence; helps us identify the source
of unexplained unit roots; and adjust for structural change.
While these studies do not use the CVAR methodology (Engle-Granger cointegration tests are a commonly-
used technique in the literature, generally speaking), there are a few studies that have employed the CVAR.
3.2.2 CVAR Studies of Stock Prices
Crowder and Wohar (1998) use a CVAR to study the relation between stock prices and dividends (a 2-
variable CVAR) under the assumption of a constant discount rate. This matches the assumption I make,
so these results are directly comparable with mine. One of the key first steps in a CVAR analysis is to
get a well-specified statistical model. In practice this means arriving at an unrestricted statistical model for
which the residuals exhibit small skewness and minimal autocorrelation (the hypothesis tests are generally
robust to high kurtosi); see Juselius (2006)). They did not discuss at length how they got a well-specified
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model, except for the fact that they used a lag length of 5 (they do not explicitly mention adding dummies,
heteroskedasticity, or structural breaks). They found a cointegration rank of 1, which means there is one
cointegrating relation. With two variables, this of course implies that the two variables are cointegrated with
each other. While they found evidence that the cointegration vector (referred to as β in the CVAR context)
implied by the present value model is consistent with the data, they found that previous studies imposed
restrictions on the error-correction vector (α, in the CVAR) that they were able to statistically reject. This is
good news for the present value model because it suggests that prior results were a result of mis-specification.
Their evidence suggested that dividends are weakly exogenous, which is encouraging for the present value
model because it supposes that dividends are the fundamental consideration that drives prices. However,
it leaves open several major issues previously discussed: structural change, persistence of deviations, and
unexplained roots, among others. My approach will explore these issues. I am also able to test hypotheses
about α, but my primary focus is on what the values of α teach us about the persistence of relative prices
versus absolute prices. However, as mentioned previously, I can do this for both absolute and relative prices.
Durre and Giot (2005) use a CVAR to study the behavior of stock indices for 13 developed countries -
but each country’s index is analyzed separately (in other words, their analysis is confined to absolute prices
“within-country”; it says nothing about relative prices “between-countries”. For each country, the variables
included in the CVAR are stock prices, earnings, and the government bond yield. They were able to show
evidence that the cointegrating relation does not require the inclusion of the government bond yield; but they
find find evidence of a single cointegrating relation (within each country, so 13 relations in total - but note
that these are 13 separate CVARs, not one CVAR in which 13 relations are found). However, they do not
appear to have found any evidence of an unexplained unit root; nor do they discuss the degree of persistence
in the deviations from equilibrium. One can interpret this as suggestive evidence that prices and earnings (or
dividends, which are likely to be closely related to each other) are cointegrated with each other, without need
for additional controls. This suggests that not including the bond yield in a CVAR estimation does not result
in a serious omitted variable bias. This provides some justification for the choice I (as well as Crowder and
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Wohar (1998), see above) have made against including a measure of the interest rate.
Nasseh and Strauss (2000) also use a CVAR approach. Their data covers six national-level stock indices:
Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and the UK. One of their main contributions was to
explore the possibility of a relation between international stock prices. However, this work is not a true
analysis of market efficiency (whether defined in absolute or relative terms) for two reasons: (1) their data
set does not include dividends for any of the countries; (2) they explore only the relation between the German
index and each of the other countries. Their analysis treats German stock prices as one of several fundamental
factors that could influence prices in other countries; it does not speak to whether the relative values of, say,
the UK and German stock indices are consistent with their (relative) fundamental value.7 However, they do
show that various other fundamentals appear to be related to price movements. This suggests that there is a
relation among different absolute prices and fundamentals; this may be indirect evidence that relative prices
more closely reflect fundamentals than absolute prices, as I have hypothesized, but that is not absolutely
clear and this is not a direct test.
Neither these discussions of the extant literature - CVAR or non-CVAR - should be construed as exhaus-
tive. Studies of the properties of broad stock price indices are ubiquitous in the finance literature. However,
it provides a fair summation of the general state of that literature. There is evidence of a long-run relation-
ship between dividends (or earnings) and prices, but with many caveats and adjustments being necessary
to detect that relation. There also appears to be an unaccountably high degree of persistence in the price
movements around the equilibrium. There is some evidence that there may be an unexplained root driving
the process. Finally, the reader may notice that some studies provide evidence for the presence of a struc-
tural break. There have been a few studies of absolute stock prices using the CVAR methodology, but no
analysis for relative prices. The key question I explore is whether the problems seen in absolute prices may
be reduced in relative prices. The CVAR studies that have been done leave many of the questions I intend to
explore - chiefly, unexplained roots, structural change, and persistence - underexplored. My contribution to
7Baek (2016) used a CVAR approach to explore the relation between prices, dividends and investor sentiment - but only as a
“first pass”; his primary methodology is a copula. This should not be regarded as a full CVAR study.
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the literature is therefore twofold: I will provide an examination of these issues in the more powerful CVAR
context; and I will be the first to explore the cointegration structure of both relative and absolute prices.
The next section will discuss the theoretical underpinnings of this study and the empirical methodology
of the CVAR. I will argue that consideration of both relative and absolute prices in a CVAR allows for a rich
exploration of the possible cointegrating relations and short-run dynamics governing stock price movements.
This approach may help us learn more about the reasons for the observed persistence and the nature of the
unexplained root.
3.3 Theoretical and Empirical Methodology
3.3.1 Theoretical Foundations
In Chapter 2, I mentioned that Shiller (1981)’s volatility test was criticized because it might return a spurious
result if a unit root is present in the price process. Campbell and Shiller (1988) responded to this criticism








where δt is the log of the dividend-price ratio, dt+j is the log real dividend in period t + j, ∆ denotes a first
difference, ρ is the (assumed constant) discount rate and r and k are constants. The value r is the assumed-
constant expected real one-period return; k is a constant defined by the equilibrium of the stationary series
δt.
This specification has several implications for the expected long-run properties of the data. First, it is
assumed that δt is stationary. While this is a standard assumption in the literature (see above), the fact
that prior research found evidence of unaccountably high persistence suggests that it may not be a good
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assumption. Given (??) and the stationarity of δt, however, two conclusions must follow. First, if the price
process contains a unit root, then lnPt − lnDt must be a cointegrating relation. Second, the right side of (??)
must be stationary (a stationary series cannot equal a non-stationary series). But the right side of this equation
is the discounted sum of (expected) future dividend growth rates, which implies that ∆dt is stationary.8
This can be shown by contradiction. For instance, if ∆dt+j is a simple random walk, then Et(∆dt+j) =
∆dt for all j > 0. But then the discounted sum of expected future dividend growth rates is 11−ρ∆dt. But that is
a constant times a variable that is I(1), so the series must be I(1). So we are assuming that dividends are I(1).
The present value model implies that prices are I(1) and cointegrate from I(1) to I(0) with dividends. In
other words, if δt = lnPt−lnDt is stationary, but the natural logs of prices and dividends are individually I(1),
then prices and dividends cointegrate in a way that suggests that stock prices do depend on fundamentals as
suggested by the present value model.
In addition, recall that a cointegration approach is robust to a time-varying but stationary discount rate
(like the assumption that δ is stationary, it isn’t obvious that this is a good assumption; for one thing, a non-
stationary discount rate might explain the persistence problem). This observation is the basic intuition behind
Timmermann (1995) and Bohl and Siklos (2004). While it might appear that (??) implies that dividends
should be “weakly exogenous” and prices the “purely responding” variable - that is to say, that dividends
move and prices follow - this interpretation is a bit too pedantic. A CVAR approach treats these as testable
restrictions (see below), but neither restriction is actually implied by the present value model or (??). Prices
are supposed to contain information about the stream of expected future dividends, so it would not be at all
surprising if we found evidence that price changes “affect” future dividends. But the proper interpretation
of that finding would be that prices lead dividends, not that they cause dividends. A far more sensible
interpretation of such a result would be that the statistical model did not include all variables that affect
future dividend flows. There are a myriad of variables that might affect future dividends, and therefore
current prices, but which cannot be controlled for in an econometric model. A well-functioning market
8If ∆dt+j is non-stationary, it can be shown that the discounted sum of its future values could not be stationary.
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would incorporate the signals from those variables into prices, and this would manifest itself in the form of
a result suggesting that prices “affect” future dividends.
Whether a variable is ”purely adjusting” or ”weakly exogenous” are hypotheses that can be tested in the
CVAR as restrictions on α (see below). I previously mentioned that Crowder and Wohar (1998) provided
evidence that dividends are weakly exogenous; as the previous paragraph suggests, that result is sufficient,
but not strictly necessary. The next subsection provides an overview of the CVAR approach.
3.3.2 The Cointegrated VAR: An Overview
The estimation of a Cointegrated VAR is an iterative process. One begins by estimating a general unre-
stricted model (GUM). In this chapter, I use the I(1) model (following the literature, I assume that prices and
dividends are I(1), so this is an appropriate assumption), the initial GUM with k lags takes the form:
∆xt = Γ
1∆xt−1 + Γ
2∆xt−2 + ...+ Γ
k−1∆xt−k+1 +Πxt−1 + εt (3.5)
where xt is the time-t vector of the endogenous variables. In the context of the present value model, xt =
[lnPt, lnDt]. While the GUM assumes both variables are endogenous, the hypothesis that a vairable is
weakly exogenous can be tested as a restriction on the GUM. The Γ i are matrices of short-run coefficients,
and Π is the matrix of long-run coefficients. However, (??) does not necessarily generate a well-specified
model, which is to say one for which the errors behave appropriately. Valid statistical inference requires a
model for which the errors are normal. The most problematic deviations from normality are serial correlation
and skewness. In practice, excess kurtosis and ARCH (autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity) are not
serious concerns. One checks whether the GUM is well-specified by conducting statistical tests of the
errors; if the errors of the ‘basic’ model do not meet the criteria - and they rarely, if ever, do - one constructs
a well-specified model by obtaining the correct lag length and adding additional controls such as constants,
time-dummies, or exogenous variables (if applicable) to the basic specification given by (??).
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The above representation does not explicitly include a constant, but in practice several different kinds of
constants may be employed. A restricted constant allows the equilibria of the cointegrating relation(s) to be
non-zero, but does not imply a deterministic trend in xt. An unrestricted constant allows for both a non-zero
mean in the cointegrating space and a determinstic trend in xt. Both cases are potentially consistent with the
present value model; the right side of (??) could easily be a number other than zero, which would require
a restricted constant; and there is no reason why, say, lnDt could not be a random walk with a trend.In the
context of this chapter, the theory does not strongly imply any restrictions on the constant term, so the type
of constant is chosen for purely statistical reasons.9
The methodology of Juselius (2006) recommends the use of dummy variables over the addition of extra
lags; in many applications k = 2 is sufficient. Suppose we add a dummy variable It to the GUM. It will
take one of three forms. The dummy is called a “transitory” dummy if its value over time looks like It =
(...0,0,0,1,−1,0,0, ...); such a dummy captures a change at the moment where t = 1 followed by a change
of equal magnitude but opposite direction in the next time period. Transitory dummies therefore represent
momentary “spikes” in xt with no long-lasting effect. It is called a “permanent” or “intervention” dummy
if its value over time is It = (...0,0,0,1,0,0,0, ...); such a dummy captures a permanent jump in the level of
at least one of the variables in xt occurring at the moment where t = 1. Such a dummy does nor correspond
to a change in the equilibrium around which xt fluctuates. For instance, a moment in time where prices
and dividends both increase by roughly the same percentage (with no reversal soon after) would likely
be represented by a permanent dummy. Finally, It is called a “shift” dummy if it takes the form It =
(...0,0,0,1,1,1, ...), but is restricted to lie within the cointegrating relation. Shift dummies capture a change
in the level around which the (otherwise stationary) cointegrating relation fluctuates (in other words, a change
in the restricted constant). While a transitory dummy represents a shock that does not have any long-lasting
effect, permanent and shift dummies may be thought of as evidence of structural change; they are often
found at moments in time corresponding to major policy changes or other economic events. Places where
9These are the only cases relevant to this paper, though an additional possibility exists. In the case of a cointegrated trend, the
cointegrating relations βxt fluctuate around a trend-line instead of around a constant value.
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dummies should be added are detected statistically by inspecting the standardized residuals and identifying
large outliers. This is especially useful in eliminating problems with skewness as one can eliminate large
outliers by the use of an appropriate dummy.
However, an alternative to the use of dummies is the use of extra lags (increasing the value of k, so that
there are more matrices of short-run parameters Γ i). Neither the methodology of using dummy variables nor
the methodology of using additional lags are “wrong”; they are merely different. In other words, the use of
dummies and the inclusion of extra lags may be thought of as approximate “substitutes” in the process of the
economist obtaining a well-specified model. In this chapter I will employ a hybrid of these methodologies.
Maintaining k = 2 made it very difficult to reduce serial correlation to acceptable levels; but increasing the
number of lags to k = 4 reduced this problem sharply. This is not surprising given that my data is quar-
terly; the additional lags probably capture seasonal effects that cannot be adequately captured by dummies.
However, because I am interested in examining whether there is evidence of structural change, I also employ
the dummy methodology. As mentioned above, permanent and shift dummies act as indicators of structural
change.
Once a well-specified GUM is obtained, one conducts tests to determine the cointegration rank of Π.
Since by assumption ∆xt is stationary, but xt is not, this implies two things: first, that the matrix Π is
singular (has reduced rank); and second, that Πxt defines a set of stationary linear combinations of non-
stationary variables. Part of the CVAR procedure is a test that determines the rank of Π that best fits the
data, which helps the economist determine the structure of the cointegrating relation(s). The cointegrating
relations may be thought of as equilibria around which the variables of xt fluctuate. Thus, for purposes of
studying cointegration properties, it is the Π matrix one must analyze. The cointegration rank tells one how
many separate unit roots are present in the system and how many cointegrating relations exist to which the
system is adjusting. This part of the process allows the economist to examine whether the data are consistent
with the present value model’s prediction that prices and dividends are cointegrated. It also informs an
assessment of whether the data shows evidence of the “unexplained roots” sometimes detected by previous
95
analyses. If Π is singular, it can be written:
Π = αβ′ (3.6)
where α and β are p X r matrices (r ≤ p) and p is the number of variables in xt. Once one has obtained
estimates of these matrices, one can conduct tests of restrictions on them. That is how the econometrician
can test, for example, whether the hypothesized cointegrating relation is consistent with the data. A test of
the rank of Π helps determine r. r is referred to as the cointegration rank of the system and is equal to the
number of different cointegrating relations in the system. β may be thought of as the matrix of estimates of
the coefficients of the cointegration vector(s) and α as the matrix of adjustment parameters; it is possible to
test restrictions on both α and β, either simultaneously or separately. The present value model predicts that
log prices and log dividends cointegrate such that the β vector can be written [1,−1], so that is the hypothesis
about β that I will be testing.
The magnitude of the elements of α represent roughly the proportion of deviations from equilibrium
that are eliminated every period. The value of the coefficient(s) of α may be thought of as the rate at
which deviations from equilibrium are corrected. The sign of the coefficients in α indicates whether the
“adjustments” are error-correcting or error-increasing. A positive coefficient in α should correspond to a
negative coefficient in β, and vice-versa, if there is error-correction. This is correct because if, say, Pt has a
positive coefficient in β and its value is above equilibrium, we would expect its value to decline over coming
periods; that is a negative change, which would imply a negative adjustment parameter. The present value
model does not make any specific predictions about the values of α, but we should expect to see evidence
of error-correction if prices are efficient.10 In addition, the value of the coefficient(s) in α act as a measure
of persistence. Small values of α indicate slow convergence back to equilibrium; that is, low values of α
indicate high persistence.
This methodology assumes that xt is I(1). The model is valid only is xt is I(1) or less. If, however, xt is
10If we saw error-increasing behavior, that might be consistent with a behavioral-finance “bubbles” story.
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I(2), the econometrician would be likely to detect the kind of persistence and unexplained roots commonly
seen in the literature. If this is the case, the CVAR will provide suggestive evidence of it: tests of the rank r
will suggest the presence of an unaccounted-for unit root, no matter the rank one chooses. There is another
measure of persistence available as well. Rewrite the k-lag system as an AR(1):
x̃t = Π̃x̃t−1 + εt (3.7)
where x̃t is the vector [xt,xt−1, ...xt−k+1]. The eigenvalues of Π̃ are referred to as the roots of the companion
matrix. If there is a root with modulus greater than 1, the system is explosive (one interpretation of such
a finding is that it is evidence of “bubbles”). Roots with modulus less than 1 are stationary. When one
sets the cointegration rank r, one will find p − r unit roots of the companion matrix. Any additional roots
with modulus close to or equal to 1 are evidence of unit root(s) that have not been accounted for by the
economist’s specification. If such an unexplained large root appears regardless of the economist’s choice of
cointegration rank, it is likely that the data is I(2) instead of I(1).
Exploring both absolute and relative prices in the CVAR may help address the active questions in the
literature by giving us a hint of “where” the unexplained unit root(s) lie. For instance, suppose that we detect
signs of I(2)-ness and high persistence in the absolute-price CVARs, but not in the relative-price CVARs.
One hypothesis that would explain such results is as follows. Suppose that the absolute-price vector for
an asset i, [pit,dit]′ is I(2), where p and d are log prices and log dividends respectively. In other words,
we are assuming that the percent change in prices and dividends ∆xt (the left side of (??)) is I(1) (in the
simplest case, a random walk), not I(0). What would it mean if the relative-price vector between assets i and
j - [pit − pjt,dit − djt]′ - is I(1), so that changes in relative prices and dividends are stationary? This would
appear to suggest that the relative prices and dividends (the relations (pit −pjt) and dit −djt) are themselves
cointegrating relations(specifically, cointegrating from I(2) to I(1)). In this case, the absolute-to-relative
transformation is similar to one used in a host of previous CVAR papers (outside the context of stock prices).
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These studies found evidence suggesting that the nominal-to-real transformation is a cointegrating relation
from I(2) to I(1)11.
If relative prices and relative dividends then cointegrate with each other (from I(1) to I(0)), then the
relation:
(pit − pjt)− (dit − djt) (3.8)
is cointegrating from I(2) to I(0). That would indicate a root held in common across prices and a root held
in common across dividends, with each individual price series driven by both of these roots. Notice that the
strategy of using the CVAR - even the I(1) version - on both absolute and relative prices may provide greater
insight than the use of the CVAR with absolute prices alone.
In this paper, I use the I(1) CVAR for both absolute and relative prices; in the absolute-price models,
xt is [pt,dt]; in the relative-price models,p ad d are replaced by pi − pj and di − dj respectively. Other
than this change, the analysis of relative prices follows the methods used for absolute prices quite closely. I
choose to employ the I(1) model instead of a more general approach that is robust to the inclusion of I(2)
variables because previous I(1) CVAR studies have not sufficiently addressed the question of whether an
unaccounted-for unit root explains the persistence problem (see above). It remains unclear whether the I(2)
approach is necessary.
I now turn to a description of the data used in this paper.
3.4 The Data
My data source is Ken Frenchs website, from which I have downloaded returns data for 5 industry portfolios.
This data is monthly, beginning in July 1926 and ending in December 2018. There is no actual “price” for
these portfolios, so I set the price of each portfolio at the beginning of my sample equal to 100. The data
11To clarify further: suppose Xt is some nominal variable - say an exchange rate - and Pt is the price level; the CVAR studies
suggest that lnXt and lnPt are I(2), but lnXt − lnPt is I(1).
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is returns data in percent terms, but includes returns both with and without dividends. The return without
dividends is the percent change in the price of the portfolio, so I can measure the percent change in the
price of the portfolio through each period. Since the data includes returns both with and without dividends,
I am also able to measure the change in the dividend paid in each period. The below table lists the 5
sectors covered by the data. With 5 sectors, there will be 5 absolute prices and 10 relative prices. I also
run an absolute-price CVAR for the market as a whole to examine the secondary hypothesis of whether
disaggregating the market gives improved results for absolute prices (see Chapters 1 and 2).






These sectors are broadly defined and diverse and, taken together, include all stocks listed on NYSE,
NASDAQ, and AMEX. Stocks are filed into each portfolio by industry, according to 4-digit SIC codes 12.
Since the data provides the percent change in prices and the dividend yield in each period, I am able
to calculate the nominal price and dividend paid for each sector portfolio in each period. I convert these
values to real prices and dividends by dividing the nominal data by the value of the CPI for each period.13
Nevertheless, this data is imperfect. The present value model suggests that the log of prices and the log of
dividends are cointegrated. Clearly, then, the endogenous variables in my analysis must be lnPt and lnDt.
But there are industry portfolios with 0-dividend observations in certain months; this creates an observation
with an ‘undefined quantity. This problem can be addressed by converting the data from monthly to (end-
of-period) quarterly. While an alternative to this approach is to construct monthly average dividends and
prices over each quarter, doing so introduces intractable econometric problems. Estimates of variances,
covariances, and autocorrelations are biased in time-averaged data. These biases are time-varying in nature,
which means there is no straightforward correction. But the problem is actually even worse than that. The
12See Appendix I for a brief description of the kinds of specific firm types that may be found in each portfolio.
13Further details available on request.
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three biases cannot all be corrected for simultaneously. One can use filtering techniques to address any
two of the problems, but the third problem will persist (see Wilson, Jones, and Ludstrum (2001) 175, 177 -
178, 189). In order to avoid these problems, I opt to use quarterly data; while the sample size is therefore
proportionately smaller, it is still over 360 observations. Statistical analysis was conducted using the CATS
package in RATS.
3.5 CVAR Results: Structural Change
In this section, I summarize the results of the CVAR analysis for each sector and each distinct relative price.
First, I briefly discuss the general methodology employed to develop each GUM after initial estimation.
Next, I summarize the estimates for each (well-specified) general unrestricted model (GUM). This includes
a summary of what kind of constant terms were used, the dummies, and other breaks employed. Particular
attention will be paid to the dummies, which as mentioned previously act as indicators of effects of structural
change. I then compare these results for absolute prices against those for relative prices and discuss what
these results teach us about the market. Second, I discuss the results for some of the “core hypotheses” of the
present value model. These include whether the cointegrating relation observed in the data is β = [1,−1],
as hypothesized by the present value mode,l and the implication that prices should move in response to
dividends, which is a hypothesis about the structure of α. Finally, I summarize what the results suggest
regarding persistence. (A fuller discussion of what these results teach us is provided in the next section).
3.5.1 Well-Specified Models: Methodology and Structure
As mentioned previously, a well-specified GUM is needed to perform valid statistical tests o the Π matrix.
This requires that the errors are normally distributed and are not auto-correlated. CATS uses the Shenton-
Bowman procedure to generate estimates of skewness and kurtosis that are adjusted for small sample sizes.
The resulting test statistic for univariate normality is a weighted average of the adjusted skewness and kur-
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tosis measures, and is distributed χ2 with 2 degrees of freedom. The CATS residual analysis procedure also
provides tests of residual autocorrelation as well as measures of sample skewness and kurtosis. If one is able
to obtain a model for which the null hypothesis of residual normality cannot be rejected, it is clear that the
skewness is not “too high;” if it were, we would reject normality. However, the tests of restrictions on Π
that will be used are minimally sensitive to ARCH and to excess kurtosis (see Juselius (2006) 74 - 75 and
citations therein). In practice, this means that we must be chiefly concerned with residual skewness and au-
tocorrelation. In other words, non-normality is acceptable if it is due to excess kurtosis. If so, the economist
must take steps to ensure that the skewness is not too high. Financial data frequently exhibits high kurtosis,
so it is usually quite difficult to get normally-distributed residuals. If my data exhibits excess kurtosis, then,
I must adopt a procedure to evaluate whether the skewness is too high.
In my data, excess kurtosis is indeed present. Therefore it was necessary to adopt some kind of rule for
evaluating whether the skewness was too high. While skewness and kurtosis statistics are asymptotically
normal, convergence may be slow. Using the Shenton-Bowman adjustment for skewness and with sample
size T = 367 (see Juselius (2006) 75 - 76 for details), one can calculate the contribution of the skewness
term to the normality test statistic. In the few papers that have used the CVAR methodology in studies of
stock prices (see above), I could not identify a clear procedure for addressing this problem. Juselius (2006)
also does not provide any explicit recommendations on these lines except for providing the details of the
Shenton-Bowman procedure (see Juselius (2006) 75 - 77). I therefore chose to adopt as restrictive a rule as
reasonably possible for judging whether skewness is too high. Given that the 10% critical value for a χ2
with 2 degrees of freedom is 4.605, I chose to adopt a rule that considered the skewness to be “too high” if
the skewness term’s contribution exceeded this value. The cutoff value for this is a skewness of roughly 0.62
(in absolute value). Note that this procedure is more restrictive (requires lower skewness) than using, say,
the 5% critical value, which would be higher and therefore allow a larger value for skewness.
The residual analysis procedure in CATS provides 3 tests of residual autocorrelation: the Ljung-Box test
and two LM tests. In most cases, I was able to arrive at a model for which the null hypotheses of no autocor-
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relation could not be rejected at a significance level of 5%. I provide diagrams of residual autocorrelations
in an appendix. While some previous CVAR research often finds that a VAR(2) and proper dummy use are
sufficient to eliminate autocorrelation, my models will be VAR(4)s. In all cases, including fewer than 4 lags
made it exceedingly difficult to eliminate residual autocorrelation. Lag selection tests also indicated that
using 2 or 3 lags resulted in significant loss of explanatory power, even when including seasonal dummies.
3.5.2 GUM Results for Absolute Prices
The table below summarizes the structure of each GUM for absolute prices. The second column is the type
of constant term used; the third through sixth columns display the number of each type of dummy or break
used in each model.
Table 3.2: Dummies, Breaks, and Constant Terms, Absolute Prices
Constant Term Transitory Permanent Shift Break
Market Restricted 1 15 1 0
Consumer Restricted 4 9 5 3
Manufacturing Unrestricted 1 22 5 6
Hi-Tech Restricted 1 6 0 3
Health Restricted 7 7 0 2
Other Restricted 1 19 12 0
The entries in the three right-most columns may be roughly thought to represent incidents of structural
change; there are 115 in total across the 6 absolute prices. On average, then, there are 19.17 structural change
events per series. The transitory dummies are not counted in this total because they represent “unusual”
events that neither changed the underlying structure nor had a permanent effect on the level of either variable.
The “Break” column in the above table gives the count of unrestricted shift dummies. These are different
from the “shift” dummies in that the latter are restricted to lie in the cointegration space; the unrestricted
breaks are not. They represent a change in the unrestricted constant term. In the cases for which the constant
term is restricted, but unrestricted breaks are present, the unrestricted constant is 0 at the beginning of the
sample but shifts to a non-zero value at some point.
Each of these dummies has its own economic interpretation. Permanent dummies represent unantici-
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pated events that affect the level of Pt and/or Dt, but have no permanent effect on their growth rates or on
the equilibrium of the cointegrating relation. Shift dummies represent points at which the equilibrium of
the cointegrating relation changes. Given equation (??), this may occur for several reasons; one notable
possibility in this category is a discrete shift in the discount rate. An unrestricted break indicates that the
unrestricted constant term in the CVAR has shifted. This indicates a change in the underlying growth rate
of dividends and/or prices; but it is also possible that the break is associated with changes over time in the
discount rate.
Many of the dummies and breaks are clustered together within small windows of time (see Figure 3.1).
The most notable such cluster falls during the period of the Great Depression. For the Consumer sector, 8
of the dummies fall between 1929 Q4 and 1939 Q4. 15 of the dummies used in the model for the “Other”
sector fell in the same period, as did 16 of the dummies and breaks used in the model for the Manufacturing
sector. For the High-Tech sector, all of the dummies (but none of the breaks) fell between 2000 Q4 and 2012
Q4.
In general, the dates of these dummies mostly correspond to major economic or historical events, such
as the onset of the Great Depression, ongoing events in financial markets during the early years of the
depression, the stock market crash of 1987, and the onset of the Great Recession. This is evidence in favor
103
of the proposition that these dummies represent structural change. We would expect that, if structural change
matters, discrete breaks are likely to coincide with major economic events. Therefore, from the absolute price
GUMs alone, we can conclude that structural change is an important component of movements in prices and
dividends. The question is whether the signs of structural change effects are reduced in relative prices. To
examine this question, I turn to the results for relative prices.
3.5.3 GUM Results for Relative Prices
Table 3.3, below, summarizes the structure of each GUM for relative prices. The constant term column is
removed from this table; a restricted constant was used in every case. Consumer/HiTec and Manufactur-
ing/HiTec were run in two separate samples for reasons discussed below. Subsample 1 for Consumer/HiTec
ends in 1975 Q1. Subsample 1 for Manufacturing/HiTec ends in 1980 Q1.
Table 3.3: Dummies, Breaks, and Constant Terms, Relative Prices
Transitory Permanent Shift Break
Cons/Manuf 3 4 0 0
Cons/Health 7 3 1 0
Cons/Hi-Tech (1) 1 1 6 0
Cons/Hi-Tech (2) 0 1 4 0
Cons/Other 1 5 1 0
Manuf/Health 1 4 1 0
Manuf/HiTec (1) 1 4 1 0
Manuf/Hi-Tech (2) 2 2 4 0
Manuf/Other 4 5 2 0
Health/Hi-Tech 2 4 2 0
Health/Other 2 5 1 0
Hi-Tech/Other 2 11 2 2
Abbreviations used in the above table: Cons =
Consumer, Manuf = Manufacturing.
Notice that there are only 74 permanent and shift dummies and 2 unrestricted breaks across these 12
models. Add the 2 sample splits and we have a total of 78 breaks - markedly fewer than the 115 total
in the 6 absolute-price models. A better way to look at this, though, is the number of breaks per price
series. Consider, as an example, a permanent dummy that appears in the GUM for the manufacturing sector
(absolute prices). If the event captured by this dummy was idiosyncratic to the sector, we would expect
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it to have an effect on all the relative prices involving the manufacturing sector. Since there are 4 such
relative prices, we’d expect 4 dummies to appear - one for each relative price. However, suppose the dummy
represents a “macro” event (a shock that has a common effect across sectors). When one takes relative prices,
the common effect of the macro events would largely cancel out. There are on average 19.17 dummies per
series for absolute prices and 7.8 per relative price. This is about 40% of the number for absolute prices.
Since many of the breaks appear around the dates of major macroeconomic events, it appears that many - but
not all - of the absolute-price breaks represent similar changes across sectors and are connected to “macro”
events. This is evidence in favor of an argument I made in Chapter 1: that the relationship between absolute
and relative prices is clearer in relative prices because the effects of macro events are canceled out in relative
prices.
In the relative price GUMs, the clustering of dummies is still present - but the degree to which the
dummies correspond across sectors is reduced. The biggest cluster of dummies still falls during the Great
Depression. 33 of the dummies and 1 of the 2 breaks, spread across all 12 models, fall during the 1929 Q4
to 1939 Q4 window. There are 9 dummies at dates roughly around the market crash of 1987, 6 of which
are in models involving the “Other” sector. Since the Other sector includes financial firms, these dummies
may correspond to the market crash of 1987 as well as events associated with the Savings and Loan crisis,
which began in the latter half of the 1980s. In addition, 18 dummies fall between 1999 Q4 and 2002 Q4,
but 15 of those 18 were used in models for which one of the two sectors was Hi-Tech. This is consistent
with the idea that these dummies represent possibly rational revisions in the market’s forecast: events that
should affect the Hi-Tech sector affect relative prices involving the Hi-Tech sector; events affecting the
financial sector affect Other, which is where financial stocks are found in my data. In addition, 10 dummies
fell between 2008 Q2 and 2009 Q2 - all of them in regressions involving at least one of the HiTec or
Other sectors and 7 of which involved specifically Other. These observations are consistent with the idea
that dummies in the CVAR methodology should ideally reflect shifts or changes connected to underlying
economic events. In the context of relative prices, though, the dummies reflect events that alter the prospects
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of one sector in comparison with another. For instance, we might expect to see evidence of breaks for relative
prices involving the “Other” sector at around the time of the bank runs of 1930 because those events could
plausibly be interpreted as negative news for specifically the financial sector, which is part of “Other”. We
see other dummies located in time periods that are consistent with this interpretation; for example, dummies
for periods associated with the so-called “Dot Com bubble” are concentrated in the HiTec sector, as we’d
expect, and dummies associated with the financial crisis and recession of 2008 - 2009 are clustered in Other,
which as just mentioned is the sector in which stocks of financial firms are found.
We can also potentially learn something from the type of dummy or break. Permanent dummies are
indicative of an unanticipated event that moved the level of prices and/or dividends, but do not change
the underlying cointegrating relation (given by (??)). Such events affect neither the discount rate ρ nor
the expected future dividend growth rate. As mentioned previously, a shift dummy represents a change
in the constant around which the cointegrating relation fluctuates - therefore, by (??), a discrete change
in the discount rate ρ or a shift in the market’s forecast of future dividend growth rates. An unrestricted
break implies a change in the trend rate of growth of dividends and/or prices, in addition to a change in the
restricted constant. It might also reflect a gradual drift in the discount rate. However, most of the dummies
and breaks are associated with moments of economic upheaval; it is not at all clear why shifts in ρ - a
parameter that reflects investors’ preferences - would shift at times and in ways that are so closely associated
with macroeconomic events. Moreover, because previous work has not found strong evidence that prices
and dividends cointegrate with the interest rate (see Durre and Giot (2005), discussed above), it is hard
to argue that the shifts reflect ρ moving in concert with interest rates. Therefore, a more straightforward
interpretation is that these breaks represent the market coping with Knightian uncertainty: the events were
not fully anticipated, so market participants had to adjust their forecasts in response to those events.
There were 27 shifts or breaks in the relative price models and 27 in the absolute-price models. As
mentioned previously, the proper way to compare breaks in absolute prices This suggests that this kind of
structural change occurs more frequently for absolute prices than relative prices because there are 4.5 per
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absolute series and 2.7 per relative series. That is consistent with the overall dummy counts: more frequent
structural change for absolute than relative prices. Because the shifts and breaks are likely to represent the
market coping with Knightian uncertainty, this corroborates the interpretation that the market finds it harder
to forecast absolute prices than relative prices.
In summary, the evidence related to structural change indicates that structural change plays a greater
role in moving absolute prices than relative prices. The clustering of dummies suggests that this structural
change is a result of the market coping with Knightian uncertainty (that is to say, unanticipated events). This
evidence suggests that the market finds it harder to accurately forecast absolute prices and dividends than
relative prices and dividends. This is consistent with the idea that many “macro” events are hard to predict,
but when such events occur, the market revises its forecasts in sensible ways. These “macro” events do not
always affect the relative prices of different sectors, which indicates that these events often do not cause the
market to revise their forecasts of the relative future prospects of different sectors.
If Knightian uncertainty explains a significant part of these price movements, then it is not necessarily
“irrational” behavior by market participants that is driving price movements. These price movements may
well reflect rational market participants doing their best to construct reliable forecasts while coping with
Knightian uncertainty. It would follow, then, that if an economist tests an asset price model, but fails to
account for this reality, they could easily get results that appear to suggest “inefficiency” or “irrationality.”
But this interpretation of those results is suspect because the economist has the wrong model of rational
forecasting. If, when we account for Knightian uncertainty, we get results that are more consistent with
rational forecasting behaviors, it means that a model without Knightian uncertainty is the wrong model.
More specifically, a VAR or even CVAR - which suggest that future outcomes follow from past outcomes -
is not a good characterization of the way real-world markets forecast future events.
In addition, I noted that clustering of dummies was observed for relative prices as well as absolute, but
these clusters were not common across sectors (with the exception of the Great Depression). For example,
in relative prices, clusters of dummies associated with the so-called “Dot com bubble” were largely concen-
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trated in the HiTec sector. This suggests that the events of the time caused the market to update its forecasts
about specifically the HiTec sector’s prospects relative to other sectors. We don’t observe evidence of struc-
tural change at that time for, say, the Consumer/Manufacturing relative price, probably because the market
“knew” that the events of that time were not relevant to the relative prospects of those sectors. This also is
consistent with the idea that the market finds it harder to forecast absolute prices - macro events often line up
with dummies in absolute prices, which appear more frequently than in relative prices. When those events
occur, the market revises its forecasts and absolute prices move in response - but we frequently observe no
effect in relative prices.
3.5.4 Other Structural Change Tests
Dummies, however, are not the only way to detect structural change in the CVAR. Recursive estimation of
the system also allows one to test whether certain estimated parameters of the model are stable over time.
One of the most important considerations is whether β is constant over the sample. This test is known as the
“Max test of β Constancy.” This test is known to be conservative - that is, it rarely rejects the null hypothesis
that β is constant. The test statistic is estimated for the full system X(t) and for the long-run components of
the system, R(t), which is the full system with the dummies and short-run components subtracted out. The
value of the statistic is plotted over time. For absolute prices, the manufacturing sector exhibits evidence
of non-constancy in the full system X(t) - the test exceeds the 95% critical value for almost the entire first
half of the sample. However, the evidence is much weaker for the long-run component, for which there is
only a brief spike in 1975 (see Figure 3.2). The test statistic there does not quite exceed the critical value,
but is very close. For the other 4 sectors, there is mixed evidence that the short-run components exhibit
more structural instability than the long-run component (because the test statistic for X(t) is usually either
roughly the same as or larger than the statistic for R(t)). See the appendices for graphs of these tests. This
structural instability in the short-run parameters is not a major issue for purposes of this research, but could
be an interesting topic for future work.
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Figure 3.1: Test of Beta Constancy: Manufacturing Sector
However, when I performed the same test for relative prices, I found that in two cases (Consumer/HiTec
and Manufacturing/HiTec), it was necessary to split the sample. In the case of Consumer/HiTec, this was
because the test of β constancy could be rejected for roughly the period 1975 - 1991 (see graph in the ap-
pendix). I therefore split the sample at 1975 Q1. For Manufacturing/HiTec, the test of β constancy could
not be rejected - but attempts to obtain a well-specified model in the full sample revealed a specification
problem. It was impossible to reduce both autocorrelation and skewness to acceptable levels. Specification
changes that reduced one invariably resulted in increases in the other. This itself is a signal of misspecifica-
tion: “(s)olving one problem frequently reveals a new misspecification problem that was previously hidden”
(Juselius (2006) p. 77). Since this issue was difficult to solve, and because the test of β constancy didn’t
provide a clear signal, I examined additional recursive tests. The fluctuation test of the eigenvalues revealed
moderate evidence of structural instability. The test statistic closely approached the 95% critical value dur-
ing a period between 1980 and 1985 and again during the 2000s. A similar test for the constancy of the
trace statistics showed somewhat more robust evidence of instability for roughly the same time periods. I
therefore split the sample in Q1 1980.
The fact that I needed to split the sample for two of the relative prices but none of the absolute prices
might seem to contradict the argument made above - that there is more evidence of structural change for
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absolute than relative prices. While there is some merit to this intuition, it should not be given too much
weight. Firstly, the fact that there were fewer dummies used for relative prices may explain the apparent
non-constancy of β. In absolute prices, the use of numerous dummies may have simply captured structural
change effects more thoroughly than when fewer dummies were employed in the relative price models. This
may have manifested itself as evidence of a non-constant β in those two relative prices. However, it is also
worth noting that we weren’t able to reject β = [1,−1] for the sub-samples at high confidence. If β were
really not constant, we’d expect to see stronger evidence of that in the estimated values of β in the sub-
samples. It is therefore likely that the sample-splitting acted as a “substitute,” so to speak, for the use of
other structural change indicators.
The natural question that follows from this reasoning is: are price movements consistent with the present
value model after we account for Knightian uncertainty? I examine this question in the next section.
3.6 CVAR Results: Cointegration and Exogeneity
In this section, I summarize results for tests of the core hypotheses of the present value model. First I
conducted a test of the cointegration rank r of the system. I do not discuss the results of these tests at length
- in every case we could reject r = 0, which means the system is not stationary (full results available on
request). This implies that there is some cointegrating relation present.
3.6.1 Tests of Cointegration
The present value model implies that the relation lnPt−lnDt is cointegrating from I(1) to I(0) (lnP and lnD
are assumed to be individually I(1)). This implies a null hypothesis about the β vector in the CVAR; namely,
that β = [1,−1]. The null hypothesis in this case is consistent with market efficiency. I therefore conducted a
test of this restriction (allowing the restricted constant to take any value). Table 3.4 presents the test statistics
for absolute prices, and Table 3.5 presents the test statistics for relative prices. In all cases the test statistic
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Significance levels marked by asterisks as follows: * = 10% ; ** =
5% ; *** = 1%.




Cons/HiTec (1) 5.000** 3.257*
Cons/HiTec (2) 0.176 0.088
Cons/Other 1.428 1.030
Manuf/Hlth 0.135 0.085
Manuf/HiTec (1) 0.180 0.098





Cons = Consumer, Manuf = Manufacturing. Significance levels
marked by asterisks as follows: * = 10% ; ** = 5% ; *** = 1%.
is distributed χ2 with one degree of freedom. The “adjusted” column for each table is the test statistic
multiplied by the Bartlett correction factor (a finite-sample correction; note that it varies by specification and
is only an approximation for models that use dummies and breaks). Because the unadjusted results are based
on a large-sample, asymptotic-distribution assumption, the adjusted results should probably be viewed as
somewhat more reliable.
The results summarized in Tables 3.4 and 3.5 are broadly consistent with the present value model. We
cannot reject β = [1,−1] for any of the absolute prices. We cannot reject the hypothesis for 9 of the 12
relative-price regressions; and in the other cases, we fail to reject at the 5% level after finite-sample correc-
tion. While we can reject the hypothesis at the 10% confidence level (and after finite-sample adjustment)
for 2 of the 12 sectors, note that one of these rejections is for the Consumer/Hi-Tech relative price. That is
one of the two cases where we had to split the sample; perhaps this results suggests that we need abother
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Table 3.6: Tests of Weak Exogeneity, Absolute Prices
Prices Prices (Adjusted) Dividends Dividends (Adjusted)
Market 2.710 1.621 20.923**** 12.511***
Consumer 3.976 2.765 5.742* 3.993
Manufacturing 1.416 0.537 0.444 0.168
Health 0.378 0.294 66.217*** 51.450***
HiTec 6.784** 3.177 1.610 0.754
Other 3.388 1.688 3.010 1.500
Significance levels
marked by asterisks as follows: * = 10% ; ** = 5% ; *** = 1%.
split, but that is hardly clear because the rejection is not at all robust. This can hardly be considered good
evidence against the present value model; in fact, the overall results are in favor of the present value model
for both absolute and relative prices. In conjunction with the results discussed in the preceding section, this
is evidence in favor of the present value model, but with the caveat that the relationship is clearer in the data
for relative prices because the effects of Knightian uncertainty are not as strong in relative price data.
3.6.2 Tests of Variable Exogeneity
Another way to examine the relation between prices and fundamentals in the CVAR is to test whether prices
or dividends are “weakly exogenous”. A variable is weakly exogenous if it does not respond to deviations
from equilibrium. Statistically, this is a test that there is a zero-row in α. For example, if dividends are
weakly exogenous, in a two variable system the Π matrix could be written:
Π = ([αP ,0])
′ ∗ β′ (3.9)
where αP is the (non-zero) adjustment parameter for prices. I tested for weak exogeneity jointly with the
restriction that β = [1,−1]. The test statistic is distributedχ2 with 2 degrees of freedom; if the null hypothesis
is rejected, the data suggests that the variable is not weakly exogenous. Table 3.6 summarizes the results of
these tests for absolute prices, and Table 3.7 for relative prices.
For absolute prices, we rejected dividends being weakly exogenous for the market as a whole and for
the health sector. We did not in any case have a robust rejection of prices being weakly exogenous. For
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Table 3.7: Tests of Weak Exogeneity, Relative Prices
Prices Prices (Adjusted) Dividends Dividends (Adjusted)
Cons/Manuf 0.730 0.525 9.817*** 7.067**
Cons/Hlth 0.553 0.403 11.939*** 8.700**
Cons/HiTec (1) 5.553* 3.870 13.627*** 9.497***
Cons/HiTec (2) 0.789 0.439 2.409 1.339
Cons/Other 3.831 2.917 13.130*** 9.997***
Manuf/Hlth 0.425 0.287 9.302** 6.275**
Manuf/HiTec (1) 0.830 0.498 16.578*** 9.943***
Manuf/HiTec (2) 14.970*** 10.492*** 4.925* 3.451
Manuf/Other 3.706 3.015 16.966*** 13.804***
Hlth/HiTec 5.068* 3.519 7.308** 5.074*
Hlth/Other 1.539 1.084 8.066** 5.682*
HiTec/Other 1.555 1.162 10.123*** 7.561**
Significance
levels marked by asterisks as follows: * = 10% ; ** = 5% ; *** = 1%.
relative prices, we fail to reject the hypothesis that prices are weakly exogenous in every case but one. We
also reject that dividends are weakly exogenous at the 5% level in 8 of 12 cases (and at 10% in two others).
This might seem to be the opposite of what we would have expected to find: since prices should be related
to fundamentals, shouldn’t we expect that prices respond to dividends, not the other way around? However,
one must keep in mind what patterns in the data these results reflect. The finding reflects a pattern of prices
moving prior to dividends; in the CVAR analysis this makes it appear that dividends are the “adjusting”
variable. But this may be occurring because the market is receiving signals about future relative dividends
that are not available in my data, and bidding prices up (or down) accordingly. In other words, the finding
may reflect the fact that the market’s forecast is superior to the CVAR’s forecast.
In other words, one might think that these results suggest that price movements are not connected to
dividends. However, the results also suggest that changes in dividends seem to “follow” price movements,
because they co-move in a way that is consistent with the present value model. Therefore, we should be
skeptical of the claim that the tests of weak exogeneity suggest that the present value model is wrong. In
the previous subsection, I mentioned that the economist may get results that look “bad” for the present value
model because the economist has the “wrong model” - one that ignores Knightian uncertainty. A related
problem may be present here. It may well be the case that the market is better at forecasting changes in
113
future dividends than the simple CVAR employed here. In that case, and if the present value model is a good
description of how prices evolve, market prices would move ahead of when the CVAR would expect to see
that movement. This would create the illusion that prices are moving and dividends are responding to those
movements. In addition, the reader should recall that the estimated values of α are usually quite small. This
implies high persistence. But higher persistence means adjustment to equilibrium takes a long time. This
slow adjustment means it may be difficult for the test to detect the fact that the adjustments are taking place
(hence, we couldn’t reject that either prices or dividends are weakly exogenous in several cases).
One possible reason for price movements that don’t appear to be connected to dividends is a time-
varying discount rate. While it might appear that this could explain the results described herein, as I noted
previously, a shift in the discount rate ρ that moves prices would also result in a shift in the equilibrium of
the cointegrating relation. But in the CVAR, shift dummies are able to account for these movements. Even
if the model specifications I have used here failed to fully account for such changes in the discount rate, this
apparent explanation is still unsatisfactory. It fails to explain why dividends would appear to adjust to price
movements in a way that is consistent with no shift in the constant term. The fact that relative dividends
appear to adjust to price movements can be plausibly interpreted as indirect evidence against a time-varying
discount rate. For a time-varying discount rate to explain these results, the model would also have to provide
a cogent explanation for why changes in ρ seem to be connected to future movements in dividends that are,
coincidentally, exactly what we’d expect to see if the present value model is right and the discount rate is
constant (at least, constant during sub-periods between shift dummies). We might put this another way:
these results appear to suggest that relative dividends are adjusting to prices. If the “real” explanation is a
time-varying discount rate, what is the mechanism by which changes in preferences just happen to occur
in advance of changes in dividends, and why do those dividend changes just happen to be consistent with
what we’d expect to observe if the discount rate is constant? Absent such a mechanism, this isn’t really an
explanation at all.
The evidence from the weak exogeneity tests is in accord with the results from the GUM: the data is
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Table 3.8: Estimates of α, Absolute Prices
Price Dividend Sum
Market 0.012 0.033 0.045
Consumer 0.046 0.065 0.111
Manufacturing 0.040 0.013 0.053
Health 0.002 0.023 0.025
HiTec 0.029 0.013 0.042
Other 0.021 0.025 0.046
Average 0.028 0.028 0.055
Standard Deviation 0.017 0.022 0.033
consistent with the present value model for both absolute and relative prices once we allow for structural
change. But the data is also more consistent with the idea that price movements may be driven by the market
coping with Knightian uncertainty than with a time-varying discount rate.
The results for absolute prices are quite different: we cannot reject that either prices or dividends are
weakly exogenous in 4 of 6 cases. This is indirect evidence that there is a persistence problem. Failing
to reject that either variable is weakly exogenous is a sign that adjustment to equilibrium is very slow, or
in other words that deviations from equilibrium persist for a very long time. Fortunately, there are other
methods in the CVAR that allow us to measure persistence. I review these measures in the next section.
3.7 CVAR Results: Persistence
The CVAR provides several ways to measure the degree of persistence present in the data. Herein I provide
results for two of these measures. First, I review the estimates of α. As mentioned previously, estimates of α
provide a measure of persistence. Smaller values indicate slower convergence, therefore higher persistence.
Second, I review findings regarding large unexplained roots of the companion matrix (see above for details).
3.7.1 Persistence Measures: Adjustment Parameters
Tables 3.8 and 3.9 provide estimates of the (absolute) values of α (after imposing r = 1 and β = [1,−1], but
without imposing restrictions on α itself) for absolute and relative prices, respectively.
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Table 3.9: Estimates of α, Relative Prices
Price Dividend Sum
Cons/Manuf 0.001 0.048 0.049
Cons/Hlth 0.004 0.099 0.103
Cons/HiTec (1) 0.014 0.131 0.145
Cons/HiTec (2) 0.010 0.055 0.065
Cons/Other 0.021 0.122 0.143
Manuf/Hlth 0.005 0.053 0.058
Manuf/HiTec (1) 0.010 0.103 0.113
Manuf/HiTec (2) 0.042 0.035 0.077
Manuf/Other 0.011 0.074 0.085
Hlth/HiTec 0.003 0.028 0.031
Hlth/Other 0.018 0.080 0.098
HiTec/Other 0.006 0.061 0.067
Average 0.012 0.074 0.086
Standard Deviation 0.011 0.033 0.036
The sum of the α coefficients provides a good approximation for the proportion of deviations from
equlibrium that are expected to disappear from one period to the next. The values of α are small, especially
for prices. A coefficient of 0.05 implies a “half-life” of 13 - 14 periods - more than 3 years14. Since a number
of the sums are smaller than this, this suggests very slow convergence back to equilibrium.
We can also get a sense of whether the degree of persistence is different for relative than absolute prices.
With the means and standard deviations of the α coefficients for prices, dividends, and their sums (see above),
one can conduct a standard T-test of whether two sample means are equal. The results of these tests show no
detectable difference in means for the price coefficients (Test statistic = 1.85, 6 degrees of freedom). Nor is
there a statistically significant difference for the sums (Test statistic = 1.72, 9 degrees of freedom). However,
the α coefficients for relative dividends have a larger mean than those for absolute dividends (Difference =
0.046, test statistic = 3.39, 12 degrees of freedom).
That difference (0.046) is not small: it means the rate of convergence back to equilibrium is more than
twice that for relative dividends than for absolute dividends. The reason we cannot detect a difference for
the sums, even though the difference is of similar magnitude, may be due to small sample size (of estimates
- only 6 absolute-price estimates and 12 relative-price estimates).
14In this context, the half-life refers to the amount of time it takes for half of a given deviation to dissipate.
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Table 3.10: Large Roots of Companion Matrix, Absolute Prices
Roots






The present value model states that the price of a stock (or portfolio) equals the present discounted value
of future dividend streams. But we observed that deviations from this “fundamental value” - represented
herein by the equilibrium of the cointegrating relation - last a long time. The generally small values of α
imply slow adjustment back towards equilibrium. In other words, prices don’t fluctuate tightly around the
fundamental value. They undergo long swings away from the fundamental value and converge back to it
quite slowly. High persistence does indeed seem to be a problem for absolute prices, but the problem is
noticeably reduced for relative prices. This suggests that the relation between prices and fundamentals may
be closer for relative prices than absolute prices.
This approach of looking at the α estimates does not, however, help us address the issue of uncontrolled
unit roots. For that, I turn to an examination of the companion matrices.
3.7.2 Persistence Measures: Unit Roots
Tables 3.10 and 3.11 report the magnitudes of unexplained roots of the companion matrix larger than 0.85.
(Note that this cutoff point is arguably somewhat low: the “half-life” corresponding to a root of 0.85 is
between 4 and 5 periods, or just over a year in quarterly data).
These results are broadly consistent with what we observed from the α coefficients. There is clear
evidence of unexplained persistence in both absolute and relative prices. Every model contains at least one
unexplained root close to 1. Moreover, in some absolute-price models there is a second large root. These are
classic signals that the data is I(2) instead of I(1). Unfortunately, because there is at least one unexplained
root present for both absolute and relative prices, it is difficult to draw specific conclusions about the nature
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of that root. We can, however, conclude that there seems to be a root that is not held in common across
sectors (If the only unaccounted-for root in the absolute price models was common to all sectors, we would
be very unlikely to detect it in the relative prices). Three explanations of this persistence are possible.
Two of these three explanations are different versions of the same problem: we are using a poor model
of price movements. In the first of these cases, the model offers a poor representation of what “rational
forecasting” looks like. If Knightian uncertainty plays a major role, price movements could reflect the
market gradually revising its forecasts as it copes with such uncertainty. Slow but continuous revisions
of forecasting strategies could easily produce the persistence we observe and would explain why the model
predicts far too little persistence in price movements. Second, the model used herein could be wrong because
it ignored a time-varying discount rate. If the discount rate varies, and if its movements through time are
persistent, price movements would reflect that persistence. For instance, if the discount rate for stocks is
related to interest rates, failing to account for interest rates could produce the unexplained persistence we
observed. However, our observation that relative dividends don’t appear to exhibit as much persistence,
and therefore appear to adjust to equilibrium, suggests a degree of skepticism towards this explanation (in
addition, recall that results from the preceding sections are not as consistent with a time-varying discount
rate as with Knightian uncertainty. The third explanation is, in short, market inefficiency. In this case,
we have a good model of rational forecasting - but the market does not use this forecasting strategy. This
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explanation is consistent with the basic story told by behavioral finance models. The persistence we observe
is a consequence of “non-fundamental” forecasting strategies (e.g. chartism).
There is more to be said about the unexplained roots in the companion matrices. This evidence suggests
that a model that says prices and dividends should be I(1) is missing something - a large root in the compan-
ion matrix suggests that the data may be I(2). There is little that we can confidently say about this root - it’s
called an “unexplained” root for a reason - except that it isn’t ‘canceled out’ in relative prices. This means
that one potential explanation for persistence in absolute prices - that an unexplained unit root comes from
a “macro” or market-wide stochastic trend - does not appear to be consistent with the data. A root held in
common across absolute prices would be unlikely to appear for relative prices. In other words, such a root
would mean absolute prices are I(2), but cointegrate with each other (from I(2) to I(1)). But then the I(1)
analysis for relative prices would not be likely to exhibit any evidence of an extra root.
These findings say much more about the need for future research than about the validity of the present
value model. If the data is I(2), the proper mode of analysis is an I(2) CVAR. The I(1) analysis would be
misspecified, almost perforce. Nevertheless, these findings are not wholly invalid or spurious - merely in-
complete. They are informative for a researcher working on an I(2) analysis - this analysis told us something
about “where to look” for that unexplained root. An I(2) analysis might also be useful in understanding why
the short-term parameters (the Γ matrices) exhibit some evidence of structural instability.
3.8 Conclusion
In this chapter, I argued that a cointegrated VAR may help us understand some of the outstanding issues
in research on the present value model. In particular, the CVAR approach is useful in examining the roles
played by structural change and persistence. It is also useful because it provides a more general way to
examine the cointegration properties of the data than the popular univariate methods, such as the Engle-
Granger test. I also advocated for examining relative stock prices, as such an approach may have several
119
advantages over an approach that examines strictly absolute prices. The results of this analysis are broadly
consistent with the present value model’s basic message - that prices are connected to fundamentals - but
it suggests that the standard version of the model is likely to be missing something. The evidence suggests
that Knightian uncertainty plays an important role, because structural change - unanticipated events - play
such a large role in movements of prices and dividends. Once we account for structural change, prices and
dividends cointegrate in a way that is consistent with the present value model; however, dividends appear to
adjust to this relation more than prices. This as well as the important role of structural change are consistent
with the idea that economists have the “wrong model” - forecasting strategies are connected to fundamentals,
but our models are not good representations of those strategies. The degree of persistence observed in the
data is somewhat more troubling for the present value model, but with some adaptations to the model we
may be able to reconcile this persistence with the basic intuition that prices are driven by fundamentals.
The findings suggest a logical next step in the research: I(2) analysis. Such an analysis would aid us in
understanding more about the sources of the persistence we observe in the data. A better understanding of
the sources of this persistence would help move the debate within the literature between behavioral finance
and the efficient markets hypothesis forward. It may even help resolve the dispute, or reconcile the role of
psychological factors with rational forecasting by market participants.
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Appendix 3: Further Description of the Sector Portfolios, Chapter 3
A full list of the SIC codes for each industry may be found by downloading the industry definitions avail-
able on Ken French’s website. Some examples, however, may illuminate the kinds of specific industries
that would be found in each portfolio. The “Consumer” sector, for example, includes 0134 (potato farm-
ing), 2047 (dog and cat food manufacturing), and 7623 (Appliance repair and maintenance), among many
others. “Manufacturing” includes 2522 (Office furniture manufacturing), 3711 (Automobile manufactur-
ing), and 4953 (Hazardous Waste treatment and disposal). “Hi-Tech” includes 3661 (Telephone apparatus
manufacturing), 7373 (computer systems design), and 8732 (Research and Development in biotechnology).
“Health” includes 2834 (pharmaceutical preparation manufacturing), 3841 (surgical and medical instrument
manufacturing), and 8011 (HMO medical centers). “Other” includes many unrelated industries not classified
elsewhere; among other things mines, hotels, entertainment, and finance are found in this sector.
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Appendix 4: Auto-correlations, Chapter 3
Figure 1: Autocorrelations: Market
Figure 2: Autocorrelations: Consumer
161
Figure 3: Autocorrelations: Manufacturing
Figure 4: Autocorrelations: Hi-Tech
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Figure 5: Autocorrelations: Health
Figure 6: Autocorrelations: Other
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Figure 7: Autocorrelations: Consumer/Manufacturing
Figure 8: Autocorrelations: Consumer/Hi-Tech, Sample 1
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Figure 9: Autocorrelations: Consumer/Hi-Tech, Sample 2
Figure 10: Autocorrelations: Consumer/Health
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Figure 11: Autocorrelations: Consumer/Other
Figure 12: Autocorrelations: Manufacturing/Hi-Tech, Subsample 1
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Figure 13: Autocorrelations: Manufacturing/Hi-Tech, Subsample 2
Figure 14: Autocorrelations: Manufacturing/Health
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Figure 15: Autocorrelations: Manufacturing/Other
Figure 16: Autocorrelations: Hi-Tech/Health
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Figure 17: Autocorrelations: Hi-Tech/Other
Figure 18: Autocorrelations: Health/Other
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Appendix 5: Test of Beta Constancy
Figure 19: Test of Constancy: Market
Figure 20: Test of Constancy: Consumer
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Figure 21: Test of Constancy: Hi-Tech
Figure 22: Test of Constancy: Health
171
Figure 23: Test of Constancy: Other
Figure 24: Test of Constancy: Consumer/Manufacturing
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Figure 25: Test of Constancy: Consumer/Hi-Tech, Sample 1
Figure 26: Test of Constancy: Consumer/Hi-Tech, Sample 2
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Figure 27: Test of Constancy: Consumer/Health
Figure 28: Test of Constancy: Consumer/Other
174
Figure 29: Test of Constancy: Manufacturing/Hi-Tech, Subsample 1
Figure 30: Test of Constancy: Manufacturing/Hi-Tech, Subsample 2
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Figure 31: Test of Constancy: Manufacturing/Health
Figure 32: Test of Constancy: Manufacturing/Other
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Figure 33: Test of Constancy: Hi-Tech/Health
Figure 34: Test of Constancy: Hi-Tech/Other
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Figure 35: Test of Constancy: Health/Other
Appendix 6: Roots of Companion Matrix
Figure 36: Companion Matrix Roots: Market
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Figure 37: Companion Matrix Roots: Consumer
Figure 38: Companion Matrix Roots: Manufacturing
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Figure 39: Companion Matrix Roots: Hi-Tech
Figure 40: Companion Matrix Roots: Health
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Figure 41: Companion Matrix Roots: Other
Figure 42: Companion Matrix Roots: Consumer/Manufacturing
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Figure 43: Companion Matrix Roots: Consumer/Hi-Tech, Sample 1
Figure 44: Companion Matrix Roots: Consumer/Hi-Tech, Sample 2
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Figure 45: Companion Matrix Roots: Consumer/Health
Figure 46: Companion Matrix Roots: Consumer/Other
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Figure 47: Companion Matrix Roots: Manufacturing/Hi-Tech, Subsample 1
Figure 48: Companion Matrix Roots: Manufacturing/Hi-Tech, Subsample 2
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Figure 49: Companion Matrix Roots: Manufacturing/Health
Figure 50: Companion Matrix Roots: Manufacturing/Other
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Figure 51: Companion Matrix Roots: Hi-Tech/Health
Figure 52: Companion Matrix Roots: Hi-Tech/Other
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Figure 53: Companion Matrix Roots: Health/Other
Appendix 7: Cointegrating Relations
Figure 54: Cointegrating Relation: Market
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Figure 55: Cointegrating Relation: Consumer
Figure 56: Cointegrating Relation: Manufacturing
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Figure 57: Cointegrating Relation: Hi-Tech
Figure 58: Cointegrating Relation: Health
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Figure 59: Cointegrating Relation: Other
Figure 60: Cointegrating Relation: Consumer/Manufacturing
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Figure 61: Cointegrating Relation: Consumer/Hi-Tech, Sample 1
Figure 62: Cointegrating Relation: Consumer/Hi-Tech, Sample 2
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Figure 63: Cointegrating Relation: Consumer/Health
Figure 64: Cointegrating Relation: Consumer/Other
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Figure 65: Cointegrating Relation: Manufacturing/Hi-Tech, Subsample 1
Figure 66: Cointegrating Relation: Manufacturing/Hi-Tech, Subsample 2
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Figure 67: Cointegrating Relation: Manufacturing/Health
Figure 68: Cointegrating Relation: Manufacturing/Other
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Figure 69: Cointegrating Relation: Hi-Tech/Health
Figure 70: Cointegrating Relation: Hi-Tech/Other
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Figure 71: Cointegrating Relation: Health/Other
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